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ABSTRACT
Ineffectiveness of prescription drugs, hidden drug hazards, and advertis-
ing violations have led to several drug recalls and numerous lawsuits against
pharmaceutical companies in recent years. These suits have involved several
varieties of medications, but psychoactive medications have figured especially
prominently. A recent $1.4 billion settlement by Eli Lilly & Company related
to improper promotion of its top-selling drug olanzapine included the largest
individual corporate criminal fine in U.S. history.
Improper promotion is far from the sole reason why olanzapine and
other "second-generation" antipsychotic (SGA) drugs have become so suc-
cessful. Rather, the widespread adoption of SGAs represents a collective
judgment error by the medical profession. For policymakers, the olanzapine
litigation is important because it provides an impetus for learning what makes
certain drugs successful and for understanding processes that determine medi-
cation choices, physicians' judgments, and expenditures for drugs. Litigation
will not solve problems with these processes, so understanding them is crucial
if regulatory agencies and other entities wish to avert future medical judgment
errors and suboptimal uses of healthcare dollars.
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To promote this understanding, we first describe the rapid switch from
older drugs to SGAs and summarize recent evidence suggesting that the
switch was improvident. We then review the lawsuits brought against Lilly,
which exemplify the many types of liability claims that drugs may generate.
We next describe marketing techniques that drug companies use to get physi-
cians to prescribe their products, the special features of SGAs that have con-
tributed to their huge success, and the ways that pharmaceutical companies
exercise virtually total control over the information doctors use to prescribe
drugs. Increased funding for independent, comparative effectiveness studies
and better incentives for pharmaceutical companies to generate and disclose
more information about their products' flaws might produce better medica-
tions, help physicians make better treatment decisions, and improve patient
safety.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, numerous popular press accounts have reported on inef-
fectiveness of prescription drugs,1 hidden drug hazards,2 drug recalls, 3 and
repeated violations of advertising regulations4 by pharmaceutical companies.
Other reports have described the methods that pharmaceutical sales forces
use to influence, "corrupt, ' 5 or "bribe ' 6 physicians who prescribe their prod-
ucts. These stories report on problems with several types of medications and
on marketing to practitioners of several medical specialties. But psychoactive
medications the types of drugs typically prescribed by psychiatrists to treat
mental disorders-have figured especially prominently in stories reporting
large judgments against pharmaceutical companies and unseemly links be-
tween physicians and commercial interests.
1. See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Study Reveals Doubt on Drug for Cholesterol, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2008, at Al, available at 2008 WLNR 786340 (apparent ineffectiveness of ezetimibe [Zetia®]).
2. See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, Report Backs Up Warnings About Drug Avandia and Heart Attack
Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 27, 2007, at A19, available at 2007 WLNR 14402147 (increased risk of
heart attacks related to rosiglitazone, a medication for diabetes).
3. See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, Studies Lead to Withdrawal of Drug for Bowel Ailment, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2007, at A12, available at 2007 WLNR 6102138 (prescription drug tegaserod
[Zelnorm®] removed from market).
4. See, e.g., Tom Murphy & Marley Seaman, Lily Settles Zyprexa Suit For $1.4 Bilon,
HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/14/lfly-said-to-
be-near-14 n 158032.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
5. Marcia Angell, 'Drug Companies & Doctors: An Exchange, N.Y. REV. BoOKS, Feb. 26,
2009 (reply to letter), availabk at http://www.nybooks.com/artides/22363 ( "[P]ervasive
conflicts of interest corrupt the medical profession, not in a criminal sense, but in the sense of
undermining the impartiality that is essential both to medical research and clinical practice.").
6. Carl Elliott, The Drug Pushers, ATANIC, Apr. 2006, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200604/drug-reps/3.
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For example, the recent settlement7 in which Eli Lilly & Company
agreed to pay $1.415 billion dollars in civil and criminal penalties related to
improper promotion of the psychotropic drug olanzapine 8 represented "a
record sum for so-called corporate whistle-blower cases" 9 and the largest in-
dividual corporate criminal fine in U.S. history.10 A recent book review illu-
strates how drug makers influence physicians using the behavior of three na-
tionally prominent psychiatrists" whose objectivity and ethics have been ques-
tioned following revelations about their extensive financial connections to
pharmaceutical firms.' 2
Popular press reports focus on events that are remarkable, sensational,
or extreme, and they often oversimplify outcomes of complex processes.
Litigation focuses on rectifying or punishing perceived wrongs by one party
against another, rather than on the various forces that induce the alleged mis-
behavior. Understandably then, published stories about drug litigation and
physicians' susceptibility to drug company blandishments typically paint a
picture of evil actions caused by moral turpitude. Drug makers and physicians
may deserve criticism and even vilification for some of their behavior, but
responses to their actions should not end with condemnation alone. Some
actions of drug companies have violated public trust, but violating public trust
cannot be these companies' main intent. Drug makers' self-interests lie in
selling good, safe, effective products, not bad ones. Similarly, a few doctors
may be amoral, evil, or corrupt, but the vast majority-including the many
physicians who have accepted meals, lecture fees, and other favors from drug
companies-want to better the lives and health of their patients.
7. See U.S. v. Eli Lilly and Co., http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/
docs/drugs/zyprexa1 1509guiltyplea.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
8. In accordance with the usual practices of academic publications, this article usually
refers to specific medications using their "genetic" or nonproprietary names (e.g., olanzapine),
rather than their trade names (e.g., Zyprexa®).
9. Gardiner Harris & Alex Berenson, Settlement Caled Near on Z)prexa, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
15, 2009, at BI, available at 2009 WLNR 773474. "The settlement resolves four qui tam actions
filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania: United States ex rel. Rudolf, et al., v. Eli Lilly and
Company, Civil Action No. 03-943 (E.D. Pa.); United States ex rel. Faltaous v. Eli Lilly and
Company, Civil Action No. 06-2909 (E.D. Pa.); United States ex rel. Woodward v. Dr. George
B. Jerusalem, et al., Civil Action No. 06-5526 (E.D. Pa.); and United States ex rel. Vicente v. Eli
Lilly and Company, Civil Action No. 07-1791 (E.D. Pa.)." Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Eli Lilly and Company Agrees to Pay $1.415 Billion to Resolve Allegations of Off-label Promo-
tion of Zyprexa (an. 15, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/January/09-
civ-038.html.
10. See U.S. Dep't ofJustice, supra note 9.
11. See Angell, shpra note 5 (discussing psychiatrists Joseph Biederman, Alan Schatzberg,
and Charles Nemerofo.
12. One such instance received front-page coverage in The New York Times. Gardiner
Harris, Top P, chiatrist Didn't Report Drug Makers' Pay, Files Show, N.Y. TINEs, Oct. 4, 2008, at Al,
available at 2008 WLNR 18884180 (reporting that, in 2000 - 2007, "One of the nation's most
influential psychiatrists," Dr. Nemeroff, "earned more than $2.8 million in consulting arrange-
ments with drug makers" that he did not report to his employer, Emory University).
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This article provides legal audiences with a detailed examination of the
uses and prescribing patterns of olanzapine and other "second-generation"
antipsychotic (SGA) medications, 13 a group of drugs which, since their intro-
duction in the 1990s, have come to account for a huge share of all money
spent on all pharmaceuticals.' 4 This huge market success is not justified by
markedly superior treatment results; older and cheaper medications might do
just as well (or poorly).
Though Eli Lilly may have improperly promoted olanzapine, improper
promotion is far from the sole reason why olanzapine and other SGAs have
become so successful. Rather, the widespread adoption of SGAs represents a
collective judgment error by the medical profession, something that litigation
has very limited power to remedy. Legal audiences need to understand that
sensational reports about drug company fines and physicians' dubious actions
arise from a larger context in which salesmanship has acquired a dominant
role in determining medical practice and patient/consumer choices about
treatment. For policymakers, the potential value of the olanzapine litigation is
that the drug's success offers a window into the complex, interacting
processes that influence medication use, medical decision-making, treatment
choices, and expenditures for all kinds of drugs. An accurate understanding
of these processes is crucial if regulatory agencies and funding entities wish to
develop mechanisms and processes that might avert future mass medical
judgment errors and suboptimal uses of healthcare dollars.
We proceed as follows. In Part II, we review the introduction into the
American pharmacopeia of two waves of antipsychotic medication, describe
why psychiatrists switched from the first to the second type, and summarize
recent evidence that suggests that the switch was improvident. In Part III, we
summarize the olanzapine-related litigation brought against the drug's manu-
facturer, which exemplifies the various legal claims for which product liability
suits can be brought. In Part IV, we describe the costly but successful mar-
keting techniques that drug companies have used to get physicians to pre-
scribe their products. We also describe several other factors that have been
crucial to the huge success of SGAs. In Part V, we show why pharmaceutical
companies enjoy virtually total control of the information practicing physi-
cians use in prescribing medications. We suggest that enhanced funding for
independent drug studies and incentives for pharmaceutical companies to
generate and disclose more information about their products' flaws might
produce better medications, help physicians make better treatment decisions,
and improve patient safety.
13. We explain the meaning of "generation" infra note 62. The first - and second - genera-
tion antipsychotic medications are discussed in Part II.
14. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
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II. FIRST- AND SECOND-GENERATION ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS 15
Olanzapine is one of several medications 16 that physicians call "anti-
psychotic drugs" and that physicians have used since the 1950s' 7 to treat psy-
choses. A psychosis is
a mental disorder characterized by gross impairment in reality testing
as evidenced by delusions, hallucinations, markedly incoherent
speech, or disorganized and agitated behavior, usually without appar-
ent awareness on the part of the patient of the incomprehensibility of
his behavior.'
8
Psychoses, or psychotic disorders, are a group of psychiatric syndromes
each of which reflects "different aspects of the various definitions of p.yychot-
ic."' Psychotic symptoms occur in several mental disorders, 20 and antipsy-
chotic drugs have varying levels of effectiveness in quelling manifestations of
these conditions. Because of their mood-stabilizing and anti-anxiety proper-
ties, antipsychotic drugs can also ameliorate conditions in which psychotic
15. This section focuses on the medical features of these medications. For a summary of
legal contexts in which antipsychotic drugs figure importantly, see Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling
the "Chemical Straip/acket": The Legal Significance of Recent Advances in the Pharmacological Treatment of
Psychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1033, 1035-37 (2002) (discussing legal categories and citing
main cases); see also Sell v. U.S., 539 U.S. 166, 180-81 (2003) (describing conditions under which
involuntary medication to restore trial competence is permissible, and noting that "[d]ifferent
kinds of antipsychotic drugs may produce different side effects and enjoy different levels of
success').
16. Generic names of other antipsychotic medications mentioned in this article include
fluphenazine, perphenazine, trifluoperazine, haloperidol, loxapine, molindone, thiothixene,
clozapine, risperidone, olanzapine, quetiapine, ziprasidone, and aripiprazole.
17. The first of these drugs was chlorpromazine, more commonly known by its proprie-
tary name, Thorazine®. Its discovery and initial use is mentioned in Williams v. U.S., 133 F.
Supp. 319, 322 (E.D. Va. 1955) (noting "an interesting article appearing in Time magazine
(March 7, 1955) involving the use of new drugs referred to as chlorpromazine and reserpine
which have been very effective in certain types of schizophrenia cases.").
18. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1489 (29th ed. 2000) [hereinafter
DORLAND'S]. A delusion is:
a false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained
despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontroverti-
ble and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily ac-
cepted by other members of the person's culture or subculture (e.g., it is not an article
of religious faith).
Am. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR MENTAL DISORDERS 821
(4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR. A hallucination is "[al sensory perception
that has the compelling sense of reality of a true perception but that occurs without external
stimulation of the relevant sensory organ." Id. at 823.
19. Id. at 827.
20. A partial list: psychotic disorders caused by general medical conditions, id. at 334-38;
psychotic disorders induced by medications or intoxicants, id. at 338-43; schizophreniform
disorder, id. at 317-19; schizoaffective disorder, id. at 319-23; mood disorders with psychotic
features, id. at 411-17; delusional disorder, id. at 323-29; and brief psychotic disorder, id. at 329-
32.
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symptoms do not occur, including manic episodes, refractory depression, de-
mentia with severe agitation, and severe anxiety.2 1 In several cases, drugs first
approved for treatment of psychoses have received subsequent approval for
treatment of other psychiatric conditions.22
For simplicity of exposition, we focus here on the role of antipsychotic
medications in treating schizophrenia. Schizophrenia is a logical choice for
three reasons. First, recent advances in understanding schizophrenia typify
psychiatrists' current thinking about many severe mental disorders. Second,
schizophrenia frequently is the principal condition for which new antipsychot-
ic drugs undergo efficacy testing prior to receiving FDA approval. 23 Third,
the clinical manifestations of schizophrenia-that is, the types of symptoms
experienced and the signs of illness exhibited by persons with the disorder-
make it a paradigmatic instance of the role that pharmacotherapy plays in the
treatment of a psychotic disorder.
A. Schizophrenia
Schizophrenia affects approximately 1 out of 200 persons, 24 and usually
makes its appearance in a person's late teenage years or young adulthood.
The classic signs of schizophrenia are hallucinations, delusions, and disorga-
nized speech or behavior.25 Over the last two decades, however, it has be-
come increasingly clear that impaired cognition, loss of emotionality, dimi-
nished speech production, and reduced initiative explain much of the disabili-
ty caused by schizophrenia. 26
21. JERROLD F. ROSENBAUM ET AL., HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRIC DRUG THERAPY 17, 23-
25 (5th ed. 2005).
22. We discuss the use of newer antipsychotic drugs to treat other conditions infra Part.
II.D.3.
23. See, e.g., Guy Chouinard et al., A Canadian Multicenter Placebo-Controlled Study ofFixed
Doses of Riipedone and Haloperidol in the Treatment of Chronic Schizophrenic Patients, 13 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 25, 35 (1993) (reporting results of pre-approval study); Charles M.
Beasley, Jr. et al., Olanzapine Versus Placebo and Haloperidol: Acute Phase Results of the North American
Double-Blind Olanzapine Trial, 14 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 111, 114-20 (1996) (reporting
pre-marketing results in patients with schizophrenia).
24. Dinesh Bhugra, The Global Prevalence of Schizophrenia, 2 PUB. LIBR. SC. MED. 372, 372
(2005), available at
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pmed.0020151 (citing study
results of 0.0046 for point prevalence, 0.0033 for period prevalence, and 0.0072 for lifetime
morbid risk).
25. Psychiatrists often call these "positive" symptoms because they involve the presence
of something pathological. Schizophrenia may be diagnosed when an individual has expe-
rienced positive symptoms for six months or longer and has undergone marked deterioration in
his social or occupational functioning, provided that the diagnostician can rule out other condi-
tions--including medical conditions, intoxicants, and mood disorders that might be potential
causes of the symptoms. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 18, at 299, 312.
26. See, e.g., Victoria Villalta-Gil et al., Neurocognitive Performance and Negative Symptoms: Are
They Equal in Explaning Disability in Schizophrenia Oupatients? 87 SCIuzoPHRENIA RES. 246, 246
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Like most mental disorders, schizophrenia is an illness with biological,
psychological, and social causes. Evidence of substantial biological causation
includes:
e rates of schizophrenia among relatives that suggest a substantial
genetic contribution to the illness; 27
e gene variations that influence the probability of developing schi-
zophrenia;2
8
* seasonal variation, i.e., people born in winter or spring are more
likely to develop schizophrenia;29
* the impact of in uterv exposure to certain infections; 3
0
" the ability of cannabis to trigger the onset of schizophrenia;31
" the capacity of some pharmaceuticals to induce symptoms that
mimic schizophrenia in persons who do not have the disorder;32
* differences in brain configurations33 and neural activity34 among
people diagnosed with schizophrenia;
("Negative symptoms are the major source of disability of our sample."). These features are
termed "negative" symptoms because they reflect the absence of normal psychological features.
27. See, e.g., Alastair G. Cardno & Irving I. Gottesman, Twin Studies of Schizophrenia: From
Bow-and-Arrow Concordances to Star Wars Mx and Functional Genomics, 97 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 12,
13 (2000) (high concordance in monozygotic twins; lower but substantial concordance in dizy-
gotic twins; heritability estimates of 80-85%); Judy L Thompson et al., Indicators of Genetic Liabili-
t to SchiZophrenia: A Sibling Study of Neuropsychological Performance, 31 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 85, 85
(2005) (studies of twins and adoptions show that genes play a major role in causing schizophre-
nia).
28. See, e.g., Xiao-Wei Chen et al., DINBP1, a Schizophrenia "usceptibilioy Gene, Affects Kinetics
of Transmitter Release, 181 J. CELL BIOLOGY 791, 798-99 (2008) (schizophrenia-dysbindin gene
link offers possible causal mechanism for the illness).
29. Geoffrey Davies et al., A Syitematic Review and Meta-Anaysis of Nortbern Hemisphere Season
of Birth Studies in SchiZophrenia, 29 SCI-IIZOPHRENIA BULL. 587, 588 (2003) (excess risk for win-
ter/spring births).
30. Alan S. Brown, Prenatal Infection as a Risk Factor for SchiZophrenia, 32 SCHIZOPHRENIA
Bu.i. 200, 200-01 (2006) (prenatal rubella, influenza, and toxoplasmosis associated with schi-
zophrenia).
31. Sven Andr~asson et al., Cannabis and SchiZophrenia: A Longtudinal Study of Swedish Con-
scripts, 330 LANCET 1483, 1484 (1987) (heightened risk for schizophrenia among cannabis us-
ers); Stephen M. Eggan et al., Reduced Cortical Cannabinoid 1 Receptor Messenger RNA and Protein
Expression in Schizopbrenia, 65 ARCHIVES Or GEN. PSYCHIATRY 772, 779-83 (2008) (relationship
between marijuana and schizophrenia may stem from fewer cannabinoid receptors); Louisa
Degenhardt & Wayne Hall, Is Cannabis Use a Contributoy Cause of Pychosis? 51 CAN. J.
PSYCHIATRY 556, 563 (2006) (marijuana use can precipitate schizophrenia in biologically vulner-
able persons).
32. Adrienne C. Lahti et al., Effects of Ketamine in Normal and Schizophrenic Volunteers, 25
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 455, 463-65 (2001) (in normal persons, ketamine causes short-
term psychotic symptoms like those of schizophrenia).
33. Laura A. Flashman & Michael F. Green, Review of Cognition and Brain Structure in Schi-
zophrenia: Profiles, Longitudinal Course, and Effects of Treatment, 27 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AMER. 1,
3-4 (2004) (reviewing many studies examining neuroanatomy of schizophrenia).
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9 the impact of medications--especially drugs that block the brain's
dopamine D 2 receptor-on some symptoms of schizophrenia.
35
Though biological factors create individual vulnerability, social and indi-
vidual psychological factors influence the risk of developing schizophrenia
and the impact of the illness:
* urban settings, poverty, and minority status increase the risk of de-
veloping schizophrenia; 36
* childhood abuse or trauma influences the severity of schizophrenia
later;37
* unsupportive family relationships increase risk for relapse follow-
ing an episode of psychosis; 38
e impaired capacity to appreciate one's own and other persons' men-
tal states adversely affects social competence of persons with schi-
zophrenia;39
* depressed mood, low self-esteem, and negative attitudes correlate
with severe, preoccupying persecutory delusions;40
e some symptoms of schizophrenia can be viewed as biased cogni-
tive or emotional states and may be amenable to verbal therapies.
41
Contemporary psychiatry's view of schizophrenia reflects the perspective
of Eugen Bleuler, a Swiss psychiatrist who coined the term "schizophrenias"
34. Heather C. Whalley et al., Correlations Between JMRJ Activation and Individual Psychotic
Symptoms in Un-medicated Subjects at High Genetic Risk of Schizophrenia, 7 BMC PSYCHIATRY 61, 69
(2007) (altered lateral temporal cortex functioning related to hallucinations; altered medial tem-
poral lobe function related to other psychotic symptoms).
35. H.M. Jones & L.S. Pilowsky, Dopamine andAntipsychotic Drug Action Revisited, 181 BRIT.
J. PSYCHIATRY 271, 271-73 (20Q2) (noting that all effective antipsychotics block dopamine D2
receptors to some degree, and discussing abnormal dopamine transmission in schizophrenia).
36. Jim van Os, The Schizophrenia Envirome, 18 CURRENT OPINION PSYCHIATRY 141 (2005)
(discussing evidence for increased risk and suggesting biological pathways that may mediate or
transmit impact of environment).
37. Lindsay S. Schenkel et al., Histories of Childhood Maltreatment in Schizophrenia: Relationships
with Premorbid Functioning, Symptomatolog, and Cognitive Deficts, 76 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 273, 281,
283 (2005) (childhood maltreatment influences specific forms of cognitive dysfunction).
38. Ronald L. Butzlaff & Jill M. Hooley, Expressed Emotion and Psychiatric Relapse: A Meta-
Anaysis, 55 ARCHIvEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 547, 549, tbl. 1, 551 (1998) (synthesizing results from
twenty-seven studies of expressed emotion).
39. Martin Briine et al., Mental State Attribution, Neurocognitive Functionin and Psychopathology:
What Predicts Poor Social Competence in Schizophrenia Best? 92 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 151, 152, 158
(2007).
40. Ben Smith et al., Emotion and Psychosis: Links Between Depression, Self-Esteem, Negative
Schematic Bels and Delusions and Hallucinations, 86 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 181, 185-86 (2006).
41. Aaron T. Beck, A Cognitive Model of Schizophrenia, 18 J. COGN. PSYCHOTHERAPY 281
(2004).
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early in the twentieth century. 42 The term's Greek roots, schiZein and phren,43
connote a mind divided or torn apart, or, as Bleuler put it, a "splitting of the
psychic functions." 44 For the past century, psychiatrists have used "schizoph-
renia" to denote a severe, debilitating disorder characterized by a pervasive
impairment in thinking, behavior, and interpersonal relationships.45 Modern
psychiatrists still endorse Bleuler's approach to understanding schizophrenia
because of its emphasis on "an underlying cognitive process" rather than of-
ten variable outward manifestations. 46
In the current U.S. diagnostic system, schizophrenia is divided into five
subtypes. Persons with the paranoid subtype retain normal displays of emo-
tion, and their speech, behavior, and thinking are usually organized and cohe-
rent.47 When symptomatic, however, they typically have delusions of persecu-
tion and fear potential harm by their putative persecutors. 48 The other four
subtypes of schizophrenia usually are much more disabling, and noncinicians
often recognize that sufferers with these subtypes of schizophrenia suffer
from severe mental problems. In disorganized schizophrenia, persons exhibit
disorganized speech and behavior, along with inappropriate emotional res-
ponses. Persons with catatonic schizophrenia have motor immobility, stupor,
rigid posturing, mutism, stereotyped and repetitive movements, and/or exces-
sive-but-poorly-organized activity ("catatonic excitement"). Persons with
undifferentiated schizophrenia hallucinate and have disorganized thinking and
lack initiative or interest in extended, determined activity. Individuals with
residual schizophrenia display reduced verbal production, initiative, and im-
42. EUGEN BLEUiLER, DFMENTIA PRAFCOX OR THE GROuP OF SCHIZOPHRENIAS 8 (Joseph
Zinkin trans., Int'l U. Press 1950) (1911). The plural form "schizophrenias"-
"schizophrenien" in German-reflects the multiple manifestations of the illness.
43. 2 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGISH DICTIONARY 2159, 2664 (1989).
44. BLEULER, supra note 42, at 9-10. His description, which still rings true, continues:
In every case we are confronted with a more or less clear-cut splitting of the psychic
functions .... Often ideas are only partially worked out, and fragments of ideas are
connected in an illogical way to constitute a new idea.
This results in associations which normal individuals will regard as incorrect, bizarre,
and utterly unpredictable. Often thinking stops in the middle of a thought; or in the at-
tempt to pass to another idea, it may suddenly cease altogether, at least as far as it is a
conscious process (blocking). Instead of continuing the thought, new ideas crop up
which neither the patient nor the observer can bring into any connection with the pre-
vious stream of thought.
In the severest cases emotional and affective expressions seem to be completely lack-
ing.
Id. at 9-10.
45. Susan K. Schultz & Nancy C. Andreasen, SchiZopbrenia, 353 LANCFT 1425,1425 (1999).
46. Nancy C. Andreasen, A Unitary Model of Scbigophrenia: Bkuer's 'Fragmented Pbrene" as
Schizoencepha#, 56 ARCHiVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 781, 782 (1999).
47. That is, the form of their thoughts and behavior are normal. The content of their
thoughts can be quite irrational, and their actions may be motivated by delusional ideas.
48. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 18, at 299, 312-13.
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paired motivation, though they do not experience pronounced delusions or
hallucinations. 49
Although schizophrenia manifests itself in disturbances of thought and
action, Bleuler conceptualized the condition as a medical disorder-he
thought schizophrenia could be understood by cataloging patients' signs,
symptoms, clinical course, and ultimate outcomes.5 0 By the end of the twen-
tieth century, scientific evidence had provided overwhelming support for this
viewpoint.51 Psychiatrists now recognize that persons with schizophrenia do
not act irrationaly because they have unusual, socially inappropriate, or crazy
beliefs. Rather, these symptoms reflect the underlying core problem in schi-
zophrenia, which is malfunctioning brain circuitry.5 2
Evidence that has accumulated over decades shows that schizophrenia is
a brain-based condition that can be addressed effectively, though not cured,
with pharmacological agents5 3 that alter neuronal5 4 functioning. By continuing
to take antipsychotic medication after initial remission of symptoms, persons
with schizophrenia can greatly reduce their risk of having a relapse of symp-
toms. 55 Research also shows that individual psychotherapy, behavioral treat-
49. Id. at 313-17.
50. For a short description of Bleuler's contributions to the modern conception of schi-
zophrenia, see J. Hoenig, The Concept of Schizophrenia: Kraepelin-Bleuler-Schneider, 142 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 547, 549-52 (1983).
51. For a discussion of the various perspectives extant in the 1960s, see Mossman, supra
note 15, at 1047-48 (reviewing viewpoints).
52. As psychiatrist Nancy Andreasen observes,
[tihe symptoms and signs of schizophrenia are very diverse, and they encompass the
entire range of human mental activity.... These symptoms and signs occur in patterns
that may not overlap; one patient may have hallucinations and affective flattening, whe-
reas another has disorganized speech and avolition [lack of motivation]. The diversity
and nonoverlapping pattern of symptoms and signs suggest a more basic and unifying
problem: abnormalities in neural circuits and fundamental cognitive mechanisms.
Nancy C. Andreasen, Understanding the Causes of Schizophrenia, 340 NEw ENG. J. MED. 645, 646
(1999).
For additional discussion of the significance of this shift in perspective, see Mossman,
supra note 15, at 1056-59 (discussing current conceptualization of schizophrenia as malfunction-
ing neurocircuitry).
53. For a summary of early research, see general# Jonathan 0. Cole et al., Phenothiazne
Treatment in Acute Schizophrenia, 10 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 246 (1964). For more recent
summaries concerning older antipsychotic medications, see generall John M. Davis et al., Impor-
tant Issues in the Drug Treatment of Schizophrenia, 6 SCHIZOPHRENIA BuLL. 70 (1980); andJohn M.
Kane, Treatment of SchiZophrenia, 13 SCHIZOPHRENIA BuLL. 133 (1987) (noting both pooling and
summarizing studies showing that antipsychotic drugs are effective for approximately seventy
percent of patients in acute episodes of schizophrenia).
54. The word "neuronal" means "pertaining to a neuron or neurons." DORLAND'S, supra
note 18, at 1212. Neurons are "the conducting cells of the nervous system." Id. at 1211.
55. See, e.g., Patricia L. Gilbert et al., Neuroleptic Withdrawal in SchiZophrenic Patients: A Review
of the literature, 52 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 173, 184, tbl. 2 (1995) (after 9.7 months, pa-
tients who continued to take antipsychotic drugs had 16% relapse rate; 53% of patients not
taking medication relapsed); Delbert Robinson et al., Predictors of Relapse Following Response From a
HeinOnline -- 13 Mich. St. U. J. Med. & L. 273 2009
274 13 MSU JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND LAW 263 (2009)
ments, and family therapy are very useful; these nonpharmacological interven-
tions help many patients and their families cope with the consequences of
schizophrenia and reduce symptoms that medication alone does not com-
pletely alleviate.56 However, antipsychotic medication is the "mainstay" of
current treatment for schizophrenia. 57
B. Development of "First-Generation" Antipsychotic Drugs
Symptoms of psychotic disorders were recognized in antiquity,58 but ef-
fective and specific pharmacological treatments for these conditions only be-
First Episode of Schizophrenia or Schizoaffective Disorder, 56 ARCHIvEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 241, 245
(1999) (stopping antipsychotic medication therapy hazard increased ratio for relapse by almost
5 times).
The relapse studies generally refer to recurrence of delusions, hallucinations, and dis-
organized thought. These are often termed "positive symptoms" because they involve the
presence of abnormal clinical findings or "distortions of normal functioning." Samuel J. Keith,
Pharmacoloc Advances in the Treatment of Schizophrenia, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 851, 851 (1997).
By contrast, the "negative symptoms" of schizophrenia-social withdrawal and apathy-
involve the absence of normal findings or "the loss of normal functioning." Id. Relapse studies
focus primarily on reduction and control of positive symptoms; negative symptoms are much
less responsive to medication.
56. See, e.g., Sukhwinder S. Shergill et al, Auditogy Hallucinations: A Review of Psychological
Treatments, 32 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 137, 143, 147 (1998); Dennis G. Dyck et al., Management of
Negative Symptoms Among Patients with Schizophrenia Attending Multiple Famiy Groups, 51
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 513, 513-14 (2000) (multifamily educational groups reduce negative
symptoms).
57. For years, medical publications have consistently referred to antipsychotic medications
as the "mainstay" of schizophrenia treatment. See, e.g., Kane, supra note 53, at 133 ("Antipsy-
chotic medication remains a mainstay of treatment in both acute and chronic schizophrenia");
Robin McCreadie, Schizophrenia: What's New?, 6 ADVANCES PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 81, 81
(2000) ("Drugs have always been a mainstay of treatment of schizophrenia"); Mahesh B. Jaya-
ram et al., Risperidone Versus Olanzpine for Treatment of Schizophrenia, 33 SCHIZOPHRENIA BuLL.
1274, 1274 (2007) ("Antipsychotic medication is a mainstay of treatment for schizophrenia');
DAVID GILL &JENNIFER BARRACLOUGH, HUGHES' OUTLINE OF MODERN PSYCHIATRY 61 (5th
ed. 2007) ("Antipsychotic drugs remain the mainstay of treatment"); and Peter B. Jones et al.,
Randomized Controlled Tnal of the Effect on Qualiv of Lift of Second- vs First-Generation Antipychotic
Drugs in Schizophrenia: Cost Utility of the Latest Anipychotic Drugs in Schizophrenia Study (CUtLASS
1), 63 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1079, 1079 (2006) ("Antipsychofic drugs have been the
mainstay of schizophrenia treatment for almost 50 years.").
58. See, e.g., 1 Samuel 21:11-22:1, which describes David's successful effort to feign a se-
vere mental disorder. The account, whether factually true or not, implies that madness was
recognized at the time of Saul or at the latest when the books of Samuelwere set down. Current
biblical scholarship places Saul's reign in the latter half of the eleventh century B.C.E., 10 NEW
ENCYC. BRITANNICA 475 (15th ed. 1998), and places the writing of I Samuel in the sixth century
B.C.E., id. at 382.
See also THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PUBLISHING TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 408
(Robert E. Hales et al., eds. 2007) (citing recent authors who believe that what we now call
schizophrenia was widely recognized by the first century C.E.); FREDERICK K. GOODWIN ET
AL., MANIC-DEPRESSIVE IILNESS: BIPOLAR DISORDERS AND RECURRENT DEPRESSION 3-5 (2nd
ed. 2007) (reviewing ancient descriptions of severe mental illness).
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came available in the 1950s, when scientists and clinicians recognized that
chlorpromazine alleviated symptoms of psychosis.5 9 Within just a few years,
pharmaceutical companies had produced several other phenothiazine deriva-
tives60 and other medications with different chemical structures but similar
actions. 61
Until this "first generation" 62 of antipsychotic drugs became available,
"most individuals with schizophrenia were destined to spend their entire adult
lives within large, often remote psychiatric hospitals. '63 In 1955, U.S. state
mental hospitals housed more than 550,000 persons,64 many of whom had
psychotic disorders. Many patients spent years or decades at these facilities
living in wretched conditions. Today, fewer than 55,000 persons are commit-
59. Chlorpromazine is the nonproprietary (or "generic') name of a compound better
known by its trade name, Thorazine®. Medline Plus Drug Information, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/
medlineplus/print/druginfo/medmaster/a682040.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2009). For a fasci-
nating account of the success, impact, and marketing of chlorpromazine in the 1950s, see ANN
BRADEN JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM: THE TRUTH ABOUT DEINSTITUTIONAuZATION 40-52
(1990).
60. Phenothiazine antipsychotic drugs all share a basic tricyclic structure. ROSENBAUM ET
AL., supra note 21, at 6. Among the better known phenothiazines are fluphenazine (marketed as
Prolixin®), perphenazine (marketed as Trilafon®), and trifluoperazine (marketed as Stela-
zine®).
61. In the 1980s, commonly prescribed non-phenothiazine antipsychotic compounds
included haloperidol (Haldol®), loxapine (Loxitane®), molindone (Moban®), and thiothixene
(Navane®). ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 21, at 9-10. Though older antipsychotic drugs
differ in potengy (and therefore in their typical dosages), "each ... has been found to be equally
effective in treating psychotic disorders." Id. at 8.
62. Pharmacologists and physicians often describe phases in drug development as "gener-
ations." See, e.g., Johannes G. Ramaekers, Behavioural Toxiciy of Medicinal Drugs: Practical Conse-
quences, Incidence, Management andAvoidance, 18 DRUG SAFETY 189, 195-96, 199-202 (1998) (refer-
ring to generations of antidepressants, antipsychotic drugs, and antihistamines); Lorenzo Drago
& Elena De Vecchi, The Safeo of Cefepime in the Treatment of Infection, 7 EXPERT OPINION ON
DRUG SAFETY 377, 377 (2008) (referring to an antibiotic, cefepime, as a "fourth-generation
cephalosporin").
In the 1990s, it was common to contrast "standard," "conventional," "typical," or
"traditional" antipsychotics-that is, the antipsychotic drugs used in the U.S. before the late
1980s-with "newer," "novel," or "atypical" antipsychotics that had just come into use. The
appellations "first-generation" and "second-generation" were first applied to antipsychotic
drugs around the turn of the present century. See, e.g., Hubert H. Fernandez & Joseph H.
Friedman, The Role of Agjpical Anoychoics in the Treatment of Movement Disorders, 11 CNS DRUGS
467, 476 (1999) (one of the first articles that refers to "first-generation antipsychotics'); and
Eric T. Edgell et al., Olan!apine versus Riperidone: A Prospective Comparison of Clnical and Economic
Outcomes in Schizophrenia, 18 PHARMACOECONOMICS 567, 568 (2000) (describing and contrasting
"first-generation" and "second-generation" antipsychotic medications).
63. Donald C. Goff, A 23-Year-Old Man With Schizophrenia, 287 J. AM. MED. AsS'N 3249,
3253-54 (2002).
64. H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, Persons With Severe Mental Illness in Jails and
Prisons: A Review, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 483, 486 (1998) (stating that 559,000 patients were
in state psychiatric hospitals in 1955).
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ted to state and county psychiatric hospitals. 65 Though several factors have
reduced the census of public sector hospitals,66 "the new drugs made the
wholesale removal of patients from hospitals imaginable and then possible."67
As a 1961 report by the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health put it,
'Unquestionably, the drugs have delivered the greatest blow for patient free-
dom, in terms of nonrestraint, since Pinel struck off the chains of the lunatics
in the Paris asylum 168 years ago."' 68
C. Limitations of Early Antipsychotic Drugs
Though it was quickly apparent that first-generation antipsychotics
(FGA) quelled psychosis, what these compounds did-why they helped-was
not clear. One hypothesis, which suggested that schizophrenia resulted from
excessive dopamine,69 drew support from findings that high doses of drugs
that increase brain levels of dopamine mimic some symptoms of schizophre-
nia.70 Also, the potency of FGAs was directly proportional to their blockade
of the brain's dopamine D 2 receptor.7' Over subsequent decades, however, it
65. GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS 328 (3d ed.
2007). In 1955, the U.S. population numbered 166 million. 1955,
http://www.infoplease.com/year/1955.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2008). In 2007, the U.S
population was estimated at 301,621,157. Factfinder, http://factfinder.census.gov/ serv-
let/SAFFPopulation (last visited Nov. 16, 2008). Thus, over 50 years, the U.S. per capita rate
of public sector psychiatric hospitalization fell nearly ninety-five percent, from 3.3 to 0.18 per-
sons per 1,000 population.
66. In 1963, Congress passed the Community Mental Health Centers Act, which recog-
nized that community services was a preferable treatment alternative for many mentally ill
persons. In the 1970s, Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security laws created financial support
for mentally ill persons to receive community-based care; also, new civil commitment laws
made involuntary psychiatric hospitalization contingent on dangerous behavior rather than
need for treatment. In the 1990s, managed care organizations used financial pressures to get
physicians to shorten hospitalizations. See Mossman, supra note 15, at 1087.
67. JOHNSON, supra note 59, at 45-46.
68. Id. at 46, quoting JOINT COMMISSION ON MENTAL ILLNESS AND HEALTH, ACTION FOR
MENTAL HEALTH 39 (1961).
69. See Arvid Carlsson & Margit Lindqvist, Effect ofChlorpmmaine and Halopeiidol on Forma-
tion of 3-Methoxyyramine and Normetanpheine in Mouse Brain, 20 ACrA PHARMACOLOGICA ET
TOxiCOLOGICA 140 (1963) (finding that after administration of antipsychotic drugs, extracellu-
lar dopamine was not increased, but its metabolites were, which suggested that the drugs
blocked dopamine receptors and activated feedback pathways); GOODMAN AND GIIiMAN'S THE
P-ARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 389 (7th ed. 1985).
70. Id. at 168, 553-54. See also Yoshimoto Sekine et al., Methamphetamine-Related Pychiatric
Symptoms and Reduced Brain Dopamine Transporters Studied with PET, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1206
(2001) (discussing the long-term impact of methamphetamine on dopamine transporter density,
and its relationship to psychotic symptoms).
71. Aspects of the dopamine hypothesis remain valid. For confirmatory findings from
brain imaging studies, see Anissa Abi-Dargham et al., Increased Baseline Occupangy of D2 Receptors by
Dopamine in Scbizophrenia, 97 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. U.S. 8104, 8109 (2000) (also showing
"direct in vivo evidence that schizophrenia is associated with excessive stimulation of D2 recep-
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was recognized that other types of drugs-including phencyclidine (PCP) and
the anesthetic ketamine-could induce psychoses even though these drugs
have little direct effect on brain dopamine activity. 72 Also, psychiatrists rec-
ognized that "negative" symptoms-deficits in interest in surroundings, vo-
lume of communication, and social relationships 3-- often influenced the
long-term functioning of persons with schizophrenia far more than the posi-
tive symptoms--delusions and hallucinations-that high doses of dopaminer-
gic drugs could induce.7 4 Indeed, negative symptoms also seemed related to a
relative lack of dopamine activity in some areas of the brain.75
tors by dopamine [as opposed to excess dopamine simplititet], and that this dysregulation is
predictive of good treatment response to antipsychotic drugs."); Oliver D. Howes et al., Ek-
vated Striatal Dopamine Function linked to Prodromal Signs of Schizophrenia, 66 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 13, 18 (2009) (dopaminergic abnormality particularly evident in the associative
striatum, which regulates information flow to and from the prefrontal cortex; this provides a
plausible link to prefrontal dysfunction in schizophrenia and indicates why dopamine-blocking
drugs attenuate symptoms of prodromal schizophrenia).
72. In 1979, the ability of ketamine and phencyclidine to mimic psychoses was found to
be related to interaction by the drugs with a unique receptor; once bound to this receptor,
phencyclidine is not displaced by dopamine or other chemically similar neurotransmitters. J. P.
Vincent et al., Interaction of Phenyclidine ("Angel Dust") n'ith a Specific Receptor in Rat Brain Membranes,
76 PRoC. NAT'L ACAD. Sc. U.S. 4678, 4678 (1979); S. R. Zukin & R. S. Zukin, Specific
13H]Phenyclidine Binding in Rat Central Nervous System, 76 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. U.S. 5372, 5372
(1979). For this reason, antipsychotic drugs do not reverse the psychotic symptoms induced by
phencycidine. For a recent study comparing and distinguishing the actions of ketanine and
phencyclidine, see Wulf Hevers et al., Ketamine, But Not Phenyclidine, Selectivey Modulates Cerebellar
GABAA Receptors Containing a6 and & Subunits, 28 J. NEUROSCIENCE 5383, 5389-91 (2008) (both
induce analgesia, psychosis-like behavior, and a catatonic unconsciousness, but ketamine's
better anesthetic properties relate to unique actions on specific receptors).
73. One of the first articles to contrast positive and negative symptoms states, "Positive
schizophrenia is characterized by prominent delusions, hallucinations, positive formal thought
disorder, and persistently bizarre behavior; negative schizophrenia, by affective flattening, alo-
gia, avolition, anhedonia, and attenfional impairment." Nancy C. Andreasen & Scott Olsen,
Negative v. Positive ScbiZophrenia: Definition and Validation, 39 ARCHIvEs GEN. PSYC-ItATRY 789,
789 (1982).
74. Wayne S. Fenton & Thomas H. McGlashan, Antecedents, Symptom Progression, and Long-
Term Outcome of the Deficit Syndrome in Schizophrenia, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 351, 351 (1994) (defi-
cits associated with poor outcomes and disability); Wayne S. Fenton & Thomas H. McGlashan,
Natural Histoy of Schizophrenia Subypes. 17. Positive and Negative Symptoms and Long Term Course, 48
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 978, 978 (1991) (negative symptoms are linked to poorer func-
tioning prior to onset of illness and a "progressive course leading to permanent disability").
75. See David Pickar et al., Neurochemical and Neural Mechanisms of Positive and Negative Symp-
toms in Schizophrenia, in 24 MODERN PROBLEMS OF PHARMACOPSYCHIATRY 124-51 (Nancy C.
Andreasen ed., 1990) (linking deficit symptoms to functional frontal dopamine dysfunction);
Terry E. Goldberg et al., Cognitive and Behavioral Effects of the Coadministration of Dextroamphetamine
and Haloperidol in Schizophrenia, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 78, 78, 81-82 (1991) (finding that the
addition of amphetamine, a dopaminergic drug, to schizophrenic patients' medication regimen
improved some aspects of cognition, motivation, and affect); Jonathan D. Cohen & David
Servan-Schreiber, A Theogy of Dopamine Function and its Rok in Cognitive D its in Schizophrenia, 19
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 85, 99 (1993) (noting that a computer model suggests that dopamine
deficieny is responsible for cognitive deficits observed in persons with schizophrenia); Kenneth
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The benefits of FGAs come with significant drawbacks. FGAs do not
help all patients who have schizophrenia or other psychotic disorders; ten to
fifty percent of patients who take FGAs experience only partial remission of
positive symptoms or no response at all, 76 and many patients see little im-
provement in their cognition or negative symptoms. 77 FGAs also consistently
cause "extrapyramidal symptoms," 78 a constellation of side effects including
stiffness, diminished facial expression, tremors, and restlessness. 79 Such side
effects were among the reasons that patients often quit taking FGAs.80 In
addition, many patients who take FGAs develop permanent and sometimes
disabling neuromotor syndromes such as tardive dyskinesia (I'D), 81 and a few
L. Davis et al., Dopamine in Schi±Zophrenia: A Review and ReconceptualiZation, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1474, 1474 (1991) (suggesting "that schizophrenia is characterized by abnormally low prefrontal
dopamine activity (causing deficit symptoms) leading to excessive dopamine activity in meso-
limbic dopamine neurons (causing positive symptoms)").
76. Studies reviewing FGAs typically reported that fifty to seventy-five percent of schi-
zophrenic patients have "a moderate to excellent response and up to ninety percent of patients
shownl some response." Daniel P. Van Kammen & Stephen R. Marder, Dopamine ReceptorAnta-
gonists, in 2 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY/VI, at 1987 (Harold I. Kaplan &
Benjamin J. Sadock eds., 6th ed. 1995). This implies that 10 to 50 percent of patients show no
response or only a partial one.
77. Lisa B. Dixon et al., Conventional Antipsychotic Medications for Schizophrenia, 21
SCHIZOPHRENIA BUL. 567, 572 (1995); Herbert Y. Meltzer & Susan R. McGurk, The Effects of
Clorapine, Raperidone, and O/anZapine on Cognitive Function in Schizophrenia, 25 SCHIZOPHRENIA
BULL. 233, 235 (1999) (seeing "some evidence" that neuroleptics "cause selective impairment of
some cognitive functions").
78. The term "extrapyramidal" refers to those neurons that control movements outside
the "pyramidal tracts." DORLAND'S, supra note 18, at 638. The pyramidal tract "provides for
direct cortical control and initiation of skilled movements, especially those related to speech and
involving the hand and fingers." Id. at 1861. "Extrapyramidal system" is "an imprecise term
referring to a functional rather than an anatomical part of the central nervous system," includ-
ing brain structures that "control and coordinate especially the postural, static, supporting, and
locomotor mechanisms." Id. at 1776.
79. Keith, supra note 55, at 851. The pronounced effects of these drugs on the nervous
system led to their being termed "neuroleptics," a combination of the Greek words neuron
(nerve) and leptis (to take hold). DORLAND'S, supra note 18, at 1210. The French psychiatrists
Delay and Deniker coined the term "neuroleptic" in 1955. JOHNSON, supra note 59, at 40.
80. The classic study on this topic is Theodore Van Putten, Why Do Schizophrenic Patients
Refuse to Take Their Drugs?, 31 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 67, 70-71 (1974) (antipsychotic
noncompliance strongly associated with extrapyramidal involvement, especially akathisia, the
subjective experience of restlessness).
81. TD rarely occurs in young individuals who have been exposed to neuroleptics for
fewer than three months. ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 21, at 45. Approximately one-fifth of
patients undergoing long-term treatment with FGAs develop TD; the risk of developing TD is
roughly five percent per year of FGA exposure. Dilip V. Jeste and Michael J. Caligiuri, Tardive
Dyskinesia, 19 SCHIZOPHRENIA Bul. 303, 303 (1993) (mean prevalence of TD among long-
term FGA patients is approximately twenty-four percent; annual incidence in young adults is
four to five percent.). The risk for elderly patients is much higher. See, e.g., Robert A. Sweet et
al., Duration of Neuroleptic Treatment and Prevalence of Tardive Dyskinesia in Late Life, 52 ARCHIVES
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patients develop "neuroleptic malignant syndrome," a severe and sometimes
fatal reaction to the drugs.82
D. Arrival of "Second-Generation" Antipsychotic Drugs
The FDA's approval of clozapine in late 198983 paved the way for a
striking change in psychiatrists' prescribing over the next decade. Clozapine
was the first really new antipsychotic medication to become available in thirty-
five years. Clozapine was distinctive-or "atypical"-because it could alle-
viate psychotic symptoms without inducing the extrapyramidal side effects
that usually accompanied treatment with FGAs. 84  Moreover, clozapine
worked better than FGAs: thirty to sixty percent of schizophrenic patients
who had not responded to FGAs improved when they took clozapine. 85 Al-
so, the incidence of extrapyramidal side effects with clozapine was much low-
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 478, 482, tbl. 3 (1995) (twenty-nine percent risk in 3-12 months of drug
exposure).
82. This syndrome occurs in one-tenth to one percent of persons receiving neuroleptics,
and includes development of fever, muscle stiffness, unstable vital signs, altered consciousness,
elevated muscle enzymes, and elevated white blood cell count." Herbert Y. Meltzer & S.
Hossein Fatemi, Treatment of SchiZophrenia, in THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PRFSS TEXTBOOK OF
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 760-61 (Alan F. Schatzberg & Charles B. Nemeroff eds., 2d ed.
1998); see also ROSENBAUM ET Ajl., supra note 21, at 43.
83. Stuart L. Nightingale, Approval of Clozapinefor Refractoy Schizophrenia, 263 J. AM. MED.
AsS'N 202, 202 (1990) (requiring FDA approval); FDA. Approves a Backup Therapy for Severe
Schizophrenia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1989, at A24, available at 1989 WLNR 2032721 (reporting
FDA approval).
84. Michael J. Owens & S. Craig Risch, Ajpical Antpsbycholics, in THE AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC PRESS TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 323, 333 (Alan F. Schatzberg &
Charles B. Nemeroff eds., 2d ed. 1998). In 1993, psychiatrist Jeffrey Lieberman suggested that
the following characteristics defined an atypical or second-generation antipsychotic drug: (1)
"pre-cinical" (that is, laboratory findings often worked out in animals) evidence of efficacy and
nontoxicity, (2) effectiveness in reducing psychotic symptoms, (3) low incidence of extrapyra-
midal symptoms and TD, and (4) no elevation of prolactin (a hormone involved in breast milk
production, secretion of which is increased in men and women who take typical antipsychotics).
Jeffrey A. Lieberman, Understanding the Mechanism of Action of A~ipical Anpiychotic Drugs: A Re-
view of Compounds in Use and Development, 163 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 7-18 (Supp. 22, 1993).
85. The landmark study reporting clozapine's efficacy in patients who had failed to benefit
from neuroleptics is John Kane et al., CloZapinefor the Treatment-Resistant Schizophrenic: A Double-
Blind Comparison uith Chlorpromaine, 45 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 789, 794 (1988) (demon-
strating improvement in thirty percent of previously refractory patients over a six-week period,
compared with just four percent of patients who received chlorpromazine). Subsequent studies
looking at treatment refractory patients treated with clozapine for longer periods have yielded
higher estimated rates of improvement. See, e.g., John M. Kane et al., Clo.zapine and Haloperidol in
Moderate# Refractog SchiZophrenia: A 6-Month Randomized and Double-Bhnd Comparison, 58
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 965, 970 (2001) (showing a fifty-seven percent response rate);
Jeffrey A. Lieberman et al., Clnical Effects of CloZapine in Chronic Schizophrenia: Response to Treatment
and Predictors of Outcome, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1744 (1994) (showing a fifty percent response
rate in treatment refractory patients).
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er, as was the likelihood of the damaging neuromotor syndromes associated
with FGAs.86
Patients who take clozapine for extended periods incur a small risk of
developing a potentially fatal side effect involving a loss of the white blood
cells responsible for fighting bacterial infections. 87 Therefore, when clozapine
was released in the U.S., it was "bundled" 88 by its manufacturer with a manda-
tory monitoring system that included weekly blood tests.89 The combined
cost of the drug plus was initially around $9,000 a year.90
Costs,91 blood testing, medical risks,92 FDA restrictions, 93 and initial re-
luctance of third-party payers 94 have meant that psychiatrists would prescribe
86. Daniel E. Casey, Effects of Cloapine Therapy in Schizophrenic Individuals at Risk for Tardive
Dyskinesia, 59 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 35-36 (Supp. 3, 1998).
87. Though clozapine had been available for prescription in other countries, it "had not
been marketed [in the U.S.] because it carried approximately a 1% risk of potentially lethal
agranulocytosis." ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 21, at 5-6. Clozapine was introduced for use
in several European countries in the 1970s. SeeJ. Idinpaiin-Heikkilfi et al., Agranulogytosis During
Treatment with CloZapine, 11 EUROP. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 1432, 1432 (1977). Agranulo-
cytosis is a potentially fatal side effect in which the bone marrow stops making the white blood
cells responsible for fighting bacterial infections. MedlinePlus Medical Enyclopedia: Agranulogytosis,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001295.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
88. The initial "bundling" of clozapine raised antitrust issues. See Michael A. Sanzo, Anti-
trust Law and Patent Misconduct in the Proprietary Drug Industry, 39 Vi. L. REv. 1209, 1224-25
(1994) (bundling clozapine to a patient monitoring system violated the Jefferson Parish test);
Robert N. Swidler, Medical Innovations and Ethics: A State Government Perpective, 57 ALB. L. REV.
655, 668-72 (1994) (commenting on ethical issues surrounding New York state's concerns
about the cost of clozapine); Mark A. Hurwitz, Note, Bundling Patented Drgs and Medical Services:
An Antitrust Analysis, 91 CoiuM. L. REV. 1188, 1219 (tying clozapine to lab tests does not vi-
olate "rule of reason" test articulated in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2
(1984)).
89. Carl Salzman, Mandato Monitoring for Side Effects: The '"Bundling" of Clo.Zapine, 323 NEW
ENG.J. MED. 827, 827 (1990).
90. Hurwitz, supra note 88, at 1189; Daniel Goleman, Outcry Grows Over Method of Selling
New Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 27, 1990, at B9, available at 1990 WLNR 2973991 (annual cost of
bundled treatment was $8,944).
Clozapine therapy was subsequently "unbundled" (allowing testing by a variety of
agencies). Because Sandoz's bundling had made the drug very expensive in the United States,
the program had been assailed by physicians, patient advocacy groups, and Congress. Milt
Freudenheim, Maker of SchiZophrenia Drug Bows to Pressure to Cut Cost, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1990,
at Al, available at 1990 WLNR 2991484. Blood testing frequency has been reduced, and generic
versions of the compound are now available. However, clozapine remains available only
through monitoring protocols under which pharmacists dispense the medication only when
they have determined that a patient's blood has been tested and that the laboratory values are
satisfactory. For a discussion of current monitoring requirements, see Yael Waknine, Clo.aril
Monitoring Schedule Modified to Include ANC Reporting, Medscape Alert, Jan. 17, 2006, available at
http://www.clozaril.com/pdfs/monthlymonitoring.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
91. In 1997, Keith estimated the cost of clozapine to be "about $6,000 a year at [his] insti-
tution-and the additional cost of the weekly blood monitoring [was] about $1,000 a year."
Keith, supra note 55, at 852. In a study conducted at VA facilities, per capita pharmacy costs in
clozapine treated patients were $3,199 a year. Robert Rosenheck et al., A Comparison of CloZapine
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clozapine only to patients who could not benefit from or tolerate other avail-
able antipsychotic drugs. In the early 1990s, these drugs included only FGAs,
which remained the primary drug therapy for schizophrenia. But clozapine's
arrival made both psychiatrists and patients realize that antipsychotic drugs
could be more effective and less neurotoxic than the preceding decades had
led them to assume.
1. Second-Generation Antipychotics for 'Tirst-Line" Use
In January 1994, risperidone entered the U.S. pharmacopeia, allowing
U.S. psychiatrists to prescribe a second-generation antipsychotic drug as inilial
therapy for schizophrenia. 95 As of June 2009, six other SGAs--olanzapine 96
and Haloperidol in HospitaliZed Patients with Refractoy Schizophrenia, 337 NEw ENG. J. MED. 809, 812
(1997).
92. Clozapine has several other potential adverse effects. Risk of seizures was known
when the drug was released in the U.S., as were other less serious but potentially troublesome
problems (e.g., sedation and drooling). Medical Letter, Inc., Clo.Zapinefor Schizophrenia, 32 MED.
LETTFER DRUGS & THERAPEUTICS 3-4 (1990). Potential for weight gain and associated medical
problems (for example, diabetes mellitus and hyperlipidemia) became better appreciated after
several years of the drug's use. Michael Davidson, Risk of Cardiovascular Disease and Sudden Death
in Schizophrenia, 63 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 5, 6-8 (Supp. 9, 2002) (summarizing results of
studies); David C. Henderson et al., CloZapine, Diabetes Melitus, Weight Gain, and Liid Abnormal-
ties: A Fiveyear Naturalistic Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 975, 979-80 (2000) (reporting high rates
of weight gain, diabetes, and hyperlipidemia in patients who take clozapine for extended pe-
riods).
93. The FDA "required a demonstration of efficacy in patients whose disease was refrac-
tory to treatment with standard antipsychotic drugs. No other antipsychotic drug had ever
been required to meet such a standard." Keith, supra note 55, at 852. The Physicians' Desk
Reference still contains a black-box warning to reserve clozapine therapy for "use in (1) the
treatment of severely ill patients with schizophrenia who fail to show an acceptable response to
adequate courses of standard antipsychotic drug treatment, or (2) for reducing the risk of recur-
rent suicidal behavior in patients with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder who are judged
to be at risk of re- experiencing suicidal behavior." Physidan's Desk Reference 2008, 2193 (62nd
ed. 2007) [hereinafter PDR]. However, clozapine has proved useful in treating other serious
mental conditions, including refractory bipolar disorder, psychotic depression, and psychosis in
Parkinson's Disease, see RONALD W. PIES, HANDBOOK OF ESSENTIAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY
189-90 (2nd ed. 2005), and borderline personality disorder. K. N. Roy Chengappa et al., Cloa
-
pine Reduces Severe Self-Mutilation and Aggression in Pyychoic Patients with Borderne Personaho Disorder,
60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 477, 483 (1999); George F. Parker, CloZapine and Borderne Persona,6y
Disorder, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERvICES 348-49 (2002).
94. After some state Medicaid programs were initially to financially support clozapine
therapy, courts ruled that Medicaid programs were obligated to make clozapine available to
beneficiaries when doctors felt that the drug was medically necessary. Visser v. Taylor, 756 F.
Supp. 501, 507 (D. Kan. 1990); Alexander L. v. Cuomo, 588 N.Y.S.2d 85, 88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1991).
95. Reuters, Johnson &Johnson DrugforSchiZophrenia Is Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1994, at
D5, available at 1994 WLNR 3520024. Risperidone is the nonproprietary name for the product
originally marked as Risperdal® byJanssen Pharmaceutica. PDR, supra note 93, at 1715.
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quetiapine,97 ziprasidone,98 aripiprazole, 99 paliperidone, 1°° and iloperidone' 01-
had received marketing approval in the U.S. and were available for first-line
use. None of these SGAs carry a substantial risk of agranulocytosis, and their
recipients do not need medical monitoring as intensive as is required for clo-
zapine.102
Through the early years of the 21st century, psychiatrists were confident
that SGAs had several advantages over FGAs. Based on premarketing studies
used to achieve FDA approval, the SGAs appeared to treat positive symptoms
as effectively as did FGAs, but with a lower incidence of noxious neuromotor
side effects, including TD.103 Psychiatrists thought that patients preferred
96. Olanzapine is marketed as Zyprexa® by Eli Lilly & Company. PDR, supra note 93, at
1816. It was approved for general use in October 1996. Associated Press, A New Drug for
Schizophrenia Wins ApprovalFrom the FDA., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1996, at A21, available at 1996
WLNR 4385816.
97. Quetiapine received FDA approval in 1997. Zeneca Given FDA Go-Ahead for Seroquel,
INDEPENDENT, Aug. 2, 1997, at 19. The drug is marketed as Seroquel® by AstraZeneca Phar-
maceuticals LP. PDR, supra note 93, at 3451.
98. Ziprasidone, marketed by Pfizer Inc. as Geodon®, was introduced in the U.S. in early
2001. PDR, supra note 93, at 2506; Scott Hensley, Schizophrenia Drug From 1fier Wins FDA's
Approval, WALL ST.J., Feb. 6, 2001, at B21, available at 2001 WLNR 2013345.
99. Aripiprazole received FDA approval in November 2002. Bristol-Myers SchiZophrenia
Drug Receives Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2002, at C4, available at 2002 WLNR 4100623. The
compound is marketed as Abilify@ by Bristol-Meyers. PDR, supra note 93, at 872.
100. The FDA approved paliperidone on December 20,2006. Press Release, Food & Drug
Admin., FDA Approves New Drug for Schizophrenia (Dec. 20, 2006), available at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2006/NEW01534.html. Paliperidone is the active
metabolite of risperidone, id., and marketed by Janssen as Invega®. PDR, supra note 93, at
1711.
101. Iloperidone, marketed by Vanda Pharmaceuticals as Fanapt®, received FDA approval
on May 6, 2009. Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves Fanapt to Treat SchiZophre-
nia (May 6, 2009), available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucml49578.htm.
102. In the 1990s, psychiatrists believed very little medical monitoring was necessary absent
indications of problems. Marvin I. Herz et al., Practice Guideline for the Treatment of Patients with
Schizophrenia, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 20-23 (Supp. Apr. 1997). By 2004, however, the risk of
weight gain and metabolic problems with SGAs had been recognized. See infra Part II.E.1.
103. For examples of studies from the 1990s, see Mossman, supra note 15, at 1073 n.201.
For a more recent study, see Christoph U. Correll et al., Lower Risk for Tardive Dyskinesia Asso-
ciated With Second-Generation Antipsychotics: A Systematic Review of 1-Year Studies, 161 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 414, 419 (2004) (mean annual TD risk with SGAs was below one percent, com-
pared to a five percent risk with FGAs).
These studies usually compared SGAs to 20-mg/day doses of the high-potency FGA
haloperidol that are well above patients' "neuroleptic threshold," that is, the minimum dose
needed to produce modest extrapyramidal side effects. In an important study of the neurolep-
tic threshold dosing, McEvoy and colleagues found that the average dose needed to treat pa-
tients with schizophrenia was just 3.7 mg/day. Joseph P. McEvoy et al., Optimal Dose of Neuro-
leptic in Acute SchiZophrenia: A Controlled Study of the Neuroleptic Threshold and Higher Haloperidol Dose,
48 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 739, 741 (1991). Some writers recognized that the side effect
evidence might have been less favorable to SGAs had the studies used lower haloperidol doses.
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SGAs'0 4 and were "better off" for taking them.1 05 Psychiatrists also believed
that SGAs left patients less affected by negative symptoms than did FGAs 0 6
and were better than FGAs at ameliorating cognitive deficits in schizophre-
nia.107
Shitij Kapur et al., Clinical and Theoretical Implications of 5-HT2 and D2 Receptor Occupancy of CloZa-
pine, R'speridone, and OlanZapine in Schizophrenia, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 286, 291-92 (1999).
However, the full significance of this has been appreciated only in the last few years. See infra
notes 181, 366, and accompanying text.
Why SGAs are novel drugs, that is, why they cause fewer neurological side effects than
the FGAs, is still not agreed upon. One explanation: SGAs "clinically help patients by tran-
siently occupying D 2 receptors and then rapidly dissociating to allow normal dopamine neuro-
transmission." Philip Seeman, A ypicalAnpychotics: Mechanism of Action, 2 Focus 48, 48 (2004).
For other theories, see Herbert Y. Meltzer, What's A~jpical about A~ipical Antip5ychotic Drugs? 4
CURRENT OPINION PHARMACOLOGY 53, 55-56 (2004) (discussing effects on serotonin, acetyl-
choline, and N-methyl-D-aspartate receptors). Aripiprazole derives its atypicality from being a
mixed agonist-antagonist of the dopamine-D 2 receptor. Kevin D. Buris et al., ApipraZole, a
Novel Antipychotic, Is a High-Affinioy Partial Agonist at Human Dopamine D2 Receptors, 302 J.
PHARMACOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL THERAPEUTICS 381, 381 (2002).
104. See, e.g., Shitij Kapur & Gary Remington, Af'picalAntipychotics: Patients Value the Lower
Incidence of ExtrapyramidalSide Effects, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 1360 (2000); Piper S. Meyer et al., Com-
parison Between the Effects of A jpical and TraditionalAntiychotics on Work Status for Clients in a Pi-
chiatric Rehabilitation Program, 63 J. CI.INICAL PSYCHIATRY 108, 114 (2002).
105. A. George Awad & Lakshmi N.P. Voruganti, Quaiy of lift and New Antpsychotics in
Schizophrenia: Are Patients Better Of?. 25 INT'L J. SOC. PSYCHIATRY 268, 273-74 (1999). Subse-
quent studies have suggested that SGAs may not contribute to loss of gray matter volume in
the way that FGAs apparently do. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lieberman et al., Antipychotic Drug Effects
on Brain Moephology in First-Episode Pgychosis, 62, 62 ARCI-IVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 361 (2005) (in
first-episode psychosis, haloperidol treatment was associated with reduced gray matter volume,
but olanzapine treatment was not; findings could be due to haloperidol-associated toxicity or
therapeutic effects of olanzapine).
106. Steven R. Hirsch et al., A 28-Week Comparison of Zipraddone and Haloperidol in Outpatients
with Stable Schizophrenia, 63 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 516, 519 fig.3 (2002) (reporting that in
previously stable patients, ziprasidone reduced negative symptoms more than did haloperidol);
Beng-Choon Ho et al., A Couparative Effectiveness Study of Rsperidone and OlanZapine in the Treat-
ment of Schizophrenia, 60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 658, 662 (1999) (reporting that olanzapine and
risperidone reduced negative symptoms). However, some authors thought SGAs merely
avoided the neurological side effects of FGAs. William T. Carpenter et al., Patient Response and
Resource Management: Another View of Clozapine Treatment of Schizophrenia, 152 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
827, 827 (1995) ("Treatment of primary negative symptoms is not supported by the current
experimental data.').
107. See Mossman, supra note 15, at 1075 n.207 (citing studies).
More recent studies question these findings. See, e.g., Terry E. Goldberg, Cognitive
Improvement After Treatment With Second-Generation Antipychotic Medications in First-Episode Schizoph-
renia: Is It a Practice Effect? 64 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1115, 1115 (2007) (findings that
cognitive improvements appeared attributable to practice - exposure, familiarity, and/or
procedural learning - rather than SGA therapy; differences between risperidone and olanza-
pine were small); Richard S. E. Keefe et al., Neurocognitive Effects of Antipoychotic Medications in
Patients With Chronic Schizophrenia in the CATIE Trial, 64 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 633, 641-
42 (2007) (after 2 months of treatment, both recipients of SGAs and the FGA perphenazine
showed small but significant improvement in cognition; reasons may have included broad
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Because SGAs seemed to offer a clear pharmacological advance in the
treatment of psychoses, most psychiatrists concluded that these drugs had
created new standards for treatment of psychotic disorders. In the mid-1990s,
psychiatrists began suggesting that the SGAs should be psychiatrists' first
choice when selecting an antipsychotic therapy, 108 and, a few years later, this
view became dominant. 09 One can appreciate how rapid and dramatic this
change was by noting that (1) in a 1995 psychopharmacology handbook, dis-
cussion of risperidone occupies less than one page in a 3 8-page chapter on
antipsychotic medications; 110 and (2) in its 1997 guideline for treating schi-
zophrenia, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) states that "conven-
tional antipsychotic medications and risperidone are all reasonable first-line
medications for patients in acute phases of schizophrenia.""' In the APA's
2004 version of the schizophrenia guideline, however, the preference for
SGAs seems clear: "The second-generation antipsychotics should be consi-
dered as first-line medications for patients in the acute phase of schizophrenia,
inclusion criteria and more reasonable dosing of FGA compared with previous studies). The
latter study contains approximately forty earlier references asserting improved cognition with
SGAs. Id. at 645 n.10, 646 nn.15-53.108. Jeffrey A. Lieberman, AJpicalAnipychotic DrMgs as a First -Line Treatment of Schizophrenia:
A Rationale and Hypothesis, 57 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 68, 68 (Supp. 11 1996) (offering "a ratio-
nale and hypothesis for the use of atypical antipsychotic drugs as a first-line treatment of schi-
zophrenia').
109. Rowland Pearsall et al., A New Algorithm for Treating Schizophrenia, 34
PSYCHOPHARMACOL. BULL. 349, 349 (1998) (suggesting "that the newer atypical antipsychotic
agents may now be the treatment of choice for initiating therapy in most clinical situations');
Alexander L. Miller et al., The Texas Medication Algorithm Project (MAP) Schizophrenia Algorithms,
60 J. CLINICAL. PSYCHIATRY 649, 652 (1999); Steven P. Shon et at., Mental Health Care from the
Public Perspective: The Texas Medication Algorithm Project, 60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 16, 18 (Supp.
3 1999); John A. Chiles et al., Tbe Texas Medication Algorithm Project: Development and Implementation
of the Schizophrenia Algorithm, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERiCFS 69, 72-73 (1999); Joseph P. McEvoy et
al., The Expert Consensus Guideline Series: Trea'ment of Schizophrenia 1999: 1, Strategies for Selecting
Medications, 60J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 12, 12 (Supp. 11 1999); Neil S. Kaye & Thomas J. Reed,
Tardive Dyskinesia: Tremors in Law and Medicine, 27 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 315, 316 (1999);
David N. Osser & Carlos A. Zarate, Jr., Consultant for the Pbarmacotherapy of Schizophrenia, 29
PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 252, 253 (1999). See also Roger S. McIntyre, Psycbotropic Drugs andAdverse
Events in the Treatment of Bipolar Disorders Revisited, 63 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 15 (Supp. 3 2002)
("Novel antipsychotics are now the antipsychotics of choice in the treatment of bipolar disord-
ers, having displaced the conventional antipsychotic agents.'); David N. Osser & Robert Siga-
del, Short-Term Inpatient Pbarmacotherapy of Schizcphrenia, 9 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 89 (2001)
("For initial oral treatment, monotherapy with one of the new 'atypical' antipsychotics is fa-
vored.'); Ren6e E. Snow & Sumer Verma, Late-4ife Pgychosis: It's Eflicaq vs. Cost in the Tug-of-War
Over Treatment, 1 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY 10, 16 (2002) ("In general, atypical antipsychotics are
considered first-line therapy [for treating psychotic disorders in elderly patients], unless there is
a compelling reason not to use them in an individual patient.").
110. STEVEN E. HYMAN ET AL., HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRIC DRUG THERAPY 30 (3d ed.
1995). This edition is a predecessor of ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 55.
111. Hem, supra note 102, at 23.
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mainly because of the decreased risk of extrapyramidal side effects and tardive
dyskinesia .... ,,112
2. Changes in Prescribing Patterns and Drug Expenditures
These changes in official treatment recommendations merely followed
the prescribing patterns of American psychiatrists, who, by the late 1990s, had
made SGAs their first-line choice for antipsychotic therapy. In the early
1990s, most FGAs were off-patent; many were available in "generic" form,
and the daily cost for an oral FGA was sometimes just a few pennies. The
costs of SGAs were up to 100 times higher, depending on the specific drug
and dosage. 1 3 Accordingly, annual expenditures for antipsychotic drugs rose
substantially in the years during which SGAs were introduced. In 1994, when
risperidone became available, annual U.S. expenditures for all antipsychotic
medication was $1.4 billion, and only a small fraction of patients with schi-
zophrenia were taking SGAs. A decade later, about 90% of patients with schi-
zophrenia received SGAs at a cost exceeding $10 billion." 4 In 2006, U.S. total
sales of SGAs reached $11.5 billion." 5
Because schizophrenia is such a debilitating illness, most sufferers of the
condition do not work; family members and/or public health funds pay most
of their health care expenses. Between 1994 and 2003, the number of indi-
viduals receiving Social Security benefits for schizophrenia increased from
112. Anthony F. Lehman et al., Practice Guideine for the Treatment of Patients with Schizophrenia,
Second Edition, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 28 (Supp. Feb. 2004). This phenomenon was not
restricted to the U.S. See, e.g., Guidance on the Use of Newer (Ajpical) Anipychoic Drugs for the
Treatment of SchiZophrenia. May 2002, National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence,
http://www.nice.org.uk/Guidance/TA43 (last visited Jan. 6, 2009) (United Kingdom recom-
mendations for using a SGA for persons newly diagnosed with schizophrenia); Stephan Heres
et al., Why Olan:Zapine Beats Risperidone, Riperidone Beats Quetiapine, and Quetiapine Beats OlanZapine:
An Exploratogy Ana~sis of Head-to-Head Comparison Studies of Second-Generation Antpychotics, 163
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 185, 185 (2006) (noting that SGAs "are now defined as the gold standard in
most aspects of treatment, at least in highly industrialized countries").113. See, e.g., Douglas Mossman & Douglas S. Lehrer, Conventional and A!ypicalAntipychotics
and the Evolting Standard of Care, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICFS 1528, 1529 tbl.1 (2000). Justifications
for higher prices included the high expectations for SGAs (that is, that they were more effec-
tive, less toxic drugs), cost-savings from lower uses of other healthcare resources, and the costs
of drug development. See infra notes 121-124, notes 364-371, and accompanying text.
114. Robert H. Rosenheck, Outcomes, Costs, and Poligy Caution: A Commentary on the Cost Utiko
of the Latest AnipiTychotic Drugs in Schizophrenia Study (CUtLASS 1), 63 ARCHIVFS GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 1074, 1074 (2006).
115. Vital Signs: Seroquel Led Antipfychotics Saks in 2006, 35 CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY NEWS 1
(May 2007). For some perspective, in 2005, about 633,000 physicians (5.1% of them psychiatr-
ists) held jobs in the U.S., and the median psychiatrists' income was $180,000. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICs, Psysidans and Surgeons, in U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK
HANDBOOK, 2008-09 EDITION 4 tbl.1, available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos074.htm.
Thus, total earnings of all psychiatrists was 633,000x0.051x$180,000 = $5.8 billion- about
half of what was spent on just antipsychotic medication.
HeinOnline -- 13 Mich. St. U. J. Med. & L. 285 2009
286 13 MSU JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND LAW 263 (2009)
400,000 to 550,000.116 Between 1993 and 2001, as use of SGAs by Medicaid
beneficiaries with schizophrenia climbed from 0 to 69%, annual per-patient
drug costs climbed from $586 to $2,854.1 7 In 2002, the Medicaid program
spent $3.73 billion on antipsychotic medications." 8 Risperidone, olanzapine,
and quetiapine accounted for 8 8% of these dollars, and the costs for these
SGAs ranked first, second, and fourth, respectively, among all prescription
drugs paid for by Medicaid." 9 By 2001, antipsychotic medications accounted
for more government spending than any other category of drugs because of a
610% increase in Medicaid spending fueled largely by the switch to SGAs.120
At the time, the switch and the added costs seemed justified, given what
psychiatrists believed. The arrival of the SGAs was accompanied by dozens
of studies that reported lower rates of adverse effects, 121 better patient accep-
tance, and greater effectiveness122-- and by concerted, elaborate promotional
efforts by the pharmaceutical companies that manufactured and sold SGAs.123
The FGAs had produced relatively modest benefit (and did not seem to re-
duce disability a great deal), so treating schizophrenia had often been relegated
to the unglamorous wards of state hospitals. The SGAs gave clinicians reason
to feel more hopeful about the prognoses of schizophrenia's sufferers, and
116. Rosenheck, supra note 114, at 1074 (citing Pamela Mazerski, Associate Commissioner,
Social Security Administration, written communication, 2004).
117. Mark Duggan, Do New Preseriplion Drugs Pay for Themselves? The Case of Second-Generation
Antipychos, 24 J. HEALTH ECON. 1, 11 tbl.2:7 (2005).
118. Id. at 2. This includes uses of these drugs to treat not just schizophrenia, but bipolar
disorder, dementia, and other conditions. See infra Part II.D.3 for discussion of the expanded
prescribing of SGAs for FDA indications and "off-label".
119. Duggan, supra note 117, at 2-3.
120. Id. at 13.
121. See, e.g., Correll et al., supra note 103, at 414.
122. See, e.g., John M. Davis et al., A Meta-Analsis of the Efticagy of Second-Generation Anipgy-
cho/ics, 60 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 553, 553 (2003) (reviewing 124 studies and conclud-
ing that four SGAs - clozapine, amisulpride, risperidone, and olanzapine - are more effica-
cious than FGAs).
123. Commenting on this, one observer noted that
a number of the ... studies [comparing FGAs and SGAs] that have been published
were developed and sponsored by the pharmaceutical companies whose medications
were being evaluated, raising concerns about potential sources of bias in experimental
design or interpretation of outcomes.
David A. Lewis, Aypical Anirychotic Medications and the Treatment of SchiZophrenia, 159 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 177 (2002). Two schizophrenia researchers commented that
aggressive marketing by pharmaceutical companies and their pervasive involvement in
continuing medical education has contributed to some confusion among clinicians
about how available pharmacologic strategies compare and what they can realistically
accomplish. Industry-sponsored drug trials are the major source of clinical trial infor-
mation, and because Phase IV trials are conducted at least in part for marketing pur-
poses, resulting biases can compromise their utility.
Rajiv Tandon & Michael D. Jibson, Pharmacologc Treatment of Schizophrenia: What the Future Holds,
6 CNS SPECTRUMS 980, 984 (2001) (citations omitted). As later portions of this article show,
these remarks proved prescient.
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effective, intensive marketing of SGAs got psychiatrists' attention and helped
spur interest in treating schizophrenia. The higher prices of SGAs seemed
justified by studies maintaining that prescribing SGAs did not raise (and might
even reduce) overall costs for patient care compared with the overall costs in-
curred by patients treated with FGAs.124
3. Off-Label Uses
By the early years of the twenty-first century, use of SGAs had expanded
rapidly and extended well beyond treating schizophrenia and closely related
psychotic disorders. 25 This made sense: what made SGAs appealing choices
for treating patients with schizophrenia also made SGAs attractive for treating
both patients who had other conditions for which psychiatrists used FGAs
and patients who might have benefited from FGAs were it not for their neu-
romotor side effects.
The rapid rise in expenditures for SGAs was due, in part, to physicians'
prescribing more than one of these drugs at a time126 and to prescribing them
"off-label.' 27  Off-label use-that is, prescribing a medication or using a
medical device outside the scope of its FDA-approved labeling 128 - is, in
124. See, e.g., Susan H. Hamilton et al., Clinical and Economic Outcomes of OlanZapine Compared
with Haloperidolfor Schizophrenia. Results from a Randomised Clinical "I rial, 15 PHARMACOECONOMICS
469, 470 (1999) (higher olanzapine costs were offset by significantly lower inpatient and outpa-
tient costs; study was sponsored by Eli Lilly and Company, which marketed olanzapine); Den-
nis A. Revicki, The New Apical Anpychoics: A Review of Pharmacoeconomic Studies, 1 EXPERT
OPINION ON PHARMACOTHERAPY 249, 257 (2000) (evidence suggests that clozapine was cost
effective treatment for patients who did not respond to FGAs; risperidone and olanzapine may
be cost-neutral compared to FGAs). For a review of additional studies available by 2002, see
Mossman, supra note 15, at 1080-88.
125. See Mossman, supra note 15, at 1043-44, nn.49-50 (describing indications as of 2002 for
SGAs, but reporting these additional uses: clozapine for treatment-refractory mania, SGAs for
acute mania and bipolar disorder, SGAs for schizoaffective disorder, olanzapine for treatment-
resistant psychotic mood disorders, risperidone for borderline personality disorder, and quetia-
pine for mood disorders).
126. The practice is termed "polypharmacy," and though quite common, it has little empir-
ical support. Constantin Tranulis et al., Benefits and Risks of Anipsychofic Poypharmagy: An Evi-
dence-Based Review of the Literature, 31 DRUG SAFETY 7, 18 (2008) (reviewing studies of frequency,
studies supporting such usage, and concluding that published scientific evidence does not sup-
port "[it]he pervasive practice of antipsychotic combination treatment for patients with schi-
zophrenia spectrum disorders").
127. Marisa Elena Domino & Marvin S. Swartz, Who Are the New Users of Antiychotic Medi-
cations? 59 PSYClIATRIC SERVICES 507, 509 (2008) (population prevalence of SGA use increased
sevenfold between 1997 and 2005, partly explained by high constant rate of off-label use).
128. Though off-label use most commonly refers to prescribing medications for conditions
other than their FDA-approved indications, other meanings include prescribing drugs at unap-
proved doses, in unapproved formats (e.g., opening and mixing a capsule's contents with apple-
sauce to aid swallowing),outside approved age groups (e.g. to children), longer than approved
intervals, or at different dose schedules (e.g., all at bedtime, rather than two or three times a
day).
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general, a perfectly legal practice 129 that is very common 130 and well ac-
cepted 131 throughout medicine. 32 Winning FDA approval for a new drug
takes years, and getting approval for additional indications takes more time-
if pharmaceutical manufacturers decide to invest the effort and funds required
to get a new FDA indication for an already-approved drug. 133 But patients
have illnesses that need treatment "today," and their physicians can address
these problems only with available drugs. Often, off-label prescribing practic-
es receive confirmation through scientific publications that endorse what phy-
sicians have been doing for years.' 34 In recent years, however, off-label use
129. FDA approval permits drugs to be marketed in specific ways, but as each edition of the
Physicians' Desk Reference states, "Once a product has been approved for marketing, a physi-
cian may prescribe it for uses or in treatment regimens or patient populations that are not in-
cluded in approved labeling." PDR, supra note 93, at Foreword. FDA approval does not "limit
or interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe" approved drugs or
devices "for any condition or disease." Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 5 396
(2009). The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that off-label prescribing "is an accepted and neces-
sary corollary of the FDA's mission to regulate." Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531
U.S. 341, 350 (2001). Judicial endorsements of off-label use also include an appellate decision's
comment that "[b]ecause the pace of medical discovery runs ahead of the FDA's regulatory
machinery, the off-label use of some drugs is frequently considered to be 'state-of-the-art'
treatment." Richardson v. Miller, 44 S.W.3d 1, 14, n. 11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
130. Sharon Conroy et al., Surv of Unlicensed and Off Label Drug Use in Paediatric Wards in
European Countries, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 79, 80 tbl.1 (thirty-nine percent of prescriptions were off-
label); David C. Radley et al., Off-label PrescribingAmong Offce-Based Physiians, 166 ARCHIVES OF
INTERNA] MED. 1021, 1023 (2006) (twenty-one percent of prescriptions were off-label).
131. David S. Baldwin and Nick Kosky, Off-label Prescribing in Psychiatric Practice, 13
ADVANCES PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 414, 414 (2007) (acknowledging that "most authorities
agree that use of drugs outside the terms of their license is a necessary part of psychiatric prac-
tice').
132. Stuart L. Nightingale, Off-Label Use of Prescription Drugs, 68 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 425,
425 (2003) ("Off-label use is legal and, with important qualifications, generally embraced by
physicians and other health care providers, health care institutions, insurers, pharmaceutical
companies, and even the FDA.").
133. According to one estimate, the average cost of drug development is $802 million (in
2000 dollars). Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development
Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 151 (2003). The process of research and development "often
extends for a decade or more." Id. at 153.
134. For example, sildenafil citrate was originally developed as a potential treatment for
angina, but during early clinical trials, observations of its effectiveness for erectile dysfunction
led to its being released in March 1998 as Viagra®, a treatment for male impotence. Andrew
Hopkins et al., Chemical Tools for Indications Discovery, in ANNUAL REPORTS IN MEDICINAL
CHEMiSTRY 339, 340 (Annette M. Doherty et al. eds., 2005); Main Gregoire, Viagra: On Release:
Evidence on the Effectiveness of Sildenafilis Good, 317 BRIT. MED. J. 759 (1998). A prestigious medi-
cal journal recently published a study demonstrating the effectiveness of prescribing sildenafil
to women with sexual problems induced by antidepressant therapy. H. George Numberg et al.,
Sildenafil Treatment of Women nith Antidepressant-Associated Sexual Dyifunction: A Randomized Con-
trolled Trial, 300 JAMA 395 (2008) (study conducted between 2003 and 2007). Physicians had
reported this practice years earlier, however. H. George Numberg et al., Sildenafilfor latrogenic
Serotoneric Antidepressant Medication-Induced Sexual Dyfunction in 4 Patients, 60 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRY 33 (1999) (rapid reversal of dysfunction in male and female patients). In June
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has received increasing scrutiny because in many instances, such prescribing
occurs with little scientific rationale. 35
In significant part, however, increased prescribing of SGAs was for
uses-particularly treatment of mood disorders-that were once off-label but
that subsequently received FDA approval.1 36 As of early 2009, approved indi-
cations for SGAs included:
* aripiprazole: schizophrenia (adults and in adolescents ages 13-17
years); bipolar disorder (by itself and in combination with mood-
stabilizing drugs, for adults and children ages 10-17 years); as an add-
on therapy with antidepressants; agitation associated with schizoph-
renia or bipolar disorder 13
7
* clozapine: treatment-resistant schizophrenia; to lower suicide risk
in people with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder 138
* olanzapine: schizophrenia; bipolar disorder (as monotherapy, in
combination therapy with mood stabilizers, and to prevent relapse);
agitation associated with schizophrenia or bipolar disorder;139 bipolar
depression 140
* quetiapine: schizophrenia, bipolar depression and mania, and ad-
junctive maintenance treatment in manial4l
* risperidone: schizophrenia in adults and adolescents ages 13-17
years; bipolar disorder in adults and children ages 10-17 years; aggres-
2005, sildenafil citrate, marketed as Revatio®, received FDA approval as treatment for pulmo-
nary hypertension. Yael Waknine, FDA Approvals: Revatio, Xeloda, Alinia, MEDSCAPE MEDICAL
NEWS, June 23, 2005, available at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/507232.
135. Becky A. Briesacher et al., The Quality of Anjipsycbolic Drug Prescribing in Nursing Homes,
165 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1280 (2005) (More than one-fourth of nursing home residents
received antipsychotic medications; many prescriptions were off-label and/or exceeded dosage
guidelines.); Radley, supra note 130, at 1025 (Though many off-label drug mentions represented
logical extensions of FDA-approved indications, "[nio more than 30% of the off-label [uses] ...
were supported by strong scientific evidence.").
136. Domino & Swartz, supra note 127, at 511.
137. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION: ABILIFY ®
4 (2008), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/tabel/2008/021436sO26,021729sO1 2,021713s019,021866s01 31b.
pdf.
138. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PATIENT INFORMATION SHEET: CLOZAPINE (MARKETED
AS CLORAZIL) (Sept. 6, 2006),
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/InfoSheets/patient/clozapinePIS.htm.
139. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ZYPREXA ®: OLANZAPINE TABLETS 7 (2006), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/label/2007/020592sO42s043,021086s022s023,021253s0261bl.pdf
140. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SYMBYAX ®: OLANZAPINE AND FLUXETINE HCL
CAPSULES 7 (2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/label/2008/021520sO171bl.pdf (in
Symbyax®, a combination drug with fluoxetine).
141. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION: SEROQUEL
® 4 (2008), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/label/2008/020639sO25sO37sO38sO401bl.pdf.
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sion and moodiness in children ages 5-16 years with autistic disord-
er
14 2
e ziprasidone: schizophrenia; agitation in schiphrenia (intramuscular
injections); bipolar mania 43
E. Medical and Scientific Reconsideration
The last few years have witnessed a major reconsideration of the risks,
benefits, and costs associated with SGAs, such that psychiatrists are not nearly
as confident about their value and superiority as they were at the turn of the
21 st century.
1. Risks of SGAs
As we noted earlier, the SGAs seemed to be a significant pharmacologi-
cal advance because of their apparent capacity to counteract pathological
nervous system functioning-that is, to reduce psychosis-without incurring
nearly the risk that FGAs posed to other parts of the nervous system in the
form of extrapyramidal side effects and TD. By the late 1990s, however, cli-
nicians recognized that SGAs caused other side effects that might, in the long
run, be just as significant. Individuals with schizophrenia have a substantially
lower life expectancy than average, chiefly because of coronary heart dis-
ease.'" Weight gain is a recognized risk associated with FGA treatment, but
the weight gain associated with SGAs appears even greater 145 By 2002, several
other reports146 had emerged showing that, in addition to weight gain,
142. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HIGHIAGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION: RIsPERDAI.
® 3 (2007), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/abe/2007/020272s46s47,20588s36s37,21444s2s2l Ibl.pdf .
143. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GEODON ® (ZIPRASIDONE HCL) CAPSULFS 7-8 (2007),
available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/label/2008/021520s0171bl.pdf .
144. Charles H. Hennekens et al., Schizophrenia and Increased Risks of Cardiovascular Disease, 150
AM. HEARTJ. 1115, 1116-18 (2005) (causes include cigarette smoking, obesity leading to dysli-
pidemia, diabetes, hypertension, less access to and use of medical care, and not following health
regimens).
145. David B. Allison et al., Ant iychotic-Induced Weight Gain: A Comprehensive Research Synthe-
sis, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1686, 1690 tbl.4 (1999) (reporting more weight gain with clozapine,
olanzapine, and risperidone than with haloperidol or placebo; several FGAs associated with
weight gain as well, but generally less than with SGAs).
146. See, e.g., Michael J. Sernyak et al., Assodation of Diabetes Meltus with Use of A picalNeuro-
leptics in the Treatment of Schizophrenia, 159 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 561, 564 fig.1 (2002) (patients who
took SGAs were more likely to be treated for diabetes than were patients taking FGAs); Brian
B. Sheitman, et al., Letter to the Editor, Olan!apine-Induced Elevation of Plasma -1ng/yceride Levels,
156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1471, 1471-72 (1999); Donna A. Wirshing et al., The Effects of Novel
Antipychoics on Glucose and Lipid Levels, 63 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 856, 863 (2002) (Chart re-
view showed elevated glucose levels and triglyceride levels in patients receiving SGAs, and
recommending that physicians "be more aggressive in monitoring glucose and lipid levels.").
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SGAs 147 were associated with'abdominal obesity, elevated blood lipids, high
blood pressure, and elevated fasting glucose-a "metabolic syndrome"'148 that
substantially heighten the risk of cardiovascular disease. In 2004, new guide-
lines were published for monitoring the weight, blood pressure, blood sugar,
blood lipids, and blood pressure of patients taking SGAs.149
Doctors who treat disturbed elderly patients with dementia have no
good pharmacologic options, yet doing nothing and allowing the agitation to
continue may put patients and others at risk. SGAs successfully reduce ag-
gression in elderly patients with dementia. 150 Although SGAs have never re-
ceived approval for this use, doctors have favored SGAs for this purpose
because they posed a much lower risk of TD than did FGAs.' 51 Physicians
believed this was a benign practice until studies showed that SGAs were asso-
ciated with serious adverse events and excess mortality risk.152 Since then, the
FDA has a required inclusion of "black box" warning for all SGAs discourag-
ing the use of SGAs in elderly demented patients with behavioral distur-
bances.153
147. Recent data suggest that clozapine and or olanzapine often induce substantial weight
gain, lipid abnormalities, and type 2 diabetes mellitus; risperidone and quetiapine often induce
moderate increases in weight; and aripiprazole and ziprasidone induce the least weight gain and
relatively little risk adverse metabolic problems. John W. Newcomer, Second-Generation (Atypical)
Anipfychotics and Metabolic Effects: A Comprehensive literature Review, 19 CNS DRUGS 1, 1 (Supp. 1
2005).
148. Scott M. Grundy et al., Diagnosis and Management of the Metabohc Syndrome: An American
Heart Association/National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute Scientific Statement, 112 CIRCULATION
2735, 2735-36 (2005).
1 149. American Diabetes Association et al., Consensus Development Conference on Anipgchotic
Drugs and Obesioy and Diabetes, 27 DIABETES CARE 596, 599 (2004) (describing monitoring proto-
col). Psychiatrists appear to have been slow to implement these guidelines. Dan W. Haupt et
al., Prevalence and Predictors of Lipid and Glucose Monitoring in Commerialy Insured Patients Treated With
Second-Generation Antpipychoic Agents, 166 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 345, 349 (2009) (less than thirty
percent of psychiatrists had patients undergo lipid or glucose testing before starting a SGA; low
rates of subsequent monitoring).
150. Clive Ballard et al., A jpialAntipychoticsfor Aggression and Psychosis in Alheimer's Disease,
Review, in THE COCHRANE LIBRARY 1,13 (2006).
151. FGAs had long been used for this purpose. See ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 21, at
23-24 (mentioning use of haloperidol and fluphenazine after stating preference for risperidone);
Lon S. Schneider et a., Risk of Death with A upicalAnpfychotic Drug Treatment for Dementia: Meta
anaysis of Randomized Placebo-Controlled Trials, 294 JAMA 1934, 1934 (2005) (noting that antipsy-
chotic drugs "have been the mainstay of psychopharmacological treatment for" "elderly pa-
tients with dementia [who have] develop[ed] aggression, delusions, and other neuropsychiatric
symptoms").
152. Id.
153. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Public Health Adisory: Deaths with Antpychoics in
Elderly Patients with Behavioral Disturbances, Apr. 11, 2005, available at
http://www.fda.gov/Cder/drug/advisory/antipsychotics.htm (citing 1.6-1.7 fold increase in
mortality). The FGAs appear just as risky, however. See, e.g., Soko Setoguchi et al., Potential
Causes of Higher Mortahy in Elderl Users of Conventional and A!jpicalAntipychotic Medications, 56 J.
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2. Doubts about Superiority
Despite the growing evidence about adverse metabolic effects, psychiatr-
ists still felt confident that SGAs, as a group, posed less risk of TD and other
neuromotor side effects than did FGAs.154 This feature of SGAs and the
belief that SGAs were more effective than FGAs'5s seemed to justify higher
prices through savings on hospitalization costs.1 5 6 Although a few scholars
and researchers questioned these views, 5 7 their views represented a decided
minority. Since 2005, however, a series of studies have led increasing num-
bers of psychiatrists to question whether SGAs are as advantageous as they
once thought.
Much of the evidence supporting the superiority of SGAs came from
studies sponsored by pharmaceutical manufacturers under restrictive condi-
tions which, though suitable for comparing a test drug to a placebo, did not
replicate what happens in real-world psychiatric practice. 58 To address this
knowledge gap, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) commis-
sioned and funded the Clinical Antipsychotic Trials of Intervention Effective-
ness (CATIE) study. 5 9 This study undertook a double-blind comparison of
then-available SGAs and a moderately-dosed FGA (perphenazine) under typi-
cal outpatient treatment conditions. 160 To be eligible for the CATIE study,
Am. GERIATRIcs SOC'Y 1644, 1648 (2008) (hazard ratio for risk of death during treatment with
FGAs was 1.23 compared to treatment with SGAs).
154. Correll et al., supra note 103, at 414 ("reduced risk of tardive dyskinesia").
155. Davis et al., supra note 122, at 553 (effect sizes of four SGAs were "greater than those
of FGAs").
156. Hamilton et al., supra note 124, at 470.
157. See, e.g, Mossman & Lehrer, supra note 113, at 1529-30; Revicki, supra note 124, at 429;
and John Geddes et al., Ajpical Antipchotics in the Treatment of SchiZophrenia: Systematic Overview
and Meta-Regression Anaysis, 321 BRIT. MED. J., 1371, 1371, 1374-76 (2000) (meta-analysis of
fifty-two studies suggests that compared to moderately dosed FGAs, SGAs "had no benefits in
terms of efficacy or overall tolerability," though SGAs caused fewer neuromotor side effects).
158. T. Scott Stroup et al., The National Institute of Mental Health ClinicalAntiptchotic Trials of
Intervention Effectiveness (CATIE) Project Schizophrenia Trial, Design and Protocol Development, 29
SCHIZOPHRENIA Buii. 15-16 (2003).
In addition, psychiatrists did not know whether one of the SGAs might be superior to
the others. Available industry-sponsored studies almost always showed that the sponsor's drug
was superior. See Heres et al., supra note 112, at 187-89 (discussing outcomes and possible
sources of bias). The CATIE study offered the potential to provide an independent comparison
of the SGAs.
159. Stroup et a., supra note 158, at 16-17.
160. Patients were randomly assigned to receive olanzapine, quetiapine, risperidone, per-
phenazine, or (after its introduction in 2002) ziprasidone. These drugs were placed in identical-
appearing capsules so that neither patients nor their doctors knew which drug was being admi-
nistered. Doctors could adjust doses from one to four capsules a day based on their judgments
about patients' needs. Jeffrey A. Lieberman et al., Effectiveness ofAntipychotic Drugs in Patients with
Chronic Schizophrenia, 353 N. ENG. J. MED. 1209, 1211 (2005) [hereinafter Lieberman, Effective-
nesA]. In contrast to using high doses of the high-potency FGA haloperidol, the CATIE study
chose "perphenazine because of its lower potency and moderate side-effect profile." Id. at 1215.
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patients were required to have schizophrenia, but many of the customary ex-
clusion criteria in clinical trials (e.g., substance abuse or medical problems)
were not imposed.'61 Data for the study, in which patients were followed for
up to 18 months, were collected in 2001-04,162 and publications of results
began appearing in 2005.
The chief measure of overall effectiveness used in by the first CATIE
publication was time to all-cause discontinuation. Essentially, this criterion
asked, "How long did patients continue taking each medication?" 63 By this
measure, olanzapine outperformed the risperidone and quetiapine-but not
perphenazine. No medication did very well, though--only a minority of pa-
tients remained on their original medication after 18 months. Moreover,
olanzapine's apparent edge in effectiveness was counterbalanced by the drug's
causing the most weight gain and metabolic problems.iM Most notably, the
researchers found no differences among the medications in rates of neuromo-
tor side effects-the driving rationale for preferring SGAs.165 Commenting
on these findings, two CATIE researchers stated, "The lack of difference be-
tween the new second-generation antipsychotics and perphenazine surprised
... us. However, such surprises are why double-blind randomized clinical
trials like CATIE are needed."'1 66
Reactions to this initial publication were varied and consistent with ex-
pectable interests of their sources. Pharmaceutical companies used selected
aspects of the CATIE findings to point out superiorities of their own prod-
161. Stroup et al., supra note 158, at 19.
162. Lieberman, supra note 160, at 1210.
163. The rationale for this criterion is as follows:
stopping or changing medication is a frequent occurrence and major problem in the
treatment of schizophrenia. In addition, this measure integrates patients' and clinicians'
judgments of efficacy, safety, and tolerability into a global measure of effectiveness that
reflects their evaluation of therapeutic benefits in relation to undesirable effects.
Id. at 1211.
164. Seventy-four percent of patients stopped their original study medication in within 18
months. The time to discontinuation was longest for olanzapine, but the difference reached
statistical significance only when compared to risperidone and quetiapine. Id. at 1209, 1212-16.
165. Id. at 1215. See also Del D. Miller et al., Extrapyramidal Side-Effects of Anipychotics in a
Randomised Trial, 193 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 279 (2008) (finding no significant differences in
neuromotor side effects or TD when comparing SGAs with perphenazine or with each other).
166. Jeffrey A. Lieberman & John K. Hsiao, Letter to the Editor, Interpreting the Results of the
CATlE Study, 57 PSYCHIATRY SERVICES 139 (2006). The CATIE study's designers expected
that their results would spell the end of FGA usage by providing definitive evidence that SGAs
were superior to FGAs. As Dr. Lieberman told an audience at the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation's 58th Institute on Psychiatric Services, "'I want to emphasize, we didn't expect the
results to turn out this way. We said, "Let's put the final nail in that coffin."" Karla Harby,
Schiopbrenia Drugs Found Similar in Efficagy, MEDSCAPE MEDICAL NEWS, Oct. 9, 2006, available at
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/5457 3 8 .
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ucts. 167 Patient advocacy groups feared that the CATIE results might be used
to restrict access to certain SGAs.168 The CATIE study's lead author felt that
the findings suggested that the medications had significant differences and
that treatment should be individualized. Yet "the results of the CATIE study
do not appear to justify the current 95 percent market share for second-
generation agents. They simply aren't that much better."'169 A New York Times
editorial concluded that "[t]he nation [had been] wasting billions of dollars on
heavily marketed drugs that have never proved themselves in head-to-head
competition against cheaper competitors."' 70
Since publication of the initial CATIE report, subsequent studies have
continued to undermine the view that SGAs are superior to FGAs. All the
medications used in the CATIE study appear to improve cognitive function-
ing equally after two months of treatment;171 after 18 months, CATIE patients
taking perphenazine appeared to have benefited the most.172 SGAs did no
better than perphenazine at improving psychosocial functioning173 or overall
quality of life, 174 but overall treatment expenditures in CATIE patients who
received perphenazine were lower because of the medication's lower cost.175
167. Marvin S. Swartz, Introduction to the CA-lIE "pecial Section, 59 PSYCHIATRY SERVICES
497, 497 (2008) (observing that "too much of the well-deserved debate and discourse on
CATIE was thinly veiled industry spin....").
168. Jeffrey A. Lieberman, What the CA I7E Study Means for Clinical Practice, 57 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 1075 (2006).
169. Idat 1075.
170. Comparing Schizophrenia Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 21, 2005, at A24, available at 2005
WLNR 14853155.
171. See Richard S. E. Keefe et al., Neurocognitive Effects of Antipychotic Medications in Patients
with Chronic Schizophrenia in the CA TE Tria, 64 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 633, 633 (2007).
172. See id. at 641. Noting that these results differed from those previously reported, the
authors commented that "findings from prior reports may not generalize well to ... everyday
clinical practice," and that "previous studies ... used high dosages of [FGAs], ... creating an
unfair comparison." Id. In support of this conclusion are the results of the European First
Episode Schizophrenia Trial (EUFEST), which showed "no overall differences" in the cogni-
tive improvement experienced by patients taking low-dose haliperidol (1-4 mg/day) or SGAs.
Michael Davidson et al., Cognitive Effects of Antifychotic Drugs in First-Episode Schizophrenia and
Schiqophreniform Disorder: A Randomized, Open-Label Clinical Trial (E UFEST), AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1
http://ajp.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/appi.ajp.2008.08060806vl (epub ahead of print
April 15, 2009).
173. Marvin S. Swartz et al., Effects of Antipyhotic Medications on Pychosocial Functioning in
Patients with Chronic Schzophrenia: Findings From the NIMH CA TIE Study, 164 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
428, 428 (2007) (all groups improved; no differences among treatment groups at 6, 12, or 18
months).
174. Robert A. Rosenheck et al., Cost-Effectiveness of Second-Generation Antipocotics and Perpbe-
naine in a Randomized Trial of Treatment for Chronic Schitophrenia, 163 A. J. PSYCHIATRY 2080,
2087 (2006).
175. Id. at 2084 (total monthly health care costs averaged twenty to thirty percent less in
perphenazine group).
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All the medications lowered the risk of violence, but again, SGAs were not
superior to perphenazine. 176
The Cost Utility of the Latest Antipsychotic Drugs in Schizophrenia
Study (CUtLASS), a non-commercial study funded by the British National
Health Service, yielded similar results: patients who received FGAs did no
poorer that did recipients of SGAs in terms of quality of life, symptoms, or
associated costs; if anything, it was FGA recipients who showed some signs
("a trend") toward great improvement in symptoms and quality of ife.'77 A
subsequent CUtLASS publication reported that, as was found in the CATIE
study, overall costs were lower but quality of life was better in the FGA-treated
British patients.178 That the findings of these studies were valid derived sup-
port from a previous study, funded by the U.S. Department of Veterans Af-
fairs, showing no advantage of the olanzapine over moderately-dosed halope-
ridol.179
The most recent meta-analysis on this topic suggests that the SGAs are
not identical and that some appear superior to other antipsychotic drugs. 180
The authors of this meta-analysis note, however, that most of the studies they
reviewed compared SGAs to haloperidol and focused on short-term efficacy
under relatively constrained conditions, whereas CATIE and CUtLASS "fo-
cused on real-world effectiveness" of SGAs compared to lower potency
FGAs.18 Finally, a study of treatment for early-onset psychosis in adoles-
cents, which showed that olanzapine and risperidone were not superior to the
FGA molindone, led investigators to "question the nearly exclusive use of
second-generation antipsychotics to treat early-onset schizophrenia and schi-
zoaffective disorder."' 82
Commenting on the findings in the studies they conducted, the chief in-
vestigators of the CATIE and CUtLASS studies concluded:
176. Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Compatison ofAntipgychotic Medication Effects on Reducng Violence
in People with Schizophrenia, 193 B~iT.J. PSYCHIATRY 37, 37 (2008).
177. Peter B. Jones et al., Randomized Controlled Trial of the Effect on Quah0 of i'fe of Second- vs
First-Generation Anipychotic Drugs in Schizophrenia: Cost Utiliy of the Latest Antipychotic Drugs in
Schizophrenia Study (CUtLASS 1), 63 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1079, 1085 (2006). Again,
the study design allowed use of moderate doses of a lower potency FGA. Id.
178. L. M. Davies et al., Cost-Effectiveness of First- v. Second-Generation Anpychotic Drugs: Results
from a Randomised Controlled Trial in Schizophrenia Responding Poorly to Preuious Therapy, 191 BmRT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 14, 17 (2007).
179. Robert Rosenheck et al., Effectiveness and Cost of Olanzapine and Haloperidolin the Treatment
of Schizophrenia: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 29 JAMA 2693, 2693 (2003).
180. Stefan Leucht et al., Second-Generation Versus First-Generation Antipychotic Dnegs for Schi-
zophrenia: A Meta-Anaysis, 373 LANCET 31, 31 (2009) (small-to-medium effect sizes indicate
superiority of arnisulpride [not available in the U.S.], clozapine, olanzapine, and risperidone).
181. Id., at 40.
182. Linmarie Sikich et al., Double-Bfind Coparison of First- and Second-Generation Antipychotics
in Eary-Onset Schizophrenia and Schio-affective Disorderv Findings From the Treatment of Early-Onset
Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders (TEOSS) Study, 165 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1420, 1420 (2008).
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1F]irst-generation drugs, if carefully prescribed, are as good as most
second-generation drugs in many if not most patients with estab-
lished schizophrenia. This is good news as it increases the range of
choices of antipsychotic drugs. Careful prescribing of first-generation
antipsychotics means using lower doses than was often done in the
past and avoiding high-potency drugs.' 83
Two researchers in schizophrenia put their conclusions quite succinctly:
"Bottom line: the dichotomy between first- and second-generation antipsy-
chotics is not supported by efficacy data (and now, effectiveness data), and
only clozapine has documented superiority in treatment-resistant cases." 184
F. Advertising; Response of Medical Organizations
A growing number of medical authorities believe that "the time has
come to abandon the terms first-generation and second-generation antipsy-
chotics, as they do not merit this distinction," 185 and that psychiatrists were
"beguiled" into thinking otherwise. 186 Thus far, however, the impact of these
findings has been modest. A study of prescribing practices in New York state
public hospitals found that use of perphenazine and clozapine increased fol-
lowing publication of the major CATIE results, suggesting "that CATIE's
findings may not have fallen entirely on deaf ears." However, increases in
uses of these two drugs were modest, and patients receiving of risperidone,
olanzapine, quetiapine, and haloperidol far out-numbered those taking per-
phenazine1 87
A few psychiatrists have attempted to explain the disparity between what
was believed a few years ago and what appears now to be the sobering truth.
CATIE's lead investigator has noted that real-world trials of medications al-
most always show less benefit than do trials designed to satisfy approval re-
quirements of the FDA.188 But in addition,
ITihe claims of superiority for the SGAs were greatly exaggerated.
This may have been encouraged by an overly expectant community
183. Sh6n Lewis & Jeffrey Lieberman, CA7IE and CUTLASS: Can We Handle the Truth? 192
BRiT.J. PSYCHIATRY 161, 163 (2008).
184. William T. Carpenter & Robert W. Buchanan, Lessons to Take Home From CATIE, 59
PSYCHIATRY SERVICES 523, 525 (2008).
185. Peter Tyrer & Tim Kendall, The Spurious Advance of Anotsycbotic Drug Tberapy, 373
LANCET 4, 5 (2009).
186. Shankar Vedantam, In Antipycbotics, Newer Isn't Better. Drug Find Shocks Researchers,
WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 3, 2006, at A01 (quoting Dr. Peter Jones).
187. Leslie Citrome et al., Did CA7E Influence Antp.ycbotic Use? 59 PSYCHIATRY SERViCFS
476, 476 (2008) (after CATIE publications, patients taking perphenazine increased from 1.2%
to 2.6%, but Figure 1 shows that nearly 30% of patients stll received risperidone, 26% received
olanzapine, 22% received quetiapine, and 18% received haloperidol).
188. Jeffrey A. Lieberman, Comparative Effectiveness ofAntipychotic Drugs, 63 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 1069, 1069 (2006) (citing T. Scott Stroup et al., Clinical T7ialsforAnipycbotic Drugs:
Design Conventions, Dilemmas and Innovations, 5 NAT. REV. DRUG DIsCOVERY 133 (2006)).
HeinOnline -- 13 Mich. St. U. J. Med. & L. 296 2009
Promoing, Prescribin, and Pushing Pills 297
of clinicians and patients eager to believe in the power of new medi-
cations. At the same time, the aggressive marketing of ISGAs] may
have contributed to this enhanced perception of their effectiveness in
the absence of empirical evidence.' 89
Three psychiatrists with expertise in public policy matters agree that fi-
nancial incentives played an important role: "the rapid adoption of the
second-generation antipsychotics was hastened by the high degree of profita-
bility of these medications, which helped to promote a belief ... that these
drugs represented 'best practice' treatments."' 90 Two British psychiatrists
were more blunt: "The spurious invention of the atypicals can now be re-
garded as invention only, cleverly manipulated by the drug industry for mar-
keting purposes and only now being exposed."' 191
The recognition of marketing's contribution to the ascendancy of SGAs
comes at a time when all medical specialties are recognizing that commercial
product promotion can have a pernicious effect on patient care and clinical
decision-making. We return to this topic in Part IV, but we first summarize
how litigators have responded to the harms and costs of SGAs.
III. LEGAL RESPONSES: HOLDING DRUG COMPANIES RESPONSIBLE
A. Litigation Concerning Olanzapine: An Illustrative Case
Over the past decade, Eli Lilly & Company has born the brunt of legal
actions filed by various parties with grievances about SGAs.192 In Lilly's case,
the accusations have centered on allegations of failure to disclose side effects
and off-label marketing of the highly successful SGA olanzapine, which Lilly
markets under the trade name Zyprexa®. Resolution of this litigation contin-
ued as we completed this article, and fully chronicling these cases with appro-
priate depth is thus impossible. Even were all the litigated concluded, howev-
er, providing a comprehensive summary would take us far beyond our in-
tended scope.193 Here, we only highlight Lilly's recent legal predicaments,
which illustrate the array of legal consequences that pharmaceutical manufac-
turers can face if they fail to adhere to or knowingly circumvent regulations on
the promotions of their products.
189. Lieberman, supra note 188, at 1070.
190. Robert Drake et al., What Expkns the Diffusion of Treatments for Mental Illness? 165 Am. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1385, 1388 (2008).
191. Tyrer & Kendall, supra note 185, at 4.
192. Various states have also initiated lawsuits against the manufacturers of the SGAs aripi-
prazole (Abilify®, Bristol-Myers Squibb), risperidone (Risperdal®, Johnson & Johnson), and
quetiapine (Seroquel®, AstraZeneca). PsychSearch.net, State Lawsuits - Atypical Antipsychot-
ics, http://www.psychsearch.net/lawsuits.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
193. In addition to the substantive state and federal legal claims that we focus on here, the
litigation has often raised complex jurisdictional and procedural issues that, for purposes of
exposition, we largely ignore.
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The successful promotion and sale of effective, safe pharmaceutical
products is in drug companies' ultimate self-interest. We can think of no rea-
son why pharmaceutical manufacturers should not realize this. We therefore
believe that the most plausible explanations for their behavior-even when
that behavior clearly skirts regulations-should emphasize the companies'
belief that their products are useful and will help people. Nonetheless, as this
section explains, the potential litigation losses for manufacturers who fad to
"play by the rules" can run into several billion dollars.194
Lawsuits have been filed by both state attorney general offices and olan-
zapine users themselves, asserting that Lilly failed to warn.the public of prob-
lematic health conditions linked to the use the drug and illegally marketed the
drug for off-label uses.
1. States Cases
In March 2008, Lilly settled its first state-initiated, olanzapine-related
lawsuit for $15 million.195 The suit, filed in April 2006 by the Alaska Attorney
General's Office, alleged that Lilly had known about olanzapine's potential to
cause high blood sugar, weight gain, diabetes, and pancreatitis, and nonethe-
less failed to warn both the FDA and the public about such risks. 196 The
complaint also stated that Lilly had failed to mention these risks in its nation-
wide olanzapine marketing campaign and had even instructed its salespeople
(or, to use physicians' term, "drug reps"'19  to downplay the drug's side ef-
fects. 198 Much like the complaints filed by other states' attorneys general, the
Alaska complaint set forth the following counts:
" strict products liability for failure to warn
* strict products liability for design defect
* fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation
* general negligence, and
* violations of the state's unfair trade practices and consumer pro-
tection statutes.
19 9
According to news sources, Alaska believed the suit to be worth some
$200 million dollars.200
194. Alex Berenson, Lil4 Settks With 18,000 OverZyprexa, N.Y. TIMFS, Jan. 5. 2007, at C1.
195. Jacob Goldstein, I illy Settles Alaska Zyprexa Case for $15 Million, WALL ST. J. HEALTH
BLOG, Mar. 26, 2008, http://blogs.wsjcom/health/ 2008/03/26/llfly-settles-alaska-zyprexa-
case-for-1 5-million (last visited Aug. 10, 2008).
196. Complaint at 3, Alaska v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 3AN-06-5630 CIV (Alaska Super. Ct.
Feb. 28, 2006).
197. Elliott, supra note 6. Dr. Elliott is a physician and ethicist at the University of Minne-
sota.
198. Complaint, supra note 196, at 6.
199. Id. at 9-14.
200. See Goldstein, supra note 195.
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As of early 2009, other states that had filed suit against Lilly included
Connecticut, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia; 20 1 these lawsuits were filed
between 2005 and 2008, with Connecticut's being the most recent in March
2008.202 The Connecticut complaint also alleged that Lilly had knowingly
misrepresented olanzapine's harmful side effects, including diabetes, weight
gain, and cardiovascular problems, thereby causing the Connecticut Medical
Assistance Program (CMAP) to incur financial injury and state consumers to
suffer medical injury. 203 Unlike the Alaska complaint, the Connecticut com-
plaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York-the location of the multi-district Zyprexa litigation 20 4 (MDL; also
referred to as the "Zyprexa MIDL"). 205 In addition, Connecticut's complaint
contained claims for violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO)20 6 against Lilly for unlawful marketing practices. 20 7
201. See PsychSearch.net, supra note 192. Although they did not file lawsuits, other states
have taken investigative steps against Lilly regarding olanzapine. Id. For instance, California,
Florida, and Illinois each subpoenaed Lilly for documents relating to the drug. Id. Lilly's 2007
SEC annual filing reports that thirty states were "part of a multistate investigative effort being
coordinated by an executive committee of attorneys general" that was investigating the compa-
ny. Eli Lilly & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K/A) at 35, 75 (Oct. 21, 2008), available at
http://investor.lilly.com/secfihng.cfm?filinglD=950137-08-12864.
202. Complaint at 1, Connecticut v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. CV-08-955 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6,
2008).
203. Id. at 5.
204. Multidistrict litigation is outlined in Title 28, § 1407 of the United States Code, which
explains when such litigation may be appropriate and the procedures that follow once the in-
volved cases have been consolidated:
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in dif-
ferent districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or con-
solidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on
multidistrict litigation . . . upon its determination that transfers for such proceedings
will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and effi-
cient conduct of such actions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the
panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from
which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated: Provided, howev-
er, That the panel may separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party
claim and remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action is remanded.
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006).
205. See United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, MDL-1596: In re Zyprexa
Products Liability Litigation,
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/Docket Information/body-docket-information.html (last
visited Apr. 25, 2009). Other states taking part in the MDL have included Louisiana, Montana,
New Mexico, Mississippi, and West Virginia. See also Class Action Certification Draft Discus-
sion at 22, In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation, No. 04-MD-1596 (E.D.N.Y. July 2,
2008).
206. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2008). RICO provides a private right of action, resulting in
treble damages, for those "injured in their business or property" through another's racketeering
activities. Michael R. Flaherty, Cause of Action for Treble Damages for Violation of the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt OTganiZations Act, 11 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 627 (2008). In addition to proving
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2. Recpient-Initiated Lawsuits
Individual recipients of olanzapine-most of whom presumably suffer
from significant mental illness-are personally affected by the drug's side
effecjs. Their claims against Lilly have been similar to those asserted by the
states. But until the October 2008 and January 2009 settlements discussed
below, there had been much more action by Lilly to settle patients' claims.
In April 2004, the federal Zyprexa MDL was consolidated in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for common fact
and discovery purposes.2 8 At consolidation, six user-initiated lawsuits from
federal districts in California, Kentucky, Louisiana, North Carolina, Ohio, and
Tennessee "share[d] allegations concerning the safety of Zyprexa. ' ' 20 9 But
more lawsuits were both pending and anticipated even then. As the court's
transfer order explained, "Given the geographic dispersal of current and antic-
ipated constituent actions, no district stands as the focal point for this wide-
ranging litigation." 210  The Zyprexa MDL has included-and continues to
include-claims filed by state attorneys general, injured recipient-plaintiffs,
insurance companies, and labor unions. 21' In mid-2005, Lilly agreed to pay
$700 million to more than 7,000 of these plaintiffs.212
a violation of the RICO statute which includes proving an element of criminal activity-
plaintiffs must also prove that they "ha[ve] been injured in [their] business or property by rea-
son of the violation." Id.
207. Complaint, supra note 202, at 6-7.
208. Transfer Order at 1, In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation, No. 1:04-MD-1596
(E.D.N.Y. 2004). In 2005, an MDL was also created to handle cases by plaintiffs against Merck
& Co. related to Vioxx's heightened risks of heart attacks and strokes. See Alex Berenson,
Analysts See Merck Victogy in Vioxx Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2007, at Al, available at 2007
WLNR 22240638. At the time of its consolidation, the Vioxx MDL encompassed 148 separate
actions from 41 federal districts. Transfer Order at 1, In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation,
MDL Docket No. 1657 (Feb. 16, 2005) [hereinafter MDL Transfer Order].
209. MDL Transfer Order, supra note 208, at 2.
210. Id. at 3.
211. The MDL claims against Lilly by insurance companies and labor unions have been
based on both state and federal law-the latter alleging specifically that the drug company
violated RICO in marketing Zyprexa. Mark Fass, Narrow Zyprexa Class Certified, Sealed Files
Released, LAW.COM, Sept. 8 2008, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202424340649. In July 2008, District Judge Jack
Weinstein proposed class action status for the MDL RICO claims against Lilly, hoping that the
threat would spur Lilly to settle, which he himself encouraged, explaining-
A global settlement... is desirable. Legal disputes of this nature should be resolved as
quickly and comprehensively as possible so that government, the medical profession,
and drug manufacturers can get on with their main job-protecting the people's health
effectively at the cheapest practicable cost.
Class Action Certification Draft Discussion at 290, In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation,
No. 04-MD-1596 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2008). In September 2008, Judge Weinstein granted class
action status to "third-party payors" involved in the Zyprexa litigation, including labor unions
and insurance companies. Fass, Narrow Zyprexa Class Cerified, Sep. 8 2008. However, Judge
Weinstein limited the status strictly to those involving RICO. Id.
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In addition to the "quasi-class action" 213 settlement just described, olan-
zapine recipients have also filed a number of non-"class action" lawsuits, al-
leging products liability claims centered on Lilly's failure to warn about the
drug's harmful side effects. For instance, Lilly settled 18,000 lawsuits for $500
million in early 2007, bringing the total at that time to "at least $1.2 billion
[paid] to 28,500 people who said they were injured by [the] drug."'214 Lilly set-
tled another 900 individual user suits later that year.215 But even after that
settlement, the drug company still "face[d] product liability lawsuits from
about 750 [olanzapine] patients. '216
3. Recent Developments
a. October 2008 Settlement
In early October 2008, Lilly announced that it had agreed to settle con-
sumer protection claims with thirty-three states 217 for $62 million.218 The
settlement came in the midst of an investigation by the Illinois and Oregon
attorneys general into Lilly's marketing of olanzapine for non-approved, off-
label uses.219 The settlement exceeded "the $58 million that Merck paid to
settle similar allegations about" rofecoxib 22° thus becoming the largest set-
212. See Eli Lilly & Co. to Pay $700 Million in Product lability Group Settlement, MENTAL
HEALTH WKLY. DIG., July 25, 2005, at 32. Judge Weinstein approved the settlement in Sep-
tember 2006 for, at that time, 8,362 plaintiffs. Jeff Swiatek, Judge Approves $700 Million Zyprexa
Deal, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 28, 2006, available at 2 006 WLNR 16910731.
213. At the Mass Tort Litigation Blog, Professor Howard M. Erichson has in this way
characterized Judge Weinstein's attitude towards the Zyprexa MDL with regard to settlements,
explaining that the Zyprexa MDL's technically non-class aggregate settlements set it apart from
other mass tort cases where settlements were achieved for traditional class actions. Howard M.
Erichson, Zyprexa Settlements: Round Two, MASS TORT LITIGATION BLOG, Jan. 4, 2007,
http://lawprofessors. typepad.com/mass-tortjfitigation/2007/01/zyprexa_settlem.html.
214. Berenson, supra note 194.
215. Ek Lily Settles Lawsuits Over Anti-Pgychofic Drug, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 13,
2007, at 2C, available at 2007 WLNR 11093768.
216. Will Connaghan, Commentary: Watch Out for Side Effects from Advertising, DAILY RECORD
(Kansas City, Mo.) June 15, 2007.
217. This includes the District of Columbia. John O'Brien, Eli lily Case Goes Fonvard,
LEGAL NEWSLINE, Nov. 21, 2008, available at http://www.legalnewsline.com/news/217559-eli-
lilly-case-goes-forward.
218. Alex Berenson, 33 States to Get $62 Milion in Zprexa Case Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,
2008, at B7, available at 2008 WLNR 19031435.
219. Id.
220. Id. Vioxx® is the proprietary name for rofecoxib, a nonsteroidal prescription pain
reliever that was withdrawn from the U.S. market in September 2004. MedicineNecom, Rofe-
coxib, http://www.medicinenet.com/rofecoxib/article.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2009).
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tlement of its kind-even though eleven other states chose not to partici-
pate.221
In November 2008, Judge Weinstein granted Lilly and the six states par-
ticipating in the MDL "a month off to hammer out a[ settlement] agree-
ment."222 According to the judge, who had encouraged settlement in the past,
"[ilt would be useful to settle all pending attorney general claims at the same
time since the issues in each are much the same.
'223
b. January 2009 Settlement: Criminal Implication
In early January 2009, news outlets broke the story that Lilly would plead
guilty to a misdemeanor charge concerning its marketing of olanzapine, 224
implying an admission of wrongdoing by the drug company. Beside agreeing
to a $515 million criminal fine, Lilly also announced that it would pay $438
million to the federal government and $362 million to the states. 225 In all, the
settlement totaled $1.415 billion.
In conjunction with the settlement announcement, Lilly's CEO, John C.
Lechleiter, stressed that the company 'deeply regret[ted] the past actions cov-
ered by the misdemeanor plea,"' and that Lilly .'take[s] seriously [its] business
practices, and .. .realize[s] that [it] ha[s] a tremendous responsibility to ...
patients and health-care professionals.' ' 226 Notably, the settlement incorpo-
rates changes in the company's business practices: Lilly will have its employees
undergo additional training on government regulations, have an independent
auditor assess its business operations, and continue an in-house governmental
compliance monitoring program.227
This settlement represents a giant step toward resolving olanzapine-
related litigation-and in implementing reforms in promotion methods. In
May 2009, settlement sums between Lilly and Georgia and Massachusetts
221. O'Brien, supra note 217. The 11 states include Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Louisi-
ana, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, and West Virgin-
ia. While the suits by Connecticut, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, and West
Virginia are before Judge Weinstein in the Zyprexa MDL, the suits by the remaining states are
pending in state courts. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. Judge Weinstein further explained that .'[iln view of the applicable statute of
limitations, it is unlikely that any new cases can be brought successfully. A global settlement of
all cases, including those pending in state courts, is desirable."' Id
224. John Russell, Eli I-ll to Pay $1.4 Bilion in Zyprexa Probe, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 16,
2009, available at 2009 WLNR 920566. Specifically, the charge concerned the marketing of
Zyprexa for the elderly during the period of 1999 to 2001. Id.
225. Id. These payments are related to the federal government's investigation, which thirty
or so states joined, into Lilly's promotion of the drug. Lilly, however, would "not admit to...
civil allegation[s ] connected to improperly promoting Zyprexa." Id. Instead, it stated that it
would settle for "business reasons." Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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were announced. 228 But outstanding lawsuits against the manufacturer re-
main. The status of the claims by both states and individuals 229 remaining in
the MDL, for instance, is still up in the air230 -and the pre-trial phase of the
litigation continues to be active with motions,231 discovery conflicts, 232 and
expert testimony debates. 233
4. Concluding Thoughts
In aggregate, states' and recipients' claims have made olanzapine-related
litigation a prominent legal event over the past few years. For Lilly, the litiga-
tion has been both financially costly and has repeatedly generated negative
publicity about the company in popular press accounts and in legal, medical,
and corporate publications.
B. Antipsychotic Drug Litigation: Areas of Law
Having summarized the outcomes of complaints filed against Lilly as of
early 2009, we next provide a summary of potential and actual claims against
an SGA manufacturer.
1. Products Liability
The products liability claims made against Lilly and olanzapine have been
primarily based on the strict liability theories of design and warning defects.
The doctrine of "strict" products liability involving defects developed in the
mid-twentieth century, with the aid of the Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
228. See Martin Berman-Gorvine, Eli lilly Pays $15 Million to Settle Zyprexa Iitgaion in Geor-
gia, 8 DRUG INDUS. DAILY 87, May 5, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 8546942; Julie M. Donnelly,
Mass. Gets $22.5M in Eli Lily Settlement, BOSTON Bus. J., May 18, 2009, available at
http://boston.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2009/05/18/daily3.html (last visited June 1,
2009).
229. Claims by individual recipients of olanzapine also remain in the MDL. See e.g., In re
Zyprexa Products Lability Litigation, 2009 WL 1044508 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2009) (granting
summary judgment for defendant hospital based on fraudulent joinder in an action brought by
decedent's estate against the hospital and Lilly).
230. See John O'Brien, Eli Lilly Finaling $1.4 Billon Settlement, LEGAL NEWSLINE, Jan. 15,
2009, available at http://www.legalnewsline.com/news/218553-ehi-lilly-finalizing-1.4-billion-
settlement (noting the state lawsuits still outstanding against Lilly); see also In re Zyprexa Prod-
ucts Liability Litigation, 2009 WL 1173069 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2009) (citing the addition of
lawsuits by Idaho and Minnesota to the MDL).
231. See e.g., In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation, 2009 WL 691942 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
11, 2009) (denying New Mexico's motion to remand its action to state court).
232. See In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation, 2009 WL 1310890 (E.D.N.Y. May 8,
2009) (denying Connecticut's motion to compel Lilly's production of certain documents).
233. See In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation, 2009 WL 1322292 (E.D.N.Y. May 12,
2009) (denying plaintiffs motion to exclude testimony of Lilly's expert).
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Inc.234 decision and the American Law Institute's (AIl) Restatement (Second) of
Torts Section 402A.235
a. Design Defect
Most states have adopted Section 402A.236 Under that section, product
manufacturers are liable for injuries caused by products found to be "in a de-
fective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer... ."37 A
claim based on design defect of a product alleges that the entire line of that
product is defective.2 38 However, the courts have diverged when it comes to
addressing the issue of whether a product is "unreasonably dangerous" be-
cause of its design.2 39 Some courts, for example, employ a consumer expecta-
tions test. "[For a plaintiff to recover [using that test], the defect in a product
which causes his injuries must not be one which the plaintiff, as an ordinary
consumer, would know to be unreasonably dangerous to him. 2'240 Other
courts employ a "risk-utility" test, which asks whether or not "a reasonable
234. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). In Greenman, Justice Traynor found a combination power
tool manufacturer strictly liable for a defect in the product that injured the plaintiff. Id. at 901.
In abandoning contract theories in favor of strict liability, Justice Traynor explained that "rules
defining and governing warranties that were developed to meet the needs of commercial trans-
actions cannot properly be invoked to govern the manufacturer's liability to those injured by
their defective products unless those rules also serve the purposes for which such liability is
imposed." Id..
235. Under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Special Liability of Seller of Product
for Physical Harm to User or Consumer is
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contrac-
tual relation with the seller.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
236. See Matthew R. Sorenson, Comment, A Reasonable Alternative? Sbould Wyoming Adopt the
Restatement (1hird) of Torts: Products Jiabili y?, 3 Wyo. L. REV. 257, 262 (2003).
237. Id.
238. See e.g., J. Stanley Mcquade, Products lI abi'fy - Emerging Consensus and Persisting Problems:
An Anaytical Retiew Presenting Some Opions, 25 CAMPBELL. L. REv. 1, 47 (2002).
239. Another approach has also surfaced following Section 402A in design defect cases
"because [the section] gave no guidance as to what to do in a design defect case": a combina-
tion of both the consumer expectations and risk-utility tests. Id. at 264.
240. Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 254 (Miss. 1993) (Mississippi Su-
preme Court explicitly abandons the consumer expectations test in strict products liability cases
in favor of the risk-utility test).
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person would conclude that the danger-in-fact, whether foreseeable or not,
outweighs the utility of the product. '241
With regard to prescription drugs specifically, Section 402A's comment k
states, "There are some products which... are quite incapable of being made
safe for their intended and ordinary use," and notes this designation is "espe-
cially common in the field of drugs. ' 242 Under comment k, products in this
category, encompassing "many other drugs, vaccines, and the like," are
deemed not defective and not unreasonably dangerous when "properly pre-
pared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning. ' 243 Courts have
taken varying views on comment k's application to prescription drugs.244
In the 1990s, the ALI took a different approach to strict products liabili-
ty.245 With the Restatement (Fhird) of Torts: Products L'abiliy, the ALI not only
"ma[de] a tripartite-type division" between manufacturing, design, and warn-
ing defects, but also adopted the risk-utility test outright.246 Notable for our
241. Id. The risk-utility test has been equated with the formula for determining when negli-
gence should be implied that Judge Learned Hand created in United States v. Carroll Towing
Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). See David G. Owen, Design Defects, 73 Mo. L. REv. 291,
312-314 (2008). Additionally, many courts invoke the so-called "Wade Factors" when assessing
risk-utility in a design defect case. See id. at 315-322 (listing the factors and describing their
history). See also David G. Owen, John E. Montgomery, & Mary J. Davis, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
AND SAFETY 226-299 (5th ed. 2007).
242. See RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, cmt. k (1965).
243. Id.
244. See George H. King, Case Note, A Prescription for Appying Strict Liabiliy: Not All Drugs
Deserve Comment K Immunization, Brown v. Superior Court, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809 (1989). While
"[s]ome courts have held that the decision of the FDA to approve a dug or device and make it
available only by prescription [under comment k] make it unavoidably dangerous as a matter of
law," id. at 817, others have rejected this position-and may not consider comment k to include
all prescription drugs. Id. at 818-19.
245. Sorenson, supra note 236 at 266.
246. Id. In addition to the risk-utility test described supra note 235, the R-ESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY requires that a plaintiff demonstrate the existence of a
reasonable alternative design for the particular product. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY §2(b), cmt. e-f (1998). As comment b points out, "[Section] 2(b) ...
reflects the substantial body of case law suggesting that reasonable alternative design is the
predominant, yet not exclusive, method for establishing defective design." Id. at cmt. b.
In the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, Section 402A's "un-
reasonably dangerous" standard has evolved to become a "not reasonably safe" standard in
design and warning defect cases. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§2(b)-(c) (1998); Dominick Vetri, Order Out of Chaos: Products Liabi4y Design-Defect Law, 43 U.
RICH. L. REv. 1373, 1406 (noting that this "language ... evokes a negligence standard without
using the word 'negligence"').
A products liability lawsuit, particularly one employing a risk-utility test where a rea-
sonable alternative design is required, will often involve (and potentially hinge on) expert testi-
mony. See generally Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Believing in Products Liabiliy: Reflections on Daubert, Doc-
trinal Evolution, and David Owen's Products Liabiliy Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 511 (2006). As a
result, the evidentiary standards for expert testimony set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)-or a state's interpretations of those or other factors
will become a crucial element of the underlying tort case itself. See id. at 523-24.
HeinOnline -- 13 Mich. St. U. J. Med. & L. 305 2009
13 MSU JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND LAW 263 (2009)
purposes, however, is a specific section in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod-
ucts Liabiliy concerning drugs and drug manufacturers, 247 which articulates a
steeper burden for plaintiffs alleging design defect(s) of a prescription drug:
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to
defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or
medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable the-
rapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of
such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe
the drug or medical device for any class of patients.248
But while Section 6 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products l'abiliy favors
drug manufacturers, the group ultimately desires even greater protection. In
Wyeth v. Lxtine, 249 for example, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals argued for the preemp-
tion of tort liability for manufacturers whose medications or devices have
been deemed marketable by the FDA.250 However, the Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Justice Stevens, ultimately rejected this position: "We conclude
that it is not impossible for Wyeth to comply with its state and federal law
obligations and that Levine's common-law claims do not stand as an obstacle
to the accomplishment of Congress' purposes in the [Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA)]." 251 Specifically, the history of the FDCA showed
that, contrary to Wyeth's claims, "Congress did not intend FDA oversight to
be the exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and effectiveness. '252 Thus,
state tort-based cases remain an available avenue for plaintiffs to seek recom-
pense for drug-induced injuries.
b. Warning Defect
Under Section 402A's comment j., "In order to prevent [a] product from
being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or
warning, on the container, as to its use. ' '253 A product may be deemed defec-
tive, then, when an injured plaintiff can show that its warning label or instruc-
tions were inadequate in some way254 or absent.255 The elements involved in a
warning defect case include
247. RESTATFNiENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §6 (1998).
248. Id. at §6(c).
249. 129 S.Ct. 1187 (2009).
250. Nan Aron & John Philo, Drugmakers Seek Lawsuit Immuniy, DETROIT FREE PRE.SS, Feb.
20, 2009, available at
http://www.freep.com/article/20090220/OPINIONO5/902200328/1068/rss06.
251. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1204; see also Jacob Goldstein, Supreme Court Rules in
Wyeth v. Levine, WALL ST.J. HEALTH BLOG, Mar. 4, 2009,
http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/03/04/supreme-court-rues-in-wyeth-v-levine (last visited
June 1, 2009).
252. Wyeth, 129 S.Ct. at 1200.
253. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, cmt. j (1965).
254. See e.g., RESTATEiENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCrS LIABILITY §2(c). However, a
plaintiff's manufacturing or design defect claim will not be defeated simply by a manufacturer
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that the defendant manufacturer .. knew or should have known of
the dangers related to the product's intended use; (2) the product's
user/consumer was reasonably unaware of those dangers; (3) the de-
fendant manufacturer . . . failed to exercise reasonable care to notify
the user/consumer of the products unsafe condition or facts which
make the product prone to be dangerous; and (4) the risk and degree
of harm was large enough to justify that a warning should have been
provided.25 6
The success of a warning defect case is tied to the element of proximate
cause. 257 Plaintiffs in such cases must show that the warning(s) they argue for
would have prevented the injuries sustained.258 As described above, there still
remains the matter of how Section 402A, comment k applies in a prescription
drug situation.259
Interestingly, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liabilio Section 6(d)
carves out a specific duty for manufacturers of "[a] prescription drug or medi-
cal device" to properly instruct or warn prescribers 260 (to help them make the
best decisions for their patients261) and patients (for "drugs that are dispensed
. . . without the personal intervention or evaluation of a health-care provid-
er' '262) of "foreseeable risks" associated with use. 263 The section also notes
that a claim of warning defect "is the major basis of liability for manufacturers
of prescription drugs and medical devices. '264 In terms of developing ade-
quate warning labels for their products under this provision, then, drug manu-
supplying a warning. J. Scott Dutcher, Comment, Caution: This Superman Suit Will Not Enable
You To Fy--Are Consumer Product Warning Labels Out of Control?, 38 Az. ST. L. J. 633, 635 (2006).
Additionally, although "strict" liability-based, warning defects claims have been equated with
negligence claims. See id. at 635, n.11.
255. Dutcher, supra note 254 at 637.
256. Id. at 636.
257. See id.
258. See id. As Dutcher explains, "Many common law courts have dropped the requirement
that had there been a proper warning for the product, the user [plaintifq would have heeded it,
because courts assume that all plaintiffs would always testify that they would have heeded the
warning." Id. at n.14.
259. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
260. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 6(d) (1998).
261. See id. at cmt. d.
262. Id. at cmt. e.
263. Id. at §6(d). The section reads in full,
(d) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to inadequate in-
structions or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks
of harm are not provided to:
(1) prescribing and other health-care providers who are in a position to reduce the
risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings; or
(2) the patient when the manufacturer knows or has reason to know what health-care
providers will not be in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the
instructions or warnings.
Id. at §6(d).
264. Id at cmt. d.
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facturers ultimately must seek to meet the informational needs of both doc-
tors and patients.
Concerning the products liability claims alleged against Lilly, it cannot be
denied that olanzapine has helped many thousands of people with treating
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and other mental illnesses. 265 As one Lilly-
employed psychiatrist explained,
While the potential side effects for any medication must be taken into
consideration when evaluating treatment options, it is equally impor-
tant not to lose sight of the benefits. More than 22 million people
have taken Zyprexa. For many, it's helped them obtain employment,
maintain housing, and re-establish relationships. 266
Like olanzapine, SGAs have helped a multitude of patients around the world.
The SGAs clearly have drawbacks, but so do the alternatives (FGAs, or no
drug treatment at all). As we have seen, even those psychiatrists who regard
FGAs and SGAs as equivalent overall acknowledge that for individual patients
one type of drug may be far more useful and acceptable than others. It is
therefore hard to conclude that SGAs are defective products simpliciter, espe-
cially under a risk-utility theory or under Section 6 of the Restatement (Third) of
Products Li'ability.
2. Coroorate Law Implications: SEA 51O(b) and SEC Rule lOb-5
In addition to recipients and purchasers of SGAs, shareholders in phar-
maceutical companies are potentially affected by extensive and costly litiga-
tion. In 2007, Lilly shareholders sued the corporation in the Eastern District
of New York for its behavior regarding olanzapine. 267 The shareholders al-
leged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) §10(b), 268 and
the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule lOb-5, which the SEC
created to enforce 510(b);2 69 these provisions relate to shareholder communi-
cation.270 Under Rule 10b-5, it is "unlawful for any person, directly or indi-
rectly," 271 to employ a mechanism to defraud, make untrue statements of ma-
terial facts, omit material facts that would make a statement no longer mis-
265. Other possible defenses in a strict products liability case could include unforeseeable
misuse of the product by a plaintiff, alterations to the product, or assumption of the risk.
266. Sara Corya, Letter to the Editor, Drug's Benefits Should Not Be Overlooked, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMFs, Dec. 23, 2007, at 2P, available at 2007 WLNR 25325060.
267. Lawsuit Filed Against Eli Lil/ by Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., OBESITY, FITNESS &
WELLNESS WEEK, Apr. 21, 2007, at 307, available at 2007 WLNR 7008003 [hereinafter Grantd.
268. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2009).
269. See 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1951); see also 69A AM.JUR. 2D Securiies Regulation -- Federal§
1514 (2008) (explaining the ability of the SEC to adopt rules to carry out the intent of certain
federal securities laws).
270. The lawsuit also made allegations under SEA §20(a), which discusses the availability of
joint and several liability for SEA violations. See Grant, supra note 255.
271. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5.
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leading, or engage in an act that "would operate as fraud or deceit upon any
person.... "272 Nonetheless, Rule lOb-5 is only applicable to shareholder
communications that were made "in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security. '273 The shareholder class action, as a result, was limited to those
persons who had purchased Lilly stock between March 28, 2002 and Decem-
ber 22, 2006.274
The crux of this lawsuit was a claim that Lilly misrepresented olanza-
pine's side effects to shareholders through its marketing campaigns. 275 The
suit also claimed that Lilly marketed olanzapine for uses that were not FDA
approved in violation of FDA marketing regulations. 276  Approximately a
year after it was filed, Judge Weinstein dismissed the shareholder suit for ex-
ceeding the SEA's statute of limitations.277 His dismissal explained that '[flor
years before the statute of limitations barred this suit, the red triangular flags
of an incipient hurricane had been figuratively hoisted over Lilly and Zyprex-
a,"' and so "'[t]he reasonable investor c[ould not] blink away what the market
[had] see[n]."' 278
Interestingly, a similar issue continues to survive in still-ongoing rofecox-
ib litigation. Though Merck has settled a number of claims related to the side
effects of its prescription pain reliever,279 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the dismissal of a shareholder lawsuit against the company related to
the medication in September 2008, four years after the company took the drug
off the U.S. market. 280 The lawsuit, which contended that Merck misled and
omitted information related to rofecoxib-associated risks of heart attacks and
strokes, had previously been dismissed by the district court for exceeding the
statute of limitations.281  According to the Third Circuit, the plaintiff-
shareholder class made a timely filing of its lawsuit, because "amid early signs
of trouble with Vioxx, Merck was still reassuring investors about the safety of
[the drug] and financial analysts were projecting growth in sales. 282
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See Grant, supra note 267.
275. Id.
276. See id.
277. See Eli Lilly Wins Dismissal of Zyprexa Shareholders Suits, PHARMA Bus. DAILY BULL., May
1, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 8073598.
278. Id.
279. Court Reinstates Merck Vioxx Shareholder Lawsuit, INT'L. HERALD TRIBUNE, Sep. 9, 2008,
available at http://www.iht com/articles/ap/2008/09/09/business/NA-US-Merck-Vioxx-
Lawsuit.php.
280. Id.
281. Id.; see Berenson, Merck Victory, supra note 208.
282. Court Reinstates, sufpra note 279. In late May 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to hear Merck's appeal in this case. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, No. 08-905, 2009 U.S. LEXIS
3913 (May 26, 2009). At issue is when the statute of limitations begins to run in this type of
securities lawsuit. See Ashby Jones, On Vioxx, Storm Warings and the Supreme Court, WALL ST. J.
LAw BLOG, May 27, 2009,
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a. Elements of a Rule 10b-5 Claim
If not for dismissal under the statute of limitations, Lilly shareholders
meeting Rule 10b-5's standing requirement (being either purchasers or sellers
of Lilly stock)283 in the lawsuit referenced above would have additionally
needed to show elements of materiality, scienter, reliance, economic loss, and
loss causation in order for their cause of action to survive.284 Under the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), class action plaintiffs
invoking Rule lOb-5 must plead their cases "with particularity. ' '285 Materiality
can be illustrated via the importance of the information at issue. In TSC In-
duslries, Inc. v. Nortbway,286 the U.S. Supreme Court explained that "[a]n omitted
fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote. '287 Olanzapine has been
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2O9/O5/27/on-vioxx-storm-warnings-and-the-supreme-court/
(last visited Jun. 1, 2009); see also Jacob Goldstein, Supremes Will Hear Merck Appeal in Viox:
Shareholder Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG, May 27, 2009,
http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/05/27/supremes-wiHl-hear-merck-appeal-in-vioxx-
shareholder-lawsuit/ (last visited Jun. 1, 2009). As Goldstein explains, a ruling in this case
"could clarify the rules for how much information is enough to start the clock running, which
could have widespread implications for the statute of limitations for filing securities-fraud
claims." Id.
283. Regarding the requirement of "a connection with the purchase or sale of a security,"
see Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975)). In Blue Chi, the Supreme Court noted that
"virtually all lower federal courts.., have reaffirmed [the] conclusion that the plaintiff class for
purposes of a 10(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5 private damages actions is limited to purchasers and sellers
of securities." 421 U.S. at 731.
284. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 341-42. Another interpretation of the elements is as follows:
While the elements of an action under §10(b) of the [SEA] and SEC Rule 10b-5 the-
reunder have been variously stated by the courts, it is generally agreed that there must
be proven: (1) use of the means or instrumentalities of insterstate commerce; (2) to im-
plement a deceptive or manipulative practice; (3) with the requisite scienter; (4) in con-
nection with; (5) the offer or sale; (6) of a security; (7) causing, (8) damages.
69A AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation -Federal § 1466 (2009).
285. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2009). The PSLRA altered the pleadings requirements for
securities class actions. See Jonathan C. Dickey, Current Trends in Federal Securities Liigation, 101
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 725, 731 (2007). According to the PSLRA, where a material omission or false
statement has been alleged, "ITlhe complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regard-
ing the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed." 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(1). A similar plead-
ing requirement exists for causes of action which hinge "on proof that the defendant acted with
a particular state of mind." Id at §78u-4(b)(2). For more on issues related to interpreting the
PSLRA's requirements, including pleading the elements of scienter and loss causation for a Rule
1 Ob-5 claim discussed in this section, see Dickey, supra.
286. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
287. Id. at 449. Although TSC actually revolved around an SEC Rule 14a-9 issue, the mate-
riality standard under both provisions is the same.
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Lilly's number one selling drug,288 and information relating to harmful side
effects arguably could have been something its shareholders would have
found important.
To illustrate reliance (also known as transaction causation) in a securities
class action, the "fraud on the market" theory-where "reliance is presumed
when the statements at issue become public"-is typically invoked.289 Lilly's
marketing campaigns for olanzapine, thus, could have been employed to show
impact on the plaintiff-shareholders. As for Rule 10b-5's scienter requirement,
plaintiffs in general must show something greater than negligence, such as
recklessness. 290
Finally, Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs must allege and ultimately show an eco-
nomic loss of some sort,291 as well as loss causation, which mirrors the "prox-
imate cause" requirement seen in basic tort law. 292 Pleading loss causation is a
sticky issue for courts in securities litigation,293 but put most simply, there
must be "a causal connection between the material misrepresentation [alleged]
and the loss. 294
3. Claims Under Federal Off-Label Prohibitions
During the rofecoxib litigation, the FDA came under heavy fire for fail-
ing to withdraw the drug more quickly after its harmful cardiovascular side
effects came to light.295 FDA-related issues concerning olanzapine and other
SGAs arose after litigation began and have focused on promotion of these
drugs for unapproved, off-label uses-most notably, in the case of olanzapine,
for depression.
Under the now-expired Food and Drug Administration Modernization
Act 296 (FDAMA), a 1997 series of amendments to the Food, Drug & Cosmet-
ic Act (FDCA), 297 a drug manufacturer could disseminate information con-
288. Report: EI Lilly Hid Top Drug's Risks, CNNMONEY.CoM, Dec. 16, 2006, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2006/12/16/news/companies/elilly-zyprexa/ index.htm.
289. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Adantica, 128 S.Ct. 761, 769 (2008); see also
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. at 341-42.
290. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 341-42. With regard to the PSLRA and scienter, as Dickey notes,
"the majority of Circuits have held that the court must consider all reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the allegations, including inferences unfavorable to the plaintiffs." Dickey, supra
note 273, at 741.
291. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 342.
292. See id.
293. See Dickey, supra note 285, at 766-80.
294. Id.
295. See Janis Kelly, Harsh Criticism Lobbed at FDA in Senate Vioxx Hearing, MEDSCAPE MED.
NEws, Nov. 23, 2004, http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/ 538021.
296. See 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1997).
297. James O'Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of Bounds? Prescriber and Marketer Liabifly
for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 295, 297 (2003). In brief, the
FDCA performs the following statutory function:
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cerning a drug's off-label uses298 to a limited group: health care practitioners,
pharmacy benefit managers, health insurance issuers, group health plans, or a
Federal or State Government agency.299  Before the FDAMA, the FDCA
prohibited drug manufacturers from engaging to even this extent in off-label
promotion.300 The FDAMA expired in 2006, however.30' As Professor Aus-
ness has commented, in the wake of the FDAMA's expiration, the FDA has
provided "a draft guidance document entitled 'Good Reprint Practices. ' '30 2
This document "identifies how drug manufacturers should distribute scientific
or medical journal reprints, articles, or reference works" concerning off-label
uses; ultimately, "the FDA retains its power to determine whether distribution
of an article or publication constitutes promotion of an unapproved 'new use'
or whether such a product may be considered misbranded or adulterated un-
der the [FDCA]."303 Of course, physicians are not bound by off-label restric-
tions304 and "may use FDA-licensed drugs or medical devices in any way they
believe will benefit their patients and are not limited to approved uses." 305
Turning to the state complaints still pending against Lilly, those in the
MDL contend that the drug company knowingly marketed olanzapine for off-
label uses in violation of federal law. Montana, 306 for instance, alleged that
"Lilly created a 280-person sales force to promote Zyprexa exclusively for off-
label uses, specifically for Long Term Care ("LTC' facilities to maximize off-
label use of Zyprexa sales in elderly population," 30 7 that "Lilly management
participated, encouraged, and authorized the unlawful payment of illegal kick-
[A]fter introductory chapters defining the terms used and listing general prohibitions
and enforcement methods, deals successively with foods, drugs, and cosmetics. It de-
fines adulteration and misbranding for each, and meets peculiar problems in each area
by special regulatory provisions such as definition and standardization of foods and
pre-shipment control of new and untested drugs. It then prescribes the administrative
procedure to be employed, and finally sets forth specific provisions governing imports
and exports.
Harvard Law Review Association, Developments in the Law - The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, 67 HARV. L. REV. 632, 635 (1954).
298. See O'Reilly, supra note 297, at 296.
299. 21 U.S.C. §360aaa(a)(1)-(5) (1997); see also Richard C. Ausness, 'There's Danger Here,
Cherie!": Liabiity for the Promotion and Marketing of Drugs and Medical Devices for Off-L-abel Uses, 73
BROOK. L. REV. 1253, 1259-60, and accompanying footnotes (2008).
300. See Ausness, supra note 299, at 1260-61.
301. See id.
302. Id. at 1261.
303. Id.
304. See id. at 1259.
305. Id.
306. Although its complaint was originally filed in state court, Montana is now part of the
Zyprexa MDL pending in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York. See
O'Brien, spra note 217.
307. Complaint at 9, Montana v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. ADV-2007-188 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Mar.
9, 2007).
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backs to physicians in order to continue generating sales of Zyprexa," 30 8 and
that "Lilly marketed Zyprexa off-label because the drug's on-label uses were
far too narrow to achieve the blockbuster revenues Lilly had planned for the
drug."30 9 Connecticut's complaint alleged that "to gain additional sales and to
compete with other antipyschotics[,] ... Lilly undertook a scheme to market
and promote Zyprexa for off-label purposes," 310 including for unapproved
uses in the treatment of children and elderly persons.31'
The allegations of off-label marketing against Lilly, if ever proved, could
result in both civil and criminal penalties against the corporation under the
FDCA.312 Civil and criminal penalties could similarly arise under RICO for
off-label marketing if the requisite "predicate acts" of racketeering were estab-
lished.313
4. The Quest for Solutions
A variety of potential legal claims serve as potential deterrents to prevent
pharmaceutical companies from marketing faulty products or promoting
those products for unapproved uses. In the case of litigation against the
manufacturer of olanzapine, litigation has resulted in compensation to reci-
pient-victims, civil and criminal financial penalties, and a promise by Lilly to
desist from certain promotion practices. Although the payouts by Lilly have
been extraordinary, drug manufacturers regard a certain amount of product
liability litigation as "normal to our business" 314 as a risk against which they
may insure themselves, or as something they may factor into drug prices.315
More importantly, however, litigation has had little impact on drug sales and
physicians' prescribing practices, and therefore seems an imperfect, at-best-
incomplete response to collective medical judgment errors reflected in physi-
cians' over-enthusiastic adoption of SGAs. In the next Part, we examine oth-
er factors that illustrate how medical judgment occurs.
308. Id. at 10.
309. Id.
310. Complaint, supra note 202, at 32.
311. Id. at 35-37.
312. See 21 U.S.C. § 333 (2008).
313. See Ausness, supra note 299, at 1264-65.
314. Eli Lilly SEC filing, supra note 203, at 16.
315. See id. at 12 (describing "difficulties in obtaining product liability insurance due to a
very restrictive insurance market" and expectation "that we will continue to be largely self-
insured for future product liability losses"). Lilly's capacity and willingness to pay large olanza-
pine-related claims may be a reflection of the fact, reported in the company's latest SEC filing,
that "Zyprexa sales of $4.76 billion represented [twenty-six] percent of our revenues in 2007."
Id. at 11.
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IV. RESPONSIBILITY AND VULNERABILITY OF PHYSICIANS
A. Drug Company Blandishments
The promotion techniques used by drug reps and pharmaceutical com-
panies have received substantial publicity over the past few years. 316 Pharma-
ceutical companies also have employed physicians in various promotional
capacities, including efforts to encourage forms of off-label prescribing that
those physicians believe are effective. Physicians are often needed to assist
pharmaceutical companies in the development of their products, 317 but they
have served as spokespersons for products, too. Accepting this role-often
by becoming a member of a company's "speaker's bureau" 318 -and accepting
payments from pharmaceutical companies is not illegal for physicians, 319 but
these "entanglements" are actually "common in the medical industry"320 and
appear to have compromised medical education.
The incentivizing of psychiatrists gained media attention in 2008 when
Iowa Senator Charles Grassley began investigating payments made by phar-
maceutical companies to psychiatrists. 321 The Grassley investigation revealed
the previously undisclosed sum of $500,000 given by drug manufacturer
GlaxoSmithKline to the chair of Emory University's psychiatry department
for speaking engagements that promoted the company's products.322 Along
with the federal probe, states have also investigated the tactic. A report re-
leased by the Vermont Attorney General's Office found that psychiatrists
316. Elliott, supra note 6; Jerome E. Groopman, How DOCTORs THINK 203-12, 289-90
(2007) (describing promotion techniques and citing five articles from the New York Times).
317. Emily Ramshaw, Some Texas Foster Kids' Doctors Have Drug Firm lies, Dallas Morning
News, Aug. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/081708dnmetdrugdoc
tors.45052b6.html.
318. Full disclosure: the first author, who claims no moral superiority over his colleagues,
acknowledges having been on drug makers' speakers bureaus.
319. Ramshaw, supra note 317.
320. Id.
321. John Gever, Senator Demands Records of Pjychiattic Associaion-Drug Industr Fiscal Ties,
MedPage Today, Jul. 14, 2008, available at
http://www.medpagetoday.com/Psychiatry/GeneralPsychiatry/10117; see also Ramshaw, supra
note 317 (describing a Minnesota investigation that revealed a third of its psychiatrists had
taken money from drug companies).
322. Marcia Angel, Drug Companies & Doctors: A Stogy of Corruption, N.Y. Rev. Books, Jan.
15, 2009, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/ 22237. Two other instances men-
tioned by Dr. Angel: (1) Drug companies paid psychiatrist Joseph L. Biederman $1.6 million in
consulting and speaking fees between 2000 and 2007 to advocate treatments for childhood
bipolar disorder when studies demonstrating drugs' effectiveness were lacking. (2) Psychiatrist
Alan F. Schatzberg controlled more than $6 million worth of stock in a company he co-
founded that was testing a drug to treat psychotic depression; Dr. Schatzberg was also the
principal investigator on a National Institute of Mental Health grant that included research on
the drug. Id.
HeinOnline -- 13 Mich. St. U. J. Med. & L. 314 2009
Promoting, Prescribing, and Pushing Pills 315
received twenty percent of all pharmaceutical money paid to its state's physi-
cians. 323
Medical schools were once relatively insulated from the influence and
lure of pharmaceutical money. But as other sources of funding for research
and education have dried up, financial entanglements have tied many academ-
ic doctors to drug companies. 324 By and large, academic recipients of drug
companies' largesse do not see their relationships with industry as influencing
their professional activities or biasing their training, particularly if the gifts are
small.325 Apparently, drug companies are savvier, and know that small gifts
influence behavior even when the gifts are not linked to explicit requests. 326
The ethical problems stemming from physicians' acceptance of money
and favors have been recognized for several years,327 but recently, the volume
of gifts and money spent on advertising to practicing physicians has increased
substantially. 328 Drug companies also do promotions for resident and medical
students who are beginning and future prescribers of companies' products.
329
Until just recently, however, regulations on such promotions had not been
implemented by either the federal government or the pharmaceutical compa-
nies themselves. 330
1. The Breadth of Inducements
The American Medical Association's Ethical Guidelines for Gifts to Physicians
from Industry describes "modest items"-including office supplies, teaching
323. Gever, supra note 321.
324. Eric G. Campbell et al., Institutional Academic-Industy Relationships, 298 JAMA 1779,
1781-82 (2007) (Sixty percent of department chairs had some personal relationship with the
pharmaceutical industry [e.g., serving as a consultant, paid speaker, or member of the board of
directors]; sixty-seven percent of academic departments had relationships with drug companies;
many also received moneys for training residents and continuing medical education).
325. Id. at 1785.
326. Jason Dana & George Loewenstein, A Social Science Peripective on Gifts to Physicians from
Industry, 290 JAMA 252, 253 (2003) (citing studies and providing examples).
327. See Alexander C. Tsai, Policies to Regulate Gifts to Physidansfrom Industry, 290 JAMA 1776,
1776 (2003) (noting that Congressional hearings were held on the topic of drug company mar-
keting in both the early 1970s and 1990s).
328. Marc-Andr6 Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of Pharma-
ceulical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 PLoS Med. 29, 29 (2008) (describing hearings
in the 1950s, and describing new activities, such as medical meetings and "seeding trials").
329. See, e.g., Michael Eisman, Letter to Editor, Medical Student Exposure to Drug Company Inte-
ractions, 295 JAMA 281 (2006).
330. See Tsai, supra note 327. As Tsai explains, the American Medical Association enacted
"voluntary ethical guidelines on pharmaceutical gifts" in 1990. Id. But while these guidelines
were endorsed by the now-titled Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of American
(PhRMA), "[A]n abatement of marketing abuses ... was short-lived. Within a few years, com-
mercial detailers and physicians continued to exhibit behavior inconsistent with the guidelines."
Id. As discussed below, however, some state legislatures have taken action to address the prob-
lem themselves. Id.
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materials, and meals provided during research meetings-as "acceptable"
under the group's guidelines on gifts to physicians. 331 On the other hand,
"lavish dinners, free trips, offers of cash and other inducements ... are clearly
not in compliance. '332
Physicians, including physicians in training, have regarded themselves as
immune from advertising, insisting that drug companies' trinkets (pens, note-
pads, etc.) and other favors do not influence the treatment of their patients.
Doctors maintain (and sincerely believe) that because they are not paid per
prescription, their decisions to prescribe only reflect what is best for their
patients.333 Empirical evidence has shown otherwise,334 however, including
contexts where psychiatrists have done the prescribing. Figures from Minne-
sota, for instance, revealed that psychiatrists who received more than $5,000
from SGA manufacturers wrote more prescriptions of the drugs for children
than did other psychiatrists.335 As Dr. Jerome P. Kassirer, a professor at the
Tufts University School of Medicine, commented in an article from AB-
CNews: 'One important question: why would the drug industry spend so
much money advertising if they didn't think they were influencing physicians?
The notion that this is all for physician education is nonsense."' 336
331. Ethical Guidelines for Gifts to Physicians from Industry: Frequently Asked Questions,
AMA-ASSN, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/ pub/category/13394.html (last visited
June 1, 2009).
332. Id.
333. Damella A. Zipkin & Mark A. Steinman, Interactions Between Pharmaceutical Representatives
and Doctors in Training: A Thematic Review, 20 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 777, 777 (2005); Mark A.
Steinman et al., Of Principles and Pens: Attitudes and Practices of Medicine Housestaff Toward
Pharmaceutical Industry Promotions, 110 AM.J. MED. 551, 551 (2001).
334. Former drug company sales representatives have also spoken out about tactics they say
they were told to use by their employers. Shahram Ahari, a former sales representative for Lilly,
gained exposure through a YouTube video addressing the marketing of Zyprexa. (The video is
available at http://www.youtube.com/ watchv=nj0LZZzrcrs.) When he testified before the
Senate Aging Committee in March 2008, Ahari explained not only downplaying side effects of
drugs, but gift giving as well. See Marcus Baram, Ex-Drug Sales Rep Tells All,
ABCNEWS.com, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Story?id=4438095&page=l.
Ahari's Letter to Congress commented about the purpose behind gifts to physicians specifically
noting that
[w]hether [it is] pens, pads, clip boards, or anatomical models, companies take great
pains to make their gifts vibrantly colored and clearly logo'ed. The strategy behind
these gifts is to draw attention to the pharmaceutical products and to serve as remind-
ers of the company's generosity. These reminders generate a conscious or subcons-
cious desire to return the "favor." Referred to as "reciprocity" (a well known term in
psychology and marketing), this desire is cultivated by drug reps with whom doctors
have a social bond.
L.etter from Shahram Ahari to the U.S. Congress
(http://aging.senate.gov/events/hrl90sa.pdo.
335. Id.
336. Baram, supra note 334.
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Gift-giving by pharmaceutical companies affects future medical profes-
sionals as well. A 2005 study published in the Journal of American MedicalAsso-
cation concluded that medical students were "at risk for unrecognized influ-
enced by marketing efforts." 337  In reaching that conclusion, the study re-
vealed an average of one sponsored activity attended or one gift received per
week, per student.338 Additionally, the study found that:
Most students perceive that they are entitled to gifts. Many simulta-
neously think that sponsored educational events are likely to be bi-
ased, but are helpful. Most think that their prescribing is not likely to
be influenced by these interactions and that their colleagues are more
likely to be influenced.339
In response to such findings, a 2006 article from JAMA recommended that
medical schools and teaching hospitals implement a ban on individual doctors'
accepting any meals, gifts, books, or other favors from pharmaceutical com-
panies, 340 echoing the ban on all gifts and marketing by pharmaceutical com-
panies to medical students that the American Medical Students Association
had recommended in 2002.341 A few institutions are implementing such
bans. 342
2. Other Restrictions on Advertising
Some states have decided to track or halt the efforts of pharmaceutical
companies when it comes to providing incentives to physicians. 343 In 2002,
Vermont became the first state to do so,344 passing a bill that required phar-
maceutical companies to report such items as travel expenses and other pay-
337. Federick S. Sierles et al, Medical Students' Eposure to and Attitudes About Drug Company
Interactions: A NationalSurvy, 294 JAMA 1034, 1040 (2005). The study tracked third-year medi-
cal students at eight schools: Case Western Reserve University, George Washington University,
the Mayo Clinic College of Medicine, Ohio State University, Rosalind Franklin University, State
University of New York Upstate Medical University, University of California at San Francisco,
and University of Nebraska. Id. at 1035.
338. Id. at 1038. The survey included everything from free lunches and dinners, to snacks,
to utensils, to sponsored ground rounds, to workshops, to waived registration fees paid by drug
companies. Id. at 1036.
339. Id. at 1040.
340. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Health Industgy Practices That Create Conlacts of Interest: A Poligy
ProposalforAcademic Medical Centers, 295 JAMA 429, 429 (2006).
341. See American Medical Student Association Applauds Pharmaceutical Industy for Voluntary Ban;
Continues to Call for Federal Regulation, AMSA.ORG, Jan. 2, 2009, available at
http://www.amsa.org/news/release2.cfx?id=365.
342. See, e.g., Aaron Nicodemus, Doctors Reject Drug-Pusher Favors, WORCESTER TELEGRAM &
GAZETrE,Jan. 18, 2009, available at
http://www.telegram.com/article/20090118/NEWS/901180384/1008/ NEWSREWIND (at
the University of Massachusetts Medical School, "gifts of any value-right down to the pens-
are banned").
343. See Tsai, supra note 327, at 1776.
344. Id.
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ments to physicians. 345 Items of de minimis value, less than $25, were excused
from the reporting requirement.346 In 2009, the Vermont legislature passed a
stricter version of the law that bans al/ gifts and requires that pharmaceutical
companies report all payments to physicians. 347 Under a newly-enacted Massa-
chusetts law, set to go into effect on July 1, 2009, pharmaceutical companies
will not only be required to report the sums paid to physicians, but will also be
banned or severely restricted from giving "most gifts and dinners." 348 Interes-
tingly, some commentators have viewed state legislation as mere redundancy
in "an industry that is already adequately regulated by the FDA and the U.S.
Department of Justice, which 'enforces fraud, abuse, and anti-kickback
laws."' 349 Looking at aspects of the litigation on olanzapine, however, raises
questions about whether the federal government does in fact adequately regu-
late physician inducements.
Pharmaceutical companies, through the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America, responded to adverse publicity about advertising
with new guidelines that became effective January 1, 2009.350 The guidelines,
which approximately 40 pharmaceutical companies have agreed to follow, 35'
limit the distribution of office items (such as pens, mugs, and staplers), and
prohibit drug company sales reps from paying for physicians' and other health
care professionals' meals. 35 2 Because of the newness of these guidelines, their
effect of their impact on doctors' prescribing and their willingness to prescribe
new drugs is not yet known.
3. Non-Markeing Factors
Doctors are as susceptible as other human beings to marketing tech-
niques (though they have been slow and reluctant to recognize this).353 Physi-
cians have a fiduciary duty to insulate themselves from the effect such tech-
niques have on their practice decisions, and medical organizations have finally
345. Gever, supra note 321. Minnesota has a similar statute. See Peggy Peck, State Oversight
of Industry Gifts to Pysiians All Bark, MEDPAGE TODAY, Mar. 20, 2008,
http://www.medpagetoday.com/PubicHealthPoicy/HealthPolicy/5291 (last visited Jan. 23,
2009).
346. Gever, supra note 321.
347. Natasha Singer, Doctors Gifts To Be Public In Vermont, N.Y. TIMFS, May 19, 2009, at BI,
available at 2009 WLNR 9573599. The law even "ban[s] all free meals" to physicians. Id.
348. Nicodemus, supra note 342.
349. Peck, supra note 345.
350. See Editorial, No Mugs, But What About Those Fees?, N.Y. TimFis, Jan. 4, 2009, at A20,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/05/opinion/05monl.html.
351. Id.
352. Id. The ban does not affect meals given to health care professionals while sales repre-
sentatives are "pitching their products," or from drug companies paying for CMEs. Id
353. Seegeneral# Dana & Loewenstein, supra note 326, at 253-254 (citing studies and provid-
ing examples).
HeinOnline -- 13 Mich. St. U. J. Med. & L. 318 2009
Promoting Prescribing and Pushing Pills 319
taken steps to fulfill this obligation. 35 4 Having finally acknowledged their sus-
ceptibility to drug advertising, it seems sensible that physicians should take
steps to limit (or ban) their exposure to favors, meals, trinkets, and other
blandishments from pharmaceutical manufacturers. Physicians should base
prescribing decisions primarily on scientifically grounded beliefs about what
will conduce to patients' welfare, not on how well they like particular drug
reps or on what they have heard while consuming expensive restaurant
meals.3
55
However, aggressive (and occasionally overly aggressive) promotion is
far from the only reason that psychiatrists so rapidly and enthusiastically
switched to prescribing SGAs between 1995 and 2000. Here, we describe
other factors that contributed to the rapid FGA-to-SGA prescribing transi-
tion.
a. Avoiding Malpractice Liability
One distinctive advantage of the SGAs-an advantage that recent stu-
dies still support-is their lower propensity to cause TD. Although it is diffi-
cult to find documentary evidence of this, a desire to avoid putting patients at
unnecessary risk of developing TD was a major factor in many psychiatrists'
preference for the SGAs. This was partly an ethical decision (fulfilling the
Hippocratic dictum to "do no harm') and partly a reflection of litigation
fear.35 6 Though some professional groups regard negligence suits as a mere
"cost of doing business," physicians do not.35 7 Actual lawsuits involving TD
have been relatively uncommon, but psychiatrists knew about them and were
intensely concerned about them even when the only drugs available to treat
psychotic patients were FGAs. 358 When the arrival of SGAs gave doctors an
354. See David J. Rothman & Susan Chimonas, New Developments in Managing Physidan
Industy Reladionsbips, 300 JAMA 1067, 1067 (2008) (noting that recently, "policies governing the
relationship between physicians and pharmaceutical and device companies have undergone
remarkable changes," including recommendations from the Association of American Medical
Colleges to prohibit all gifts and prohibit food provided by industry).
355. Brennan et al., supra note 340, at 430 (arguing that academic medical centers should
lead the way in eliminating drug advertising in which "physicians have motives or are in situa-
tions for which reasonable observers could conclude that the moral requirements of the physi-
cian's roles are or will be compromised").
356. See, e.g., Mossman & Lehrer, supra note 113, at 1531 (quoting other physician's discus-
sion of potential liability).
357. The professional socialization of physicians instills an ideal of error-free practice and a
belief that good physicians are virtually infallible. See David Hilfiker, Facing Our Mistakes, 310
NEW ENG. J. MED. 118, 121 (1984). Legalistic and self-critical thinking has led physicians to
believe that medical error only occurs because of negligence. Physicians often personalize this
even further, concluding (consciously or unconsciously) that medical errors reflect underlying
character flaws. See Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1852 (1994).
358. Perhaps the best known case is Clites v. State, 322 N.W.2d 917 (Iowa App. 1982). Tim
Clites's development of TD was compounded by poor monitoring, id. at 921, and lack of con-
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alternative to prescribing FGAs, many psychiatrists felt that to prescribe an
FGA was to invite a lawsuit.359 Suicide and violence by patients are major
liability concerns for psychiatrists, so literature supporting the superior effec-
tiveness of SGAs at reducing violence risk provided yet another reason for
prescribing the newer drugs and avoiding the older ones.360
b. Physicians' Mental Limits
Problems with SGAs and limitations of studies supporting their supe-
riority were becoming apparent in the late 1990s-the very point at which
psychiatrists were switching to the newer drugs. Why did this anti-SGA in-
formation have so little impact on what psychiatrists were doing? The short
answer is that physicians have cognitive limitations.
Practicing physicians can devote only so much time to assessing and
weighing of probabilistic information. Like all other human beings, doctors
use "fast and frugal" heuristics to make decisions. 361 Because most physicians
cannot make their own informed judgments about drugs' relative advantages,
the pharmaceutical reps who visit physicians' offices often become the key
sources of information about medications. Doctors often fail to recognize
that the goal of these salesmen are to promote their companies' interests362 or,
if doctors realize that reps' information is biased, they mistakenly believe they
are immune to marketing techniques. 363
Physicians can examine only a tiny sliver of the findings and minutiae
published in journals concerning just their own specialty, and most read only
sent, id. at 922, but these details often escaped clinicians' notice. By the mid-1980s, more than a
decade after the recognition of TD, just ten TD-related lawsuits had been identified. Phil
Brown & Steven C. Funk, Tardive Dyskinesia: Barriers to the Professional Recognition of an Iatrogenic
Disease, 27 J. HEALTH Soc. BEHAVIOR 116, 124 (1986) (citing these cases). Nonetheless, psy-
chiatrists warned their colleagues of dire consequences from future TD-related litigation. See C.
Thomas Gualtieri & Robert L. Sprague, Preventing Tardive Dyskinesia and Preventing Tardive Dyski-
nesia Legislation, 20 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 346 (1984).
359. See Mossman & Lehrer, supra note 113, at 1531-33 (medical journal's discussion of
malpractice and various other theories under which FGA prescribing might generate litigation);
see also Mossman, supra note 15, at 1092-1125 (lengthy exploration of potential sources of liabili-
ty).
360. See Mossman & Lehrer, supra note 113, at 1533; see also Mossman, supra note 15, at
1104-06. Several medical publications now support a connection between SGA therapy and
violence reduction. See, e.g.,Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Effectiveness ofAgpicalAntipoychoticMedica-
tions in Reduing Vioknt Behavior Among Persons With Schizophrenia in Community-Based Treatment, 30
SCHIZOPHRENIA Bull. 3 (2004) (finding that SGAs "significantly reduce the risk of violent be-
havior" but FGAs do not, and recommending that SGAs "be considered as an important com-
ponent of violence risk management").
361. Glyn Elwyn et al., Decision Anaysis in Patient Care, 358 LANCET 571, 573-74 (2001).
362. Howard Brody, The Company We Keep: Why Physicians Should Refuse to See Pharmaceutical
Representatives, 3 ANNALS FAMI. MED. 82, 83 (2005).
363. Melinda L. Randall et al., Attitudes and Behaviors of Pgchiatry Residents toward Pharmaceutical
Representatives before and after an Educational Intenvention, 29 ACAD. PsYCHIATRY 33, 35-36 (2005).
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summaries of most articles that they hear about.364 If one looks only at the
abstracts of studies on SGAs from the 1990s, those studies really seem to
show that SGAs are better than FGAs.365 In general, prior to the CATIE
study, most psychiatrists had little basis for thinking that these advantages did
not translate into real-world benefits. The research details that might have
alerted psychiatrists to SGA limitations-for example, using a high-potency
FGA (usually haloperidol) as the comparator drug and dosing it high enough
to induce many side effects, 366 or selecting nonrepresentative patients as sub-
jects for studies367 -were easy to miss.
The problems caused by FGAs versus SGAs different importantly in
their obviousness, timing, and salience. Many persons who take high-potency
FGAs look drugged and slowed down by neuromotor side effects that quickly
occur, but the movements of people who take SGAs usually are not effected
much. 368 By contrast, weight gain induced by SGAs accumulates over weeks
364. See Teresa Jones et al., What British Pychiatrists Read: Questionnaire Survy of Journal Usage
Among Clinicians, 185 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 251, 253 (2004) (only two journals read by most
psychiatrists); Sanjay Saint et al., Journal Reading Habits of Internists, 15 J. GEN. INTERNAL MID.
881, 881 (2000) (internists "rely heavily on abstracts"); David T. Burke et al., Reading Habits of
Practicing Physiatrists, 81 AM. J. PHYS. MED. & REHABILITATION 779, 779 (2002) ("most physiatr-
ists only scan the table of contents and read the most important abstracts").
365. See, e.g., Richard L. Borison et al., ICI 204,636, an A jpicalAnipvychofic: Efficagy and Safei
in a Mulicenter, Placebo-Controlled TDial in Patients with Schizophrenia, 16 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 158, 158 (1996) ("treatment with [quetiapine] did not induce" extrapy-
ramidal side effects); Chouinard et al., supra note 23, at 38 (risperidone at least as effective as
haloperidol with far lower incidence of EPS); Donald C. Goff et al., An Exploratory Halperi-
dol-Controlled Dose-Finding Study of Ziprasidone in Hospitalized Patients with Schizophrenia or Schizoaffec-
tive Disorder, 18 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 296, 304 (1998) (ziprasidone at least as
effective as haloperidol with far lower incidence of EPS); and Gary D. Tollefson et al., Olanza-
pine Versus Haloperidol in the Treatment of Schizophrenia and Schizoaffective and Sthizophreniorm Disord-
ers: Results of an International Collaborative Trial, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 466, 473 (1997) (olanza-
pine at least as effective as haloperidol with far lower incidence of EPS).
366. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
367. To avoid confounding variables that would make results difficult to interpret statisti-
cally, studies of new medications typically exclude patients with various medical problems, co-
existing psychiatric problems, and substance use disorders. See, e.g., Borison et al., supra note
365, at 344 (exclusion criteria included patients with "any other psychiatric disorder, ...
[s]uicidal ideation within a year of trial entry, mental retardation, convulsive disorders, history of
severe head trauma or suspected organic brain disease, ... risk of pregnancy, ... clinically signif-
icant laboratory findings or abnormal electrocardiograms'). In real-world psychiatry, however,
such patients make up the vast majority of persons who receive treatment for severe mental
illnesses. See supra note 188, at 1069 (noting that drug approval studies are "conducted at least
partially in a hospital setting, involve only a selected subsample of the population for which the
drug will eventually be indicated, and exclude patients with psychiatric and medical comorbidi-
ties').
368. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing SGAs' lower incidence of neu-
romotor side effects).
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or months, 369 and any glucose and lipid abnormalities are usually evident only
in laboratory results of blood tests. At a time when the entire American popu-
lation was becoming fatter,370 observing weight gain in a person whose mental
state was improving may not have seemed unusual or troubling. In sum, the
limitations of FGAs are gross and immediately apparent, while the problems
with SGAs are subtle and slower to materialize. Individual physicians have
very limited ability to discern large population trends such as a higher inci-
dence of obesity and metabolic syndrome in certain patients. Movement ab-
normalities in an individual patient are, by contrast, easy to spot and worry
about.371
From the standpoint of a practitioner with limited time and resources,
SGAs are huge time-savers. Prescribing high-potency FGAs so that they do
not produce troubling side effects often requires careful dose adjustment and
frequent monitoring of a patient's response.372 By contrast, the SGAs were
marketed with relatively clear dosage guidelines, 373 and the margin of error
between a dose that quells psychosis and the dose that causes neuromotor
side effects is much wider.374 As the effectiveness of SGAs for other condi-
tions (e.g., mood disorders) was recognized, psychiatrists could prescribe them
instead of older mood stabilizers (e.g., lithium and valproate), which also re-
quire careful dose adjustments. 375 SGAs thus are an easy-to-prescribe, one-
369. David B. Allison et al., Anipychotic-Induced Weight Gain: A Comprehensive Research Snthe-
s4, 156 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1686, 1692 (1999) (weight gains with SGAs of 1-4 kg over 10
weeks).
370. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Obesity Trends 1985-2007,
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/trend/maps/index.htm (last visited Feb. 10,
2009) (animated map showing no state with obesity rates above fifteen percent in 1985 and only
one state (Colorado) with obesity rate below twenty percent in 2007; obesity rates above twen-
ty-five percent in most states).
371. See Michael J. Sernyak & Robert A. Rosenheck, Antipychoic Use in the Treatment of Out-
patients With Schizophrenia in the VA From Fiscal Years 1999 to 2006, 59 PSYCI-IIATRY SERVICES
567, 569 (2008) (concluding that "antipsychotic prescribing patterns over an eight-year period
suggests that concerns about side effects are the strongest driver of differences in medication
use').
372. See, e.g., McEvoy et al., supra note 103, at 741 (discussing every-other-day assessment of
patients); Douglas Mossman, A Decision Anaysis Approach to Neuroleplic Dosing: Insights from a
Mathematical Model, 58 J. CuNICAI. PSYCHIATRY 66, 69-70 (1997) (discussing ranges of FGA
doses and balancing of benefits with side effects). See also Peter J. Weiden et al., Translating the
Pycbopbarmacologv of Antipycbotics to IndividualiZed Treatment for Severe Mental Illness: A Roadmap, 68
J. CUNICAL PSYCHIATRY 4, 13-19 (Supp. 7 2007) (discussing narrow range of doses that are
effective with inducing neuromotor side effects).
373. Heres et at., supra note 112, at 190 (noting that the SGAs were "a major step forward.
For the first time antipsychotic drugs with clearly defined dose ranges were made available,
while the optimum dose, even of the standard conventional antipsychotic haloperidol, is still in
doubt").
374. Michael D. Jibson & Rajiv Tandon, New A!pical Antipychotic Medications, 32 J.
PSYCHIATRIC RFs. 215, 223 (1998) (graphic summary of SGA advantages over FGAs).
375. See THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PUBLISHING TEXTBOOK OF MOOD DISORDERS 471
(Dan J. Stein et al. eds., 2005) (discussing need for plasma levels and noting that lithium's the-
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drug-fits-all solution for a large fraction of the severely ill patients whom
many psychiatrists treat.
Finally, the high cost of new drugs-a drawback of which doctors and
payors were immediately aware-was not a factor blocking the adoption of
SGAs. In most U.S. healthcare settings, neither the prescribing doctor nor the
patient who takes (and benefits from) a particular drug has any personal in-
centive to control pharmaceutical CoStS. 376 However, doctors do have ever-
present incentives to avert liability, and patients have incentives to avoid side
effects that they experience immediately.
For all these reasons, SGAs seemed much more attractive choices with
apparently little disadvantage.
c. Outside Influences
Entities that pay for new and expensive treatments are logical sources of
opposition to adopting those treatments, especially if those treatments do not
clearly offset higher costs. In the early to mid-1990s, some agencies responsi-
ble for paying pharmaceutical bills attempted to limit costs by putting limits
on use of SGAs. In some cases, court decisions barred large-scale efforts to
do this consistently. 377 Even after the results of CATIE, few formulary re-
strictions limit use of SGAs,378 though some state mental health directors sug-
gest that these might be justified.379 Formulary restrictions have been opposed
by advocacy groups, such as the National Association for the Mentally Ill,
380
who appear to accept what pharmaceutical companies and prescribing psy-
chiatrists believe about the advantages of SGAs.381 State legislatures and state
rapeutic range is 0.8-1.2 mEq/L, with toxicity at 1.5 mEq/L); see also THE MEDICAL BASIS OF
PSYCHIATRY 609 (S. Hossein Fatemi & Paula J. Clayton eds., 2008) (valproate dose ranges from
750 to 6,000 mg/day and requires monitoring of blood levels).
376. Duggan, supra note 117, at 2 ("[Blecause Medicaid recipients typically do not share in
the cost of their prescription drugs, the program distorts medical care purchase decisions.").
377. See supra note 94 (discussing Visser v. Taylor, 756 F. Supp. 501 (D. Kan. 1990) and
Alexander L. v. Cuomo, 588 N.Y.S.2d 85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991)).
378. See, e.g., Chi-Chuan Wang et al., Coverage of A~pical Antipychoics Among Medicare Drug
Plans in the State of Washington for Fiscal Year 2007, 10 Prim. Care Companion J. CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRY 313, 314 (2008) (almost all Medicare plans cover all SGAs).
379. See Joseph J. Parks et al., Impact of the CATIE Findings on State Mental Health Po/7, 59
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 534, 535, 536 (2008) (three medical directors who previously endorsed
SGAs now feel that "neither complete open access for all patients at all times nor a uniform
fail-first trial of a first-generation drug are optimal approaches.").
380. See, e.g., Dr. Fred Frese Testifies before House Veteran's Affairs Committee, NAMI E-News,
June 20, 2001, http://www.namiscc.org/newsletters/ Sept01/veteran.htm (last visited Feb. 10,
2009) (quoting testimony of NAMI board member (who is also a psychologist with mental
illness) opposing VA formulary restrictions).
381. Pharmaceutical companies have made substantial donations to NAMI. Thus, it was
not just physician recipients of drug company blandishments who were convinced that SGAs
were superior treatments; patients and their advocates believed this too.
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mental health departments have also exempted SGAs from the sorts of cost
controls placed on other medications. 382
d. Lack of Good Information
A final factor in the collective judgment error concerning SGAs is the
sub-optimal quality of information that physicians receive about medications.
Drug development has become very costly, but pharmaceutical companies
spend twice as much on drug advertising as they do on research-57.5 bil-
lion by one recent estimate.383 As anyone who has attended a large medical
meeting knows, the most interesting "educational" events-and the ones of-
feting meals and gifts-are those sponsored by pharmaceutical firms, at which
the topics and speakers can be selected in ways that highlight advantages of
products produced by those firms. 384 Similarly, a glance at any medical journal
quickly reveals that the most vivid, esthetically appealing pages are not those
that contain scientific articles, but those that contain advertisements paid for
by commercial concerns.
Though physicians may underestimate their invulnerability to advertising,
they certainly know when they are attending commercially sponsored events
or reading promotional materials. In recent years, however, pharmaceutical
companies have used activities that physicians have usually regarded as inde-
pendent of commercial influence to promote products, especially off-label
uses. Pharmaceutical enterprises have created physician advisory boards and
have organized gatherings of "consultants" (physicians identified as profes-
sionally influential), knowing that the doctors attending these functions will
later discuss the companies' products favorably with their colleagues. Com-
panies have sponsored continuing medical education events where "thought
leaders" (again, prominent physicians) spread the word about their products;
often, a purpose of these events is to promulgate off-label uses of drugs,
something physician speakers may do even when drug manufacturers may
not.385 Drug companies have also hired communication companies that get
382. See Chris Koyanagi et al., Medicaid Poicies To Contain Pychiatric Drug Costs, 24 HEALTH
AFFAIRs 536, 540 (2005) (noting that although many Medicaid programs put limits on some
medications, many "states have legislated exemptions from those policies for certain medica-
tions, particularly antipsychotics and antidepressants"); David Bergman et al., State Efforts to
Manage The Behavioral Health Pharmaceutical Benefit, NAT'L ACAD. STATE HEALTH POL'Y, Mar.
2006, at IssuE BRIEF 1, 3 (noting that "no state used the fail-first strategy" to limit costs).
383. See Gagnon & Lexchin, supra note 316, at 30, 32.
384. This problem is not restricted to psychiatry. For just two of many recent descriptions,
see Arnold S. Relman, Industry Support of Medical Education, 300 JAMA 1071 (2008), and Brennan,
supra note 328, at 429 (2006). This is not a recent problem. See, e.g., Anthony G. Salem, Medical
Education and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 5 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 91, 91-92 (1990), and older
sources cited therein.
385. See, e.g., Michael A. Steinman et al., Narrative Review: The Promotion of Gabapentin: An
Anaylsis of Internal Industry Documents, 145 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 284, 286-290 (2006)
(describing use of advisory boards, consultants meetings, medical education events, recruitment
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articles published in medical journals. 386 Many research studies that appear to
have been proposed and designed by academic, independent researchers show
evidence of "ghost authorship" by commercial concerns.387
Even peer-reviewed, double-blind studies published in prestigious medi-
cal journals can spread faulty information about off-label drug uses when
sponsors of these studies structure them or use statistical analyses to cast their
products in a favorable light. The former editors of the British Medical Journal
and the Lancet believe that these publications have unwittingly functioned as
"an extension of the marketing arm" 388 or "information-laundering opera-
tions" for drug companies' indirect promotions of off-label drug uses.389 Al-
so, medical journals prefer to publish results showing that medications are
effective, and manufacturers often decide not to submit for publication the
results of studies showing lack of effectiveness. This means that even for
psychotropic medications used for their FDA-approved indications, published
results make drugs seem more effective than one would conclude if one knew
the results of all studies.390
Conducting studies of medication is an expensive enterprise. Proving ef-
ficacy and safety of a drug under FDA guidelines usually requires experiments
that involve thousands of volunteer subjects. For each of these subjects,
proper monitoring may require dozens of hours of clinicians' time and exten-
sive laboratory testing. The result, according to one widely cited estimate, is
that companies' out-of-pocket costs are more than $800 million per FDA-
of local champions to communicate favorable product messages to fellow physicians, and not-
ing that by using these "techniques . . . commercial interests can intrude into the practice of
medicine in both visible and hidden ways").
386. These practices are described in Sergio Sismondo, Ghost Management: How Much of the
Medical Literature Is Shaped Behind the Scenes by the Pharmaceutical Indust!? 4 PLOS MED 1429, 1431
(2007) (noting that "medical journals have real effects upon physician prescribing behavior,
which is why pharmaceutical companies invest so much in their publication').
387. See Peter C. Gotzsche et al., Ghost Authorship in IndusttT-Initiated Randomised Trials, 4
PLoS MED. 47, 48-49 (2007) (finding evidence of ghost authorship in 75% of trials, further
evidence if acknowledgments are included, particularly among the statisticians who had primary
responsibility for mathematical analyses).
388. Richard Smith, Medical Journals Are an Extension of the Marketing Arm of Pharmaceutical
Companies, 2 PLoS MED. 364, 365 (2005).
389. Richard Horton, The Dawn of McSdence, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Mar. 11, 2004, at 7, 9. The
former editor of the New England Journal of Medidne echoes these sentiments:
It is simply no longer possible to believe much of the clinical research that is published,
or to rely on the judgment of trusted physicians or authoritative medical guidelines. I
take no pleasure in this conclusion, which I reached slowly and reluctantly over my two
decades as an editor of The New England Journal of Medicine.
Angel, supra note 5.
390. See Erick H. Turner et al., Selective Pubication of Antidebressant Trials and its Influence on
Apparent Efficag, 358 NEw ENG. J. MED. 252 (2008) (medical publications made it appear that
ninety-four of antidepressant trials were positive, whereas only fifty-one percent of all trials
were).
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approved drug.391 Because relatively little money for drug studies is available
from non-commercial sources, most drug studies are initiated and designed by
pharmaceutical manufacturers whose understandable and perfectly reasonable
goal is to improve sales of their products. Criteria for receiving FDA approv-
al require a showing that a compound is safe and superior to placebo for treat-
ing a particular disorder.392 What doctors often need to know, however, is
whether a new (and usually more expensive) drug is not only effective, but
better than an older (an often less expensive) already existing drug, and if so,
how much better. Pharmaceutical companies currently have no obligation to
conduct such costly comparison studies, and even if they wished to do so,
their efforts must first be focused on meeting high-cost requirements of FDA
trials. Moreover, manufacturers often have only disincentives to conduct
comparison studies of their products because of the threat to sales that such
adverse results might pose.
B. Concluding Thoughts
If the FGA-to-SGA prescribing transition described in Part II indeed re-
flects a collective judgment error by psychiatrists, it was a judgment error pro-
duced by a confluence of forces: physicians' fears of liability, unopposed
power of industry to structure scientific knowledge, promotional excesses,
advocacy groups' clamor for better treatment of devastating illnesses, and
individual physicians' limited power to perceive trends and evaluate scientific
data. Limiting pharmaceutical promotional activities, restricting gifts to physi-
cians, and punishing companies for improper (off-label) promotion are all
appropriate steps. As we have seen, however, these measures do not address
the huge information-dispensing advantage held by pharmaceutical companies
and the collective judgment errors exemplified by psychiatrists' over-eagerness
to jettison older antipsychotic drugs.
V. THE NEED FOR BETTER INFORMATION
A. Problems with Past Responses
In describing the legal system's responses to the costs and imperfections
of SGAs, Part III has discussed what are, in essence, efforts to control future
behavior by punishing undesirable past behavior. These remedies are founded
on an implicit conception of pharmaceutical companies' legal transgressions
as bad decisions by many persons who, left to their own devices, would not
accept and respond properly to their social responsibilities. This implicit con-
ception also regards punishment-either in the form of tort-based compensa-
391. See Ross Tonkens, An Overview of the Drug Development Process, PiYsIcIAN EXECUTIVE,
May-June 2005, at 48, 49-50 (May-Jun. 2005); DiMasi, supra note 133, at 166.
392. DiMasi, supra note 133, at 155-56; Tonkens, supra note 378 at 50.
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tion for victims or in monetary penalties for violating regulations-as the
appropriate response to bad decisions.
We see three problems with this response. First (and most obviously,
though not trivially), penalties follow disapproved-of behavior; they occur after
the harm is done. An often promulgated justification of tort penalties is that
they prevent harm: individuals, knowing the potential adverse consequences
of certain course of action, will do what is desirable or at least not do what is
harmful. The problem with this idea, however, is that to the extent that per-
sons rationally weigh consequences of potential courses of action, punish-
ments only create motivations to avoid punishment.393 If we can avoid pu-
nishment by means other than doing what is desired, and if avoidance is less
costly or less onerous than doing what is desired because we continue to re-
ceive the rewards of undesirable behavior, then avoidance plus engaging in the
disapproved-of behavior may seem like the best choice. 394
In the case of drug manufacturing and promotion, legal sanctions com-
pensate plaintiffs or states for wrongdoing if the wrongdoing is detected and
the litigation is successful. However, legal sanctions create incentives to avoid
adverse consequences rather than to engage in desirable conduct.395 As expe-
rience with medical malpractice litigation suggests, lawsuits create incentives
to avoid lawsuits. Lawsuits may also promote better practices and avoid
harms,396 but they do this only imperfectly. The threat of litigation may make
practitioners improve their performance and act more safely. However, the
punitive and adversarial approaches of tort law are the opposite of the sys-
tems-oriented, cooperative strategies that leaders of the patient-safety move-
ment believe are conducive to exposing problems in systems, which are the
real loci of medical errors.397
393. Recently, scientists have shown that avoiding aversive stimuli activates the same neural
substrate-the brain's medial orbital frontal cortex-as is activated when rewards are received.
See Hackjin Kim et al., Is Avoi&ng an Aversive Outcome Rewardng? Neural Substrates of Avoidance
Learning in the Human Brain, 4 PLoS BIOLOGY 1453 (2006).
394. On the relationships among punishment, negative reinforcement, escape, and avoid-
ance, see BENJAMIN J. SADOCK ET AL., KAPLAN & SADOCK'S SYNOI'Sis OF PSYCHIATRY 145-46
(2007). Evasion often seems preferable to law-abiding behavior. As the popularity and sales of
radar detectors attest, many fast drivers choose to retain the rewards of traveling quickly with-
out getting a speeding ticket.
395. Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85 GEO. L.J. 295,
313, 314 (1996) (noting that the tort system "transfers money in the form of damages for past
injuries" but is not a system that "regulates behavior by imposing limitations upon future con-
duct").
396. See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Qualy in the U.S.: Is
Mafractice I'abi,60 Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNEa. L. REV. 893, 916 (2005)
(reporting "an inverse relationship between the magnitude of the malpractice risk and the rate of
negligent injuries" leading to a reduction in patient injuries, but arguing that injury prevention
should be a key factor in debates about malpractice litigation).
397. David M. Studdert et al., MedicalMaoractice, 350 NEw ENG.J. MED. 283, 287 (2004).
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Drawing lessons from the rofecoxib litigation, Jennifer Wolsing suggests
that the threat of tort action actually discourages drug manufacturers from
undertaking actions that might promote public welfare, such as conducting
and publishing additional studies beyond the bare minimum required for FDA
approval. Instead, the potential for tort litigation and other legal sanctions
encourages companies to publish only the minimum necessary results, "to
provide conspicuous warnings detailing every possibility of harm" and to ac-
tually "keep drugs on the market,.., rather than to withdraw them abruptly,
to avoid the 'red flag' effect of alerting plaintiffs and trial lawyers that a drug
may be dangerous." 398 How manufacturers will actually respond to the recent
spate of litigation is an empirical matter. But the potential profits from off-
label uses of pharmaceutical remain powerful incentives for the actions that
have led to lawsuits, and those profits have not been countered by incentives
for other behavior that might better promote patients' welfare.
A second problem with the bad-behavior-deserves-punishment response
is that it implies that the only reason drug manufacturers will behave respons-
ibly and sell good products is to avoid punishment. We suspect, however,
that pharmaceutical companies recognize that their long-term self-interest is in
producing and selling good, effective products, and that their product promo-
tions usually reflect sincere-if-humanly-imperfect beliefs that they are making
money by doing something good-helping patients with illnesses. Viewed in
this light, drug industry practices that have recently been characterized in
medical journals and lay media as nefarious and corrupting-the recruitment
of academic physicians as influential "thought leaders," sponsoring continuing
medical education events, even selective publishing of study results-are logi-
cal responses to beliefs about the value of products and the escalating need to
respond to what competitor companies do to promote their products.
Finally, criticism and punishment of drug companies does not get at
what we believe is the real problem behind over-enthusiastic adoption of
SGAs: inadequate information about the value and real effectiveness of the
new drugs. As Part II explains, until 2005, the best scientific data suggested
that newly available antipsychotic treatments had clear advantages over the
drugs psychiatrists previously used. Psychiatrists should now understand that
those advantages emerged in the artificial, carefully controlled, placebo-
comparison studies that drug companies were (and remain) required to con-
duct to win marketing approval for their products. But when SGA-over-FGA
advantages that emerged from drug-approval studies did not translate into
real-world benefits, it surprised the very investigators who designed the real-
world studies. 399 Moreover, the adverse effects particularly associated with
SGAs-hyperlipidemia, diabetes and increased weight gain-are not uncom-
mon in populations with serious mental illnesses and are not unique to per-
398. Jennifer Wolsing, The Vioxx l-igaion: Disincenfiviing Patient Safey Through Misdirected
Tort Rues, 75 DEF. COUNS.J. 209, 212-13 (2008).
399. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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sons taking SGAs; they are, however, much less obvious than the neuromotor
problems caused by high-potency FGAs that psychiatrists wanted to avoid.
The SGA side effects display a feature common to other subjects of mass tort
litigation, in which problems and injuries "emerge progressively as the rele-
vant latency periods run their course. '400 Mere reliance on the tort-based
sanctions or punishments for violating advertising regulations may not be the
best means to address what is really behind these latent harms: gaps in scien-
tific information.
How, then, could regulatory and other reforms provide incentives to
create and quickly promulgate information about drugs? We offer three pro-
posals.
B. Promoting Information
1. Comparative Effectiveness Studies
As earlier portions of this Article have explained, psychiatrists developed
more accurate views about the value of SGAs only after release of results
from CATIE, CUtLASS, and other studies sponsored by agencies indepen-
dent of drug companies. These research efforts are examples of so-called
"comparative effectiveness" studies, which have been championed lately as
ways giving doctors and patients unbiased data that can help them "[k]now
more about the effect of different health interventions[,] ... improve the
treatment of diseases, help Americans better manage and prevent illness, and
... lower health care costs for everyone. '40 1 Although definitions of what
constitutes a "comparative effectiveness" study vary, the core notion is that
more studies comparing outcomes of different treatments or services, relative
400. Nagareda, supra note 395, at 314. As Professor Nagareda further explains, "[A]ny
solution [regarding mass tort fitigation]-at least one other than protracted litigation of thou-
sands of claims over the span of many years-must entail not only the disposition of present-
day lawsuits but also an attempt to determine the status of future claimants." Id. The problem,
he suggests, is that compensating future victims is accomplished through the tort system rather
than through institutions better suited to the task:
mfIhe job of addressing, on a prospective basis, entire categories of persons at risk of
disease in the future is a familiar feature of administrative decisionmaking. Risk as-
sessment and the selection of an appropriate policy response are tasks within the ordi-
nary business of many regulatory agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) .... Under current law, [however,] the major obstacle
to the use of administrative bodies lies in their traditional inability to facilitate transfers
of money between private parties, whether in the form of damages or by way of com-
pensation prescribed in a settlement agreement.
Id. at 315.
401. Mike Mitka, Comparaive Effectiveness, 300 JAMA 1290 (2008) (quoting statement by
Senator Max Baucus, co-sponsor of the Comparative Effectiveness Research Act of 2008 (S.
3408)).
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effectiveness of treatments, and the different options available for treating
particular medical condition in particular patients would lead to more effec-
tive, less costly medical care.402
Currently, medical professionals have no overarching source for obtain-
ing or accessing data on comparative effectiveness of treatments. As one
commentator has noted,
The rapid growth of medical knowledge and technology means it is
much harder for doctors and other health care providers to keep up
to date. Indeed, the problem of information and practice transfe-
rence is rendered almost impossible by the fact that health care is
now a highly statist and corporatist venture. Today, there is no such
thing as a free market in health care .... 403
Lack of comparative effectiveness data keeps patients from availing
themselves of the best treatments and from exercising "the personal freedom
... to choose the health care that, in the professional judgment of their doc-
tors, best serves their personal needs.' 4°4
Amplifying the funding for and potential sources of comparative effec-
tiveness data would help to offset the huge resources that pharmaceutical
companies have available to openly promote approved uses and covertly
promote unapproved uses of their products. Currently, pharmaceutical com-
panies have shied away from conducting the time-consuming and costly stu-
dies needed to have their products approved for multiple, on-label uses. The
knowledge that their products might be faced with increased independent
scrutiny through comparative effectiveness studies might spur pharmaceutical
companies to explore getting their products approved for additional indica-
tions. Pharmaceutical manufacturers also might experience less need to pro-
mote their drugs for off-label uses if they knew that doctors would learn (le-
gally!) about their products' value for off-label uses through comparative ef-
fectiveness studies.405
402. See Michael M. Gaba & Renee R. Wentzel, The Role and Scope of Comparative Effectiveness
in Our Evolving Healtb Care System: Balanng Treatment Choices with Budget Reality, HEALTH LAW &
LIFE SCIENCES NEWSLETTER, Feb. 12, 2009, available at
http://www.hklaw.com/id24660/Pubicationld2563/Returnld31 /contentid53900/#1.
403. Helen Evans, Comparaive Effectiveness in Health Care Reform: Lessons from Abroad, THE
HERITAGE FoUNDATION, Feb. 4, 2009, available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/bg2239.cfm.
404. Id.
405. Dr. Richard A. Friedman, professor of psychiatry at Weill Cornell Medical College, has
commented on the prescribing of newer drugs for psychiatric patients versus older ones with
time-tested comparative effectiveness research, and on the ultimate "need [for] head-to-head
trials comparing new and standard treatments." Richard A. Friedman, M.D., New Drugs Have
Allure, Not Track Record, N.Y. TIMFS, May 18, 2009, at D6, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/19/health/19nind.html. As Friedman also explains,
"[Pihysicians continue to believe that they are immune to the influence of drug companies,
despite strong evidence to the contrary." Id.
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The February 2009 $787 billion stimulus package contains a provision to
create a Federal Coordinating Counsel for Comparative Effectiveness Re-
search and provides the Agency for Health Research and Quality with $700
million to conduct the relevant research.4 6 Although some argue that federal
oversight is not the best way to address all questions arising in the compara-
tive effectiveness debate,407 the stimulus package represents a real first step
towards providing new, independent sources of information about drugs.408
Furthermore, Margaret Hamburg, the newly-confirmed FDA Commission-
er,409 has expressed a desire to have the FDA involved in the health care
reform process-including comparative effectiveness research.410
2. Information in Exchange for Litigation Protection
Even with the renewed emphasis on comparative effectiveness studies
reflected in February 2009 legislation, relying on government funds alone is a
woefully inadequate strategy to improve the quality of medical information.
Even with recent increases in funding, moneys available for government-
sponsored independent research are dwarfed by the funds drug companies
spend on advertising and promotion. Approaches that recognize this and that
incentivize companies to do more beneficial research thus stand a better
chance of protecting patients than relying only on independent sources of
research.
Wolsing has offered an "evidentiary reform proposal" that does just this.
Under her proposal, if manufacturers conducted post-marketing studies and
fully disclosed the results, the disclosure would create a rebuttable presump-
tion that the manufacturer did not know about the adverse drug effects dis-
covered in the study.411 Wolsing notes that the most common products liabil-
ity claim is negligent failure-to-warn regarding which a defendant's prior
406. Katherine Skiba, As Obama Signs $787 Bil#on Stimulus, The Queslion Is, Will It Work,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 17, 2009, available at
http://www.usnews.com/artices/news/stimulus/2009/02/17/as-obama-signs- 787-billihon-
stimulus-the-question-is-will-it-work.html.
407. See Evans, supra note 403.
408. To appreciate the significance, it helps to compare the recently allocated resources to
those proposed just a few months ago. Had it been passed, S. 3408 would have provided total
funding for fiscal year 2009 of just $5 million, with funding increases to $300 million a year by
2013. See Baucus-Conrad Proposal Can Improve.Quafiy, Lower Costs Throughout American Health Care
System, Aug. 1, 2008, available at
https://www.ecri.org/Documents/CERC/Comparative EffectivnessBaucusConradAugust
_NewsRelease.pdf.
409. See Jacob Goldstein, It's Official Peggy Hambug Will Lead FDA, WALL ST. J. HEALTH
BLOG, May 19, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/05/19/its-official-peggy-hamburg-
will-lead- fda.
410. Hambuig Welkomes FDA Role in Health Care Reform Debate, 15 FDA WK. 18, May 8, 2009,
available at 2009 WLNR 8793152.
411. See Wolsing, supra note 398, at 224.
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knowledge of danger is a key element.412 Wolsing's proposal offers the par-
ticular advantage of motivating manufacturers-through litigation protec-
tion-to engage in vigorous monitoring after drugs receive FDA approval.
This is the point in a product's history at which the general public is exposed
to undetected adverse effects, yet it follows the period during which the FDA
has the most power to influence drug manufacturers. Currently, manufactur-
ers have reasons not to initiate post-release studies of their products413 and to
withhold data about post-approval outcomes. Wolsing's proposal counters
these motives by giving drug makers "the prospect of a favorable tort position
in the event of litigation. '414
3. Patent Protection and FDA Exclusivity
Through the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 1984 (hereinafter "Act"; also known as the Hatch-Waxman Amendments),
an amendment to the federal FDCA, the government created a non-patent 4 5
system for protecting both the interests of pioneering drug manufacturers and
generic drug manufacturers. 416 Congress's intent under the Act was to
"strengthen incentives for continued innovation for research-based firms
while simultaneously expediting and encouraging earlier market entry of ge-
neric drugs. '417 Although new drugs are expected to enjoy a longer period of
market exclusivity versus their generic counterparts under the Act,41 8 the Act
also encourages and enables generic manufacturers to challenge the still-valid
patents of pioneering drug companies. 41 9 Generic manufacturers can do this
by either showing that their product does not infringe on pioneering compa-
ny's patent or by showing that the pioneering company's patent is invalid.420
412. Id. at 225, n.104, citing Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products l'abilily:
Testing Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IowA L. REv. 1, 65-66 (1992) and Kellen Cloney, Note,
AIDS Vaccine Manufacturers v. Tort Regime: The Need for Alternatives, 49 WASui. & LEE L. REV. 559,
571 (1992).
413. Manufacturers would fear that any such study might generate findings that would
discourage doctors from prescribing their drugs. Wolsing, supra note 398, at 225.
414. Id.
415. For purposes of space, this Article does not discuss patent protection for pharmaceut-
ical companies in depth. We note, however, that such "protection allows a researched-based
pharmaceutical firm to recover the tremendous investment necessary to discover and develop
new drugs; [and] . . . also ensures the company's ability to further profit from its innovations
before generic drug manufacturers can copy and market the drug at a greatly reduced cost."
Ashlee B. Mehl, Note & Comment, The Hatch-Waxman Act and Market Exclusivityfor Generic Drug
Manufacturers: An Entitlement orAn Incentive?, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 649 (2006).
416. Abbott Laboratories v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 985 (D.C. App. 1990).
417. See Mehl, supra note 415, at 650.
418. See infra note 408.
419. Mehl, spra note 415, at 650. The term "pioneer drug companies" refers to the "re-
search-based drug company," id. at 653, that originally develops a particular drug.
420. Id. at 653.
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Invalidity, for instance, can be argued based on theories of anticipation, ob-
viousness, 421 or fraud during the patent application process. 422
Despite Congress's intent under the Act, in addition to the importance
behind the availability of generic drugs, 423 the ability of generic manufacturers
to undermine previously valid patents limits the financial rewards of pioneer-
ing companies that initially procured them. While market exclusivity periods
exist for the pioneering manufacturers, 424 the Act does not do much more to
recognize and reward their ingenuity. If increased protection for pioneering
manufacturer's products--either in the form of strengthened patent coverage
or lengthened exclusivity periods-were coupled to requirements to conduct
and disclose results of post-marketing studies on side effects and real-world
effectiveness, however, pharmaceutical companies might find it more attrac-
tive to develop and publish bodies of data that would strengthen knowledge
about existing products.
VI. CONCLUSION
The lessons of SGA drug litigation are many. Pharmaceutical companies
sometimes respond to short-term market incentives that serve neither their
own long-term interests nor the interests of patients who use their products.
Prescription drug makers skillfully exercise their largely unopposed control
over the production, promulgation, and interpretation of information about
their products. Individual physicians who make decisions about prescription
drug selection respond to incentives (such as ill-placed fears of litigation, ease
of prescribing, or immediate convenience) that do not necessarily coincide
with their patients' long-term health interests. Individual physicians and even
larger organized groups of physicians have at-best-very-limited ability to dis-
cern general trends of and outcomes from prescription choices. Most patients
421. See Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. App. 2008) (drug
manufacturer sued a generic manufacturer for patent infringement, and the federal appellate
court granted a preliminary injunction against the generic manufacturer). As the Abbott court
explained, "'Anticipation' in patent usage means that the claimed invention was previously
known and described in a printed publication, explicitly or inherently." Id. at 1345. Invoking
the argument requires one to provide "documentary evidence, [that shows] every claim element
and limitation ... set forth in a single prior art reference, in the same form an order as in the
claim." Id. A prima facie case for obviousness, on the other hand, is present "when the ranges
of a claimed composition overlap the ranges disclosed in the prior art." In re Peterson, 315 F.3d
1325, 1329 (Fed. App. 2003).
422. 60 AM. JUR. 2D. § 919 Patents (2008).
423. See Mehl, supra note 415, at 649, n.5.
424. As Mehl explains, "the Act provides an increased term of market exclusivity on the
back end of the patent term to offset the patent term lost on the front end while the pioneer
awaits FDA approval." Id. at 653-54. Ultimately, this can result in a "total extension" time of
"up to five years." Id at 654. See also 25 AM. JuR. 2D. § 123 Drugs and Controlled Substances (2008)
(noting that the length of an exclusivity period is tied to the "pharmaceutical novelty" of a
particular drug.)
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and doctors have no immediate, personal incentive to make economical drug
selections. Those entities and agencies that pay medication bills are reluctant
to restrict prescription choices to control costs.
The most important lesson from SGA litigation is that viewing pharma-
ceutical companies as villains and doctors as unwitting, corruptible dupes ig-
nores the circumstances of and reasons for their judgment errors. Fear of
public exposure and condemnation will motivate doctors to avoid sources of
these negative reinforcements but may not get them to make smarter prescrip-
tion decisions. Fear of litigation may motivate drug makers to produce better
products, but drug makers may conclude they can more easily avoid lawsuits
by doing things that do not improve their products or make publicly available
information about them.
However, getting better information to physicians might help them to
make better decisions about drugs and to avoid the types of mistakes that
psychiatrists' improvident adoption of SGAs exemplifies. Given incentives to
produce information about their products' problems and knowing that their
products will undergo extensive independent scrutiny, pharmaceutical manu-
facturers will have clear reasons to create and promote products that further
the public good. Lawsuits, fines, and public opprobrium are all appropriate
responses to past misbehavior. But the best way to get drug companies and
doctors to improve their future behavior is to give them unambiguous reasons
to do so.
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